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or construction bottlenecks, refineries cannot be built as rapidly as economics and national policy would otherwise indicate, there is no reason to think that District V will be affected any more adversely than District II, the Midwest, or any other district. Thus, in its ability to absorb and make productive use of North Slope oil for the benefit of the entire country, the West Coast stands at least on a par with the Midwest, and the factors of certainty, timing and cost to be developed hereinafter tip the balance far over on the side of deliveries to the West Coast from a Trans-Alaska pipeline rather than deliveries to the Midwest from a Trans-Canadian line.

While the Trans-Alaska line is being built and operated, negotiations and procedures necessary for the initiation of a Trans-Canadian pipeline may be undertaken, so that, if the required agreements can be reached and an economically feasible proposal devised, a Trans-Canadian pipeline can be delivering oil from the Arctic to the Midwest by the mid-1980's.

Signi

a series of new legal problems in the United States. ficantly, few if any of these anticipated problems lend themselves to resolution by the affected governments until the enterprises that would own and operate a Trans-Canadian pipeline have come into being and the details of the project have crystallized.

Rights-of-way over federal land would be required. Regardless of the action that the Congress takes to alter the width limitation of Section 28 of the Mineral Leasing Act, there is a possibility that the acquisition of rights-of-way for a Trans-Canadian pipeline over federal lands would run on the shoals of federal law just as the Trans-Alaska pipeline did. If, for example, conflicts with federal withdrawals accomplished by the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act were encountered, amendatory legislation might be

necessary.

If the international agreement necessary for

a Trans-Canadian line took the form of a treaty, Senate ratification would have to be obtained. Depending on the nature of the entities that were created to own and operate a Trans-Canadian pipeline or any of its components, upon the circumstances of the financing of the project and upon the terms of any relevant international agreement, the existing federal economic regulatory authority of the Interstate Commerce Commission might prove inadequate, requiring Congressional action.

Further, the dissenting judges of the Court of Appeals in the Trans-Alaska Pipeline case pointed out that a significant legal impediment to the acquisition of a federal permit under Section 28 of the Mineral Leasing Act for a Trans-Canadian pipeline may lie in the Canadian insistence on 51 percent Canadian ownership of any pipeline running through Canada. (See p. 20, infra.) Judge MacKinnon said for

the dissenters:

"[S]ince United States laws provide that rights
of way for oil pipelines through public lands
may only be granted by the Secretary of the
Interior to applicants who possess the citizenship

11

and nationality qualifications required by
section 181 [of Title 30], a Canadian insistence
on 51% control of a pipeline through Canada
might mean that a United States pipeline
controlled as to its throughput capacity by
Canadian citizens could not acquire a grant of
any right of way in the United States because
Canadian laws, customs and regulations do not
permit a pipeline in Canada to be controlled
by United States Citizens through a Canadian
corporation. Wilderness Society v. Morton,
D.C. Cir. Nos. 72-1796 etc., decided Feb. 9,
1973, slip op. at 135.

At least one new environmental impact statement covering a Trans-Canadian pipeline would have to be prepared by the federal government to satisfy the National Environmental Policy Act. Work on such a statement could not even begin, of course, until formal requests for specific and concrete federal actions

right-of-way

-

applications for permits and

were filed with appropriate federal agencies.

Thus, this process, with its tendency to spawn litigation, would not even begin until a Trans-Canadian pipeline project had progressed to the level of detail that would allow for permit applications.

The combination of these likely federal statutory problems and others as yet unforeseen, given the presently hypothetical character of discussions concerning a TransCanadian pipeline, could well force the Congress some years

in the future to face the problems of getting northern oil to southern markets by formulating an omnibus Trans-Canadian pipeline enabling act. This event itself might be used as a lever by groups whose interests were engaged by the proposal, each hoping to parlay its influence to achieve objectives unrelated to the Trans-Canadian pipeline itself. The net effect of this could be to protract Congressional consideration and thus delay action to proceed with a TransCanadian pipeline.

Complementing the legal complications that would attend a Trans-Canadian pipeline at the federal level in the United States would be state, local and private land acquisition problems. A Trans-Canadian pipeline would traverse at least three states in addition to Alaska (Minnesota, Wisconsin and Illinois) and perhaps four (North Dakota) to reach Chicago refineries. While existing pipelines could presumably be looped and existing corridors expanded, significant interests in nonfederal land would have to be acquired. The time and expense required for this undertaking are indeterminate. Economic and regulatory

conflicts can also be expected to blossom across the route

as each state and political subdivision seeks legitimately to protect its local interest.