of the Impact Statement:

Emmett, W. W., 1972, Hydraulic Geometry of some Alaskan

streams south of the Yukon River, Open File Report, Water Res. Div., Alaska). Data presented by Emmett suggest that burial depths proposed for the Alaskan stream crossings are sometimes inadequate to accommodate the mobile river beds to be expected and that serious problems exist with many Alaskan crossings. In Canada, however, the generally greater distance between the pipeline route and high mountains means that fewer larger rivers will drain the majority of the regional runoff to the major Mackenzie watercourse. This means that the bulk of the tributary discharges can be crossed subaerially with advantage and that hazard is thus considerably reduced. The greater distance to the mountains, and the very different nature of the glacial history of part of the Canadian route, also accounts for the lesser depths of gravels encountered in many of the Canadian small streams. Thus, large rivers in Canada present no more hazard than they do in Alaska (the Yukon), except that in Alaska the seismic risk to suspended crossings is greater than in Canada. On the intermediate rivers risks are about comparable if pipe is to be buried, and on smaller rivers Canada affords safer crossings for the general case. Hazard to crossings for suspended pipelines for large rivers are very much less than to intermediate and small rivers with wide fluctuations in flow volumes and attempted pipe burial.

In Alaska, in addition, there is the compound problem of glacier dam bursts to be contended with along the sections of the route passing near and through the Alaskan range. This is not encountered along any of the Canadian route either in Alaska or Canada. These dam bursts, occasioned when lakes imponded behind glaciers force their way outward suddenly, adding many times the expected discharges to small drainage channels with much scour and sediment movement. These occur in the highest seismic and landslide risk parts of the southern Alaskan route only.

Permafrost

While the Secretary is again technically correct when he states in this Congressional letter of April 4th that the Canadian pipeline would cross nearly twice as great a length of area underlain by permafrost (based on very inadequate data from Alaska and Canada), he has been seriously misled if he believes that the Canadian permafrost will create greater hazard. Depending upon the actual route chosen from Prudhoe Bay to the Mackenzie Corridor, permafrost hazard may be equal or considerably less with the Canadian route. This is because the flanks of the Brooks Range are underlain by 'drier' permafrost than the Arctic Coastal Plain or interior Alaska permafrost areas. These upland dry permafrost areas pose some hazard to concentrations of runoff but do not pose the thaw-instability problems that are by now well understood for the Alaskan route. The offshore alternative doubtless has some permafrost formed during the lower glacial-age sea level stands, but this does not probably extend to depths below 100 to 200 feet and such depths are found within several miles of shore along most of the route, particularly toward Canada. The MacKenzie River valley itself has less permafrost than might be expected by comparison to Alaska since it is the locus of a northflowing river carrying huge quantities of heat northward and thawing its near-shore areas. Careful location of the route along this corridor could minimize total length of high ground-ice permafrost for the Canadian route to make equal or less hazard than the shorter Alaskan route.

Another major permafrost consideration is that associated with haulage and service roads. All of the Alaskan pipeline must be built and serviced from roadways, which themselves constitute a serious threat to permafrost stability and thus to the pipeline. With the MacKenzie valley river corridor available for shipping pipe and service vehicles along a major portion of the route, new major roads paralleling the pipe need not be built. With a suspended pipeline, particularly carrying both gas

and oil pipes, no roads need be bullt at all in permafrost areas, even to carry pipe from barge to construction sites. Long-term environmental damage will probably be

greater in Alaska from roads than from the pipeline itself. Certainly the effects upon game, vegetation, and permafrost will be greater associated with the roads and vehicle travel over them and the thawing, road construction, and greater gravel volumes required in Alaska, (not Canada as Morton was informed) will do greater damage to stream habitat and fisheries away from the Immediate pipeline and road rights-ofway due to thermal erosion, stream course changes (particularly in Alaska where the pipeline route parallels many intermediate rivers rather than crossing them at right angles as in Canada), and necessity of hydraulic reequilibration after gravel removals. Roadways cannot be reclaimed in the Arctic in lengths of times necessary to protect permafrost thaw effects, as has been amply demonstrated by Interior investigators (R. Sigafoos, for instance) and many others.

Summary

The major terrestrial advantages of the Canadian versus the Alaskan route are lesser Canadian seismic hazard by on the order of 100 times; lesser hazard associated with most probable-mode stream crossings; and route possibilities requiring less gravel, less stream destruction, less high-ground-ice permafrost crossing, and fewer miles of permanent roads. Coupled with the clear short-term and long-term economic advantages of the Canadian route assuming international cooperation, total absence of the marine leg and associated severe hazards to Canada and to a lesser extent the United States, and the security advantages of the inland route, there seems little reason to continue Alaskan Pipeline proposals except as a favor to energy company interests who would stand to make the greatest short-term profit from the Alaskan route.

