INFORMATION ABOUT THE CANADIAN ROUTES Most immediately, no right-of-way through Canada has been established and thus there is no "Canadian Route." Our environmental impact statement examined six possible routes through Canada, but clearly there has been no single route determined and quite obviously we have no set of detailed route studies comparable to our comprehensive TAPS analyses. Contrary to the testimony of Mr. David Anderson, a Member of the Canadian Parliament, before your Committee, the United States did formally request information of the Canadian authorities to assist us in the preparation of the TAPS environmental statement. This information was requested in a United States Aide-Memoire of July 9, 1971. We have that document for your consideration. Chairman PROXMIRE. Without objection, it will be put in the record. (The document follows:) DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON, JULY 9, 1971 AIDE-MEMOIRE In its aide-memoire of June 29, 1971, the Canadian Embassy conveyed a proposal of the Government of Canada to hold further consultations between officials of the United States and Canada on the environmental risks of proposed oil tanker traffic from Alaska into the Strait of Juan de Fuca and inward coastal waters. As background to its response, the Department of State wishes to summarize the current status of environmental studies undertaken by the United States Government pursuant to Section 102 of the Environmental Policy Act of 1969 in relation to an application before the Department of the Interior for a permit to construct and operate a pipeline across Alaska for the transport of oil. This is the information mentioned by the Secretary of State of the United States to the Secretary of State for External Affairs of Canada in their conversation of June 10, 1971. Study and analysis of the environmental aspects of the above-mentioned application are proceeding under a three-stage process, in which (1) the Department of the Interior, which has central responsibility for the project, prepares a draft environmental impact statement; (2) the draft is reviewed by appropriate Federal and State agencies and by the public; and (3) a final draft statement is prepared incorporating data and considerations developed in the course of this review. At present, this final draft is in preparation. When completed, it will be submitted to the Council on Environmental Quality and made available to all interested parties. Thereafter, the Secretary of the Interior may act after thirty days on the requested permit for the construction and operation of the pipeline system. The scope of the Department of the Interior's final draft statement will be very comprehensive. Among other aspects, it will reflect full attention to the environmental problems which might result from the marine transport of the proposed production of Alaskan oil to ports of destination. An important phase of the current version of the environmental impact statement has been the acquisition and analysis of data from all interested sources. In view of the concern expressed by the Government of Canada about the marine transport aspect of the proposal, special care has been taken to ensure that not only the nature of this concern but also all revelant information, in detail, be considered by the United States officials engaged in this study. In particular, this information has included material developed during hearings conducted by the Department of the Interior early in 1971 and during the United States-Canadian consultative meeting on this matter held in Washington on May 3, 1971; the records of hearings conducted by the Special Committee on Environmental Pollution of the Canadian House of Commons, as provided by the Canadian Embassy; the above-mentioned discussion of June 10, 1971 during the visit to Washington by the Secretary of State for External Affairs and the Minister of the Environment; and, most recently, the information and considerations provided by Canadian officials in connection with the Embassy's aide-memoire of June 29, 1971. The Department of State desires to facilitate continued United States-Canadian exchanges on this problem. At the present juncture, it believes that the immediate problem is to determine those procedures which will prove most useful. The subjects raised in the Embassy's aide-memoire of June 29 have been discussed at some length in the consultative meeting of May 3. On most of these matters the information provided by the United States at that time remains current. On others, generally those concerning legal problems, the United States Government is continuing to study the issues, and further study will be necessary before additional responses can be developed. Therefore, as an effective alternative to another meeting at this time, the Department of State proposes to provide to the Canadian Embassy, as soon as it is developed and on a continuing basis, any new information which would be of interest to the Canadian Government. Meanwhile, if the Canadian authorities have any pertinent additional information which has not already been conveyed to the United States Government, the Canadian Embassy is invited to furnish such information as expeditiously as possible. The advantage of the procedure outlined above is that effective transmission of such information in written form can be achieved with a minimum of delay. If received promptly any new information can be considered before the revised draft environmental impact statement is completed and the United States authorities move into the next