Mr. Chairman, I was pleased to note that in your opening remarks yesterday you indicated your desire to see a second pipeline built from the northern slope of Alaska area across Canada to the Midwest. This approach offers a constructive basis for dialog, but I believe that the information we now possess indicates the advantages of building a Canadian route first, rather than an Alaskan route.

As a strong supporter of a trans-Canada route, I would now like to discuss my reasons for backing this choice. I believe that the type of study and negotiations provided for in S. 1565 will demonstrate the soundness of this choice, and I have sufficient confidence in the trans-Canadian route to believe that once the facts have been fully presented, Congress will authorize the rights-of-way for an oil pipeline from Prudhoe Bay through Canada.

The cornerstone of the Department of the Interior's decision to opt for a trans-Alaskan route has been that such a route would allegedly bring oil more quickly to the United States than would a transCanadian route.

In July of 1972, Secretary Norton testified before the Joint Economic Committee to this effect. "The nucleus of my decision to grant the Alaska route is based on the urgent need to bring North Slope oil and gas into the American market place as rapidly as possible."

I share this sense of urgency, but I do not share the Secretary's view that this sense of urgency compels selection of a trans-Alaskan route.

The Secretary of the Interior has consistently maintained that a Canadian route would result in a 3- to 5-year delay. However, other estimates have placed the delay at about 2 years, as you indicated, Mr. Chairman, in a recent National Public Radio interview.

And, Mr. Chairman, I believe that even this 2-year estimate of delay may overstate the case. A $7 million study done by 15 oil and pipeline companies-MacKenzie Valley Pipeline Research, Ltd.-recently concluded that a pipeline through the MacKenzie Valley of Canada would take about 4 years to complete, from the date of a decision to proceed.

The best estimates we have on the length of time needed to construct an Alaskan pipeline is 3 years, from the date on which the court litigation has ended and rights-of-way permits granted.

Therefore, the real delay time is probably only 1 year for a Canadian line, and may be less than that should the Alaskan route be delayed for over a year in court.

Perhaps of greater importance, however, is the result of any delay that might occur. The delay argument has largely been framed in terms of our need for Alaskan oil. However, the Interior Secretary has consistently ignored indications from the Canadian Government that they would be willing to make up any lost Alaskan oil production on a temporary basis-should that result from choosing a transCanadian route.

As recently as March 18 of this year, Canadian Energy Minister Macdonald was specifically asked if Canada's recent decision to limit exports to the United States invalidated a previously announced willingness to increase exports to make up for any delay which a Canadian route might cause. Macdonald specifically replied that it was his view that the Canadian Government stood by its position that such increased

exports could be made available while a trans-Canadian pipeline was under construction.

The time delay argument therefore is not the crucial one which trans-Alaskan proponents make it out to be. The delay which might result from choosing a trans-Canadian route would probably be 1 to 2 years, and the Canadian Government has offered to make up for this delay with temporary, increased Canadian exports to the United States.

My legislation would seek to negotiate the specific terms of any such commitment, to insure that the decision to bring Alaskan oil across Canada to the Midwest and East would involve no loss in the amount of oil we receive to help meet our growing energy needs. We can get oil from the Alaskan North Slope to American markets with no sacrifice to national energy needs. But we must also make sure that this oil gets to those parts of the country where the need is greatest.

In my view, this means that we must recognize the greater needin both absolute and percentage terms of the areas east of the Rockies for Alaskan oil.

Tables I through VIII-appended-reveal the relative needs of the west coast, the Midwest and the East with either an Alaskan or a Canadian pipeline. The data for these tables were developed by Congressman Les Aspin, using information from a variety of sources, including the National Petroleum Council estimates on which the Department of the Interior often bases many of its own calculations.

The figures tell a simple and compelling story. In 1980, the west coast will be dependent on insecure Middle Eastern sources of supply for 19 percent of its oil needs, without any Alaskan oil. With Alaskan oil, the west coast will have a surplus of supply over demand of between 200,000 and 400,000 barrels per day.

By contrast, the Midwest and the East-taken together-will be dependent on Middle East sources for 51 percent of oil supply in 1980, without Alaskan oil. With Alaskan oil coming through a Canadian pipeline, this dependence is reduced to 38 percent.

