This extreme demand for cars occurs, of course, only in times of car shortage, and chiefly from the producers of and the dealers in the great staples-coal, grain, ore, cotton, lumber and the like. For such commodities demands are often made on different railroads to supply cars to ship the same goods, causing an exaggeration of the demand which can hardly be estimated.

In a situation of this kind, all a railroad can do is to avoid unjust discrimination in its distribution of cars; and this is a very

difficult thing to do. It has been said that in times of car shortage, the only way in which a railroad can treat all its patrons justly is to make them all equally dissatisfied-and there is much truth in the remark. The railroads, are, however, trying to form rules of car distribution which will justly meet any emergency. The Interstate Commerce Commission and the state railroad commissions are helping in their way, and the Supreme Court will be heard from at its coming session.

Something can be done by the railroads to increase their car supply, by the purchase of additional cars. This, however, is not as easy as it looks. In times of car surplus the railroads feel justified in doing but little more than replacing their equipment which goes out of service, and the manufacturers of freight cars meet this situation by a reduction of their forces.

When a car shortage comes, the railroads at once order cars and the manufacturers promptly accept the orders; but it becomes a physical impossibility to supply cars as fast as they are ordered. The coming of a car shortage is only an indication of revival of industry and consequent full employment of labor, so that the manufacturers of cars have great difficulty in increasing their forces to meet the sudden doubling or quadrupling of the demand, and as a consequence deliveries of cars are very slow. On such occasions railroads have had to wait for their new cars for a year or more. This is not always an unmixed evil, for many roads are so well equipped with cars that they could not use more to advantage without an increase of facilities. Most of the roads would need an increase in the number of their engines to properly handle any considerable increase in their cars. All roads in times of car shortage have great difficulty in procuring competent help to man their trains, yards and shops. Most roads would be obliged to increase their track facilities, both in the yards and on the line, before they could use any largely increased number of cars to advantage.2

It will therefore be seen, as stated above, that all the railroads can do at once, when they are confronted by a car shortage, is to avoid discrimination, with all the difficulties, real and imagined, attending such a course. When the car shortage is an ordinary one, such as may be expected every year for two or three months, this seems all that can be expected under the present circumstances. It is only when the car shortage extends over a longer period, as occurred in the car shortages of 1906 and 1907, that it becomes practicable for the railroads to so increase their facilities that the supply will equal the demand without the help of a change of freight rates.

There is still another way in which railroads can increase the

It should here be noted that in acquiring new cars and new facilities, and also when they increase their force, the railroads find the old law of supply and demand working against them. The price of cars and all other facilities rises rapidly, and so do rates of pay.

efficiency of their equipment so as to postpone or end a car shortage, and that is by moving their cars faster, by loading them heavier, and by avoiding the movement of empty cars when this does not involve undue delay. This means, of course, that there is opportunity for the railroads to improve their methods in general; but it is also a matter in which the railroads are very largely dependent upon the public. The railroads are very anxious to load their cars full. Certain shippers find it to their advantage to ship small lots of freight at carload rates. The railroads would be very glad to have all cars loaded and unloaded promptly. Some shippers find it to their advantage to take their time in loading, to take their time in unloading, and to store freight in cars.

As may be imagined from the above statement of the general principles involved in car supply and the general conditions surrounding it, a recital of the present situation on this continent, involving, as it does, half the railroads and half the cars in the world, is a matter of considerable difficulty. The reports, however, received by the American Railway Association for the latest date available—that is, up to October 13, 1909-indicate a total shortage on all the principal railroads, except one, amounting to 23,431 cars. The Interstate Commerce Commission reports that a ton moves, on an average, 242 miles. The American Railway Association reports that the car, on an average, now makes about seventy per cent loaded mileage. We may assume from these data that the average time of the round trip of a car is something over twelve days. To obtain this we use the best monthly record of the American Railway Association-27.2 miles per day.

As there are something over two millions of cars on the continent, the indications are that 185,000 cars are loaded every day, and this shortage of 23,431 cars is therefore a shortage of thirteen per cent. This means that thirteen per cent of the freights offered are delayed one day or more before they can be shipped. But this is all that this shortage means. It does not necessarily mean any restriction in production, except in those trades where absolutely no storage is provided before shipment. It is not a shortage which can be compared with the great shortages occuring in 1906 and 1907. It should also be remembered that the present shortages are only local, and that the car supply is ample in the regions and trades where car surpluses are reported; and further, that the rail

roads are now doing probably as much business as they did in October, 1907, when the shortages reported amounted to over 90,000 cars, or fifty per cent of the shipments.

It is too early to fully explain how the railroads of the country are carrying this immense business with so small a car shortage, but this can be said: The number of cars in the country has increased in the last two years by nearly 200,000, and the average capacity of the cars is much greater than it was two years ago. Further, the railroads of the country, by increasing their facilities and by improving their methods, are able to give a better movement to their freight cars than they did two years ago. In this they now have the assistance-even if it be the reluctant assistance of a large part of the public in the enforcement of demurrage rules, and this has undoubtedly increased the equipment available by hastening the loading and unloading of cars.

The present shortage appears to be on the increase, as will be seen by the accompanying chart. As noted above, it is not a net shortage. Although there are shortages reported on various railroads amounting to this figure of 23,431, there are surpluses reported amounting to more than this-namely, to 35.977. This surplus amounts to very little compared to the surpluses which we have had in the last two years; but it will be noted that the rate of decrease in the surplus is much slower than it was one and two months ago.

There are several reasons why this surplus is not used to fill the shortages. In the first place, the surplus cars are generally stored at considerable distances from the points where shortages occur, and not infrequently represent cars in transit to meet shortages. Second, the surpluses are often in one kind of car, while the shortages are in other kinds of cars. It is, of course, practicable, in an emergency and at additional expense, to use box cars for products which are ordinarily shipped in open cars, and vice versa. This occurred two years ago, but the present shortage is not yet sufficient to justify devices of this kind.

No survey of the situation is adequate without an indication of the prospects for the future, at least for the immediate future, and such indications are usually based on experience. Here we are somewhat at fault, for the records of car supply in the country only go back to January 1907. All prior records are local in their character. A summary of the records of the American Railway