phase of consideration of the pipeline application. In addition, the Department of State would be disposed to enter into preliminary discussions looking toward establishment of joint contigency plans to deal with potential oil spills in waters affecting the two nations on the West and East Coasts, drawing as appropriate on the work undertaken with regard to the Great Lakes. Regardless of whether additional tankers should be authorized for the transportation of Alaskan oil, tanker traffic already exists in both these coastal areas, and a broadening of United States-Canadian cooperation on contingency planning should serve to minimize the risks involved, to the mutual interest of both countries. Secretary MORTON. The 30 environmental and social studies of northern pipelines being pursued by Canada were not announced in Canada by Minister Macdonald until April 18, 1972, three weeks after the publication of the TAPS environmental statement and nine months after our request. Not one of the studies, as far as we know, has been completed and we have not received any substantive information from the Canadian Government on any pipeline route through their country. RELATIVE ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATIONS While specific information on the Canadian route is not available, we have had enough general knowledge to reach some important conclusions. There are two types of environmental impacts that must be considered in comparing the Alaskan and Canadian routes; unavoidable impacts and potential impacts. A major conclusion with respect to terrestrial impact is that because the Canadian route is longer, crosses more permafrost and more major rivers and necessitates much more gravel extraction, it involves a greater degree of unavoidable environmental damage than does the Alaskan route. On the other hand, the Alaskan route involves a maritime leg to the West Coast which is likely to involve small chronic discharges from the ballast treatment plant at Port Valdez. We were unable to deter mine the extent of environmental impact, if any, that might result from these discharges. An Alaskan pipeline would have potential seismic risks along three zones in the southern half of the route. These zones have been identified and the system designed to accommodate the largest earthquake on record. The system is being engineered to withstand ground movements of from 5 to 20 feet, and all seismic zones will be continuously monitored to determine crustal movements. In addition to these unprecedented seismic safeguards, containment dikes and remotely controlled block valves will further insure against environmental damage from the remote possibility of earthquake damage. The marine leg of the Alaska route also involves potential pollution from oil tanker collisions and groundings, and from accidental spills during loading and unloading. It is pertinent to observe that the pipeline will have a throughput of only 600,000 b.p.d. for the first 1 to 2 years of operation, then an increase to 1.200,000 b.p.d. in the 3d year with 1,500,000 b.p.d. planned by the 6th or 7th year. While the system is being designed for a maximum throughput of 2 million b.p.d. it is uncertain when that capacity will be attained. Consequently, the number of ships entering Valdez and other west coast ports, and the accompanying risks of polluting accidents, will be proportionately reduced during the first 6 to 7 years of operation. NEW AMERICAN INITIATIVE Nonetheless, I am convinced that we must seize this opportunity to set new and exacting standards to govern the marine transport of American oil. This goal is worth accomplishing by itself; but if our standards can set an example for solving the broader problems of international oil movements, we will have accomplished a task of long range significance for mankind. I have discussed this matter with Secretary Volpe, and we are now studying the implementation of the following steps: All tankers, foreign and domestic, operating in the TAPS trade will be prohibited from discharging oil into the ocean, including oil contaminated ballast, tank cleaning waste, or bilge effluent. The facilities at Port Valdez will not be allowed to deliver oil to tankers that have violated this prohibition. Newly constructed American flag vessels carrying oil from Port Valdez to United States ports will be required to have segregated ballast systems, incorporating a double bottom which will avoid the necessity for discharging oily ballast to the onshore treatment facility. All other tankers will be required to discharge oily wastes into the treatment facility at Port Valdez. That facility will be required to eliminate as much oil from these wastes as technologically practicable. In no instance will the discharge exceed 10 p.p.m. of oil, and the standard will be upgraded as improved technology becomes available. Vessel Traffic Systems will be required for Port Valdez and the West Coast ports. These systems will incorporate traffic separation schemes and will be geographically situated so as to avoid the fishing grounds and ecologically sensitive areas off Canada, Alaska and our West Coast. The Coast Guard will increase its staff and equipment as necessary to implement these schemes. Aids to navigation will also be modified as required to implement these systems. New United States flag vessel designs will be evaluated, looking toward improving their maneuverability with regard to stopping distance and turning characteristics. All accidental discharges during loading and unloading will be eliminated to the fullest