In other words, Mr. Chairman, the combined reliance on Middle Eastern oil sources for the Midwest and East will still be twice as great in 1980 as the west coast's reliance on those sources, even if a Canadian pipeline is built. However, if an Alaskan pipeline is built, the west coast would have a surplus of oil and the Midwest and East would have to depend on the Middle East for over half of their oil supply.

The consequences of these figures are inescapable. Unless we build a pipeline through Canada to supply the Midwest and East-where this oil is needed most-we will find ourselves in a situation where one region of the country will have an excess of oil, while much of the area east of the Rockies will be put in a position of unhealthy dependence on the Middle East for vitally needed fuel.

And if a trans-Alaska pipeline is built. Mr. Chairman, where is the excess of oil which the west coast would then enjoy likely to go?

Clearly, the Alyeska pipeline consortium and high Japanese officials seem to have an answer. In 1971, Edward Patton, president of the Alyeska consortium, stated that one-quarter of a trans-Alaska

line's eventual production was slated for markets beyond the U.S. west coast. Most of this would undoubtedly go to Japan. And in February of 1972, Japanese Prime Minister Sato stated after meeting with President Nixon in San Clemente, that "we will, of course, be purchasing oil in the event that the pipelines are completely laid." We have heard little of this sort of talk recently. Now, Alyeska officials and Japanese Government officials realize that it is incongruous to talk about an American energy crisis, while at the same time advocating a pipeline route that would result in up to 182 million barrels per year being exported outside our borders. But this is clearly their intention, and the inability of the west coast to absorb all the Alaskan oil makes such an intention an economic necessity should a trans-Alaska line be built.

And the amount of this oil exported to Japan could go much higher should the President's recently announced plans to resume oil production off the California coast, and explore the Gulf of Alaska materialize.

The natural market for gulf of Alaska oil would be the west coast. The crude oil potential of this area is up to 40 billion barrels more than most estimates of the North Slope's potential.

And the Interior Department itself has stated in the environmental impact statement that: "Substantial Gulf of Alaska production could produce a substantial and inconvenient surplus on the west coast if North Slope oil were to go there."

Mr. Chairman, this deeply troubles me. By the early to mid 1980's, we will find ourselves exporting millions of barrels per day of American oil to fuel Japanese industrial competition with American goodsat the same time that factories in the East and Midwest are without adequate fuel?

Surely, a trans-Canadian alternative to the Midwest and East would bring the oil where we need it most-when we need it.

Closely related to regional demand are the national security implications of the alternative routes.

Interior Secretary Morton stated in July of 1972 that the national security argument followed from the question of relative speed of delivery of north slope oil.

However, as I have noted previously, there would be very little time difference between the two routes, and the Canadian Government has indicated its willingness to make up any difference in oil delivery which might be caused by delay.

We should be trying to reduce American-not foreign-dependence on Middle Eastern supply, and only a trans-Canadian pipeline would accomplish that end.

In addition, a number of other national security-related arguments point to the trans-Canadian route as a superior alternative.

The Navy has repeatedly in recent years stated its inability to protect American shipping on the high seas. A trans-Atlantic pipeline would mean over 2,200 miles of transshipment in the Pacific. The Department of Defense, in its comments on the Department of Interior's Environmental Impact Statement, has noted that the transCanadian route would be preferable on this question.

A trans-Canadian alternative would also aid in the exploration of the vast oil resources which are believed to be in the northern and

western sections of Canada. While these reserves have not yet been proven, their potential is estimated at 50 billion barrels. Å transCanadian route would encourage exploration of these fields, thereby aiding national security by developing a "secure" foreign sourcesCanadian-rather than relying on "insecure" Middle Eastern sources. However, a trans-Alaskan route, by shipping oil away from the Canadian fields, might well impede development of this valuable resources, from which both Canadians and Americans could benefit.

Finally, some advocates of a trans-Alaskan pipeline have been raising vague, somewhat sinister prospects of Canada as an emerging enemy, who would be unsafe to trust with so vital a resource as Alaskan oil running across its land.

I frankly regard this as nonsense. Canada is our largest single trading partner. She is a nation with whom we have always enjoyed friendly relations; and with whom we share the longest unpatrolled common border in the world.

To suddenly suggest that the Canadians would "cut off" American oil supply shows the desperation to which some trans-Alaskan proponents have been reduced.