Senator FANNIN [presiding]. Thank you, gentlemen. You have presented your case quite well and on behalf of the committee, I thank you for the extent of coverage of your testimony and the comprehensive study that has been made in connection with your statements. It is very impressive. I think that you were here this morning or several of you were here this morning and heard Governor Egan and heard the conclusions of the chairman that both routes are needed and both the pipelines will be needed and that we should go forward with the Alaskan pipeline and then later to go ahead with the pipeline that would incorporate the oil line and the gasline in the common corridor. I think that you heard the Governor state that in contrast to the 10or 11-year minimum timeframe, the completed task is no more than 4

years away.

I understand you do not agree with that but I am not sure that you gave us a time figure other than I note that you said in less than a year you felt something could be underway.

What is the exact time figure that you talked to?

Mr. DIENELT. If I may address myself to that, the time difference between the TAPS line and the Canadian alternative was estimated last year by the Minister of Energy, Mines, and Resources in Canada, Mr. MacDonald, after he came down here to speak with Secretary Morton, as approximately 2 years. That, of course, comes from a very informed source, the Government of Canada today which has the best knowledge as to the kind of delays which their own processes would

encounter.

The second point I would make on that is that the recent Mackenzie Valley pipeline research limited study has estimated a total of 4 years from the point in time, which on the basis of the study appears theoretically to be tomorrow, that a management decision by the oil companies or the urging which we believe is very appropriate of this Government to pursue the Canadian alternative further, 4 years would be necessary for, one, obtaining approval, and, two, bringing that pipeline on line.

That is an industry study. Perhaps it would not be surprising to hear either the industry or people like Governor Egan try to indicate that is very over optimistic and much longer time would be required.

The point that we would want to stress is that certainly there is enough reason to believe in light of those two things, Mr. MacDonald's statement and the Mackenzie Valley pipeline study as well as the other information constantly developing in Canada, there is reason to believe that the time gap between the two pipelines is slim and narrow. That in our view is sufficient reason to justify the kind of thorough independent study that the Mondale view contemplates.

That is the only way you are going to get an objective answer. You are otherwise going to get an adversary position from us. The best answer you are going to get is after the study, but there is reason to do the study.

Senator FANNIN. When you talk about that time element, are you including the adequate study and provision for environmental protection?

Mr. DIENELT. Yes.

Senator FANNIN. Would it give the Alaskan people the same environmental protection that would be given as far as Alaska is con

cerned, what would be involved in the lower 48? In other words, would Canada be given the same protection from an environmental standpoint?

Mr. DIENELT. I should think so. I should think the Canadian Government would endeavor to see to that.

Senator FANNIN. Would the time you are talking about provide adequate ability to go through that process?

Mr. DIENELT. I believe there is certainly reason to believe that is a good estimate of the time it would take. The Canadian Government from the beginning of the time that it is realized there had been oil discovered on the North Slope has undertaken a study and is continuing to study, they spent $15 million.

Just last month the Minister for Indian Affairs and Oil Development which would be the Department that would pass on this submitted a report on this $15 million study to the House of Commons. He listed 51 different reports, all technical and environmental in character, which appear to have been published mainly in 1972. None of these were considered in the environmental impact statement but all of them are there and all would be available in addition to other studies which Minister Crutchen listed, approximately 51 studies which should be completed by the end of this year.

So the study effort is going on, both by private industry and particularly by the Canadian Government. It is not the same thing as was confronted in 1969 when the applications were made for the transAlaska pipeline where nothing had been done insofar as the necessary environmental study and protection.

We also point out that the kinds of safeguards which the proponents of the TAPS line claim will protect the environment of Alaska are available and according to their own testimony have been developed and could easily be applied to the Canadian line.

The one thing the Canadian line won't have is the marine transport leg. And if there are two pipelines we will have not only a Canadian line and an Alaskan line, which I think would be disastrous to the environment and will create a great deal of opposition.

Senator FANNIN. Evidently the chairman doesn't feel it would. Looking at it from the standpoint of Governor Egan representing the people of Alaska and the two Senators from Alaska, they, of course, desire to protect the people of Alaska to the greatest extent possible. I don't think they care whether the first line goes through Canada or the Alaskan line.

What they desire is to have the project finished at the earliest possible time because of the crisis that faces us. I think you understand that. But I think Governor Egan would be very happy to have the project go forward if it could be in the time element that you claim is possible. But he doesn't feel that way about it and made it very clear in his testimony that you heard.

Mr. DIENELT. Senator Fannin, the last point I will make on that is that it appears to me that if for no other basis than just a simple matter of legal judgment as to what would happen in the courts, that if Congress undertook to require and to have before it the kind of independent study provided for by the Mondale bill, and in that study indicated either that our firm belief that the Candian alternative is superior on environmental security and economic grounds was not the