extent possible and if they occur, will be subject to substantial penalties. Coast Guard regulations scheduled to become effective late this summer are being reviewed to assure their adequacy for Alaskan operations. Construction specifications and required manning and equipment standards are also being reviewed to provide further insurance against accidental discharges during loading and unloading operations. Contingency plans for cleaning up oil spills must be continually reviewed and proven to minimize the damage in the event any accidents occur. These will be kept current in the light of new technology to assure their maximum effectiveness. The Coast Guard will augment its personnel and equipment to insure a maximum capability in this regard. A continuing environmental monitoring system will be required during the lifetime of oil movement in American coastal waters. Discussion of the marine leg should not blind us to the grave environmental problems that would be involved along a Canadian route. First, it is important to stress that the large number of river crossings constitute significant potential risks along a Mackenzie route. The wider the river crossing, the greater the risk to the environment of a pipeline system. The only crossing of as much as one-half mile width on the Alaskan route is at the Yukon River. At least twelve major river crossings of this width or greater are involved between Prudhoe Bay and Edmonton on a route up the Mackenzie River. Second, guidelines adopted by Canada in 1970 require that oil and gas pipelines be located within a common corridor. Chairman PROXMIRE. Is there anything that you haven't covered so far in your statement, and if so, go right ahead. Secretary MORTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. However a recent study by Canada's Federal Environmental Agency recommends that gas pipelines should be built in the west side of the Mackenzie River and oil pipelines on the east. This study by the project leader of Canada's Northern Pipeline Project indicates that for engineering and environmental reasons the two quite different types of lines should be constructed a considerable distance apart. If the recommendations of this Canadian study are observed, then the environmental and economic savings from a common corridor are materially diminished. With your permission, Mr. Chairman, I would like to offer for the record an account of the study prepared by Mr. C. T. Hatfield, Fisheries Service, Department of the Environment, Winnepeg.1 Third, a Canadian oil pipeline alone, 3,200 miles in length could require as much as 320 million cubic yards of gravel, involving over 1.000 excavation pits. The uncertain availability of this material and the impact of its extraction on the environment of the Mackenzie Valley constitute most serious questions. 1 The study by Mr. C. T. Hatfield may be found on p. 340. I have not made these points in an effort to convince you or the American people that the Alaskan route is environmentally superior to a Canadian route. Rather, I have attempted to show that the environmental question is not as simple as some believe, and that we cannot. avoid the tough environmental problems involved in this massive project by sweeping them under the rug of our Canadian neighbors. In fact, it is by no means clear which route will produce more environmental damage over the long run, because no one can predict with certainty which potential risks will actually be realized. My authority does not run to Canada, so I can give no assurance with respect to a Canadian route similar to the exacting environmental stipulations and strict environmental surveillance that we have developed for Alaska. DETERMINING THE NATIONAL INTEREST While environmental concerns have been among our highest priorities, a project of this magnitude compels the consideration of the broadest framework of issues in determining the national interest. One of the most critical issues is the time frame in which oil can move to market. CAUSES OF DELAY ON CANADIAN ROUTE Selection of a Canadian alternative would involve substantial and unacceptable time delays. In my May 11 announcement, I estimated the delay to be 3 to 5 years; it might be even greater-possibly as much as seven years. There is no objective justification for the view that the delay could be as short as 1 to 2 years. 1. LONGER LINE The first, and most obvious, point is that the Canadian route to Chicago would involve a 3.200-mile pipeline, four times as long as the Alaskan route of less than 800 miles. As a matter of logic, a longer line takes longer to build because of increased requirements for material. logistics, and manpower. 2. DRILLING IN PERMAFROST TERRAIN The second point is not so obvious, but it is equally important. During the past three years, the Department has required the drilling of 3,300 core holes in permafrost terrain, to ascertain optimum pipe location and construction modes. This drilling is essential both to the safe construction of any oil pipeline system in the Arctic and sub-Arctic and to the preparation of adequate impact analyses. Since very little of this engineering feasibility work has been done for a Canadian oil pipeline route, the companies and the Canadian Government would be starting nearly from scratch. It is reasonable to assume that if two years were required to core-hole 700 miles of permafrost along the defined Alaska route, then at least two years and probably three would be required to drill the 1,200 miles of permafrost along the Canada route, which has not yet been chosen. |