Furthermore, even assuming that this argument had any substance, a look at the realities of Canadian-American oil supply shows the ample leverage we possess.

As Secretary Morton stated in a letter to Canadian Energy Minister Macdonald in May of 1972, the Eastern half of Canada relies for much of her oil on a pipeline delivering 400,000 barrels per day which runs from Portland, Maine, through three New England States. This 400,000 barrel per day figure-when adjusted for the differences in Canadian and American population-is twice the amonut of oil that would be pumped through Canada by a trans-Canadian pipeline system.

Perhaps the most interesting recent development in the long Alaskan oil controversy has been the Secretary of the Interior's attempt to imply that a trans-Canadian pipeline would be more environmentally damaging than a trans-Alaskan line.

The Secretary states that the Canadian route is four times as long as the Alaskan route. In fact, the real distance of a Canadian pipeline is about 1,700 miles, as compared to the 2,900 miles he alleges. The remaining 1,200 miles would use existing rights-of-way which would cause absolutely no environmental damage.

The Secretary states that the Canadian route would pose major risks because of the number of river crossings it would involve. Yet the Secretary knows that his Department's own environmental impact statement lists a Prudhoe Bay to Valdez route as crossing 60 rivers. and streams, while a Prudhoe Bay to Edmonton route is listed as crossing 19 rivers and streams.

In addition, river crossings are an established part of pipeline technology. They can be accomplished with little risk. This is in marked contrast to the infinitely greater danger from earthquakes which a trans-Alaskan route would entail.

The trans-Alaskan pipeline would cross one of the world's major earthquake zones, which has recently experienced the most severe earthquake ever recorded on the North American continent. By con

trast, a trans-Canadian route would cross virtually no earthquakeprone territory.

In addition, a trans-Alaskan pipeline would mean massive oil spills resulting from the trans-shipment of oil from Valdes to American ports. The Interior Department's own environmental impact statement stated that almost 6 million gallons of oil per year could be expected to spill into the Pacific as a result of collisions and other mishaps. This is almost twice the amount of oil spilled by the disastrous Santa Barbara oil spill of 1969. No spills would result from a transCanadian route.

Finally, everyone-the Interior Department included-concedes that a gas pipeline will be built from Prudhoe Bay to Chicago, through the Mackenzie Valley. Since this is a virtual certainty, a trans-Canadian oil pipeline would minimize environmental damage by putting both oil and gas pipelines in a common corridor, rather than doubling the environmental damage by routing oil through a dangerous Alaskan route, and gas through Canada.

Obviously no pipeline through Canada can conceivably be built without the cooperation of the Canadian Government. But the claims of those supporting the trans-Alaskan pipeline that the Canadian Government has shown a lack of interest-are simply untrue.

My legislation would seek to open negotiations immediately with the Canadians to pin down precisely their attitudes on a number of crucial questions relating to a trans-Canadian pipeline. As I have mentioned previously, these negotiations would not result in a single day's delay in beginning of construction for any pipeline route, since the trans-Alaska route will be in court for at least the next year to 18 months.

We have at the present time numerous statements by key Canadian Government officials that they would welcome applications for construction permits for a Canadian pipeline. Such applications have not yet been made not because of a lack of interest on the part of the Canadians, but because of the American Government's stubborn insistence that a trans-Alaskan route must be built.

As recently as April 3, Canadian External Affairs Secretary Mitchell Sharp stated:

If the American oil companies, after looking at the problems that are involved and looking at the dangers to the environment that would be invoked in building a pipeline across Alaska and tanker route down the Pacific Coast feel that they would want to build through Canada, they will find the Canadian authorities willing to give serious consideration to their request.

On March 18, Canadian Energy Minister Donald Macdonald stated on nationwide Canadian television:

If the Americans came back and said to us, "Look, we've had second thoughts on the trans-Alaska pipeline, we would like to take you up on your willingness to entertain an application about the oil line through the Mackenzie route," I think the interests of the West Coast (of Canada) would dictate that the government of Canada should enable that kind of application to go ahead.

These are but the two most recent in a long series of remarks by leading Canadian governmental officials expressing the willingness of Canada to negotiate seriously for a trans-Canadian line.

In addition, however, questions have been raised regarding the conditions which the Canadians might attach to any pipeline running