of 1883 she had about ten acres of the tract broken and had ten acres planted to crop each year of 1883 and 1834. That she took this tract of land in good faith and to the best of her knowledge she has done all she could in complying with the homestead law.

George W. Woodford and William P. Fell of Beadle county, Dakota, swear that they have carefully read said affidavit and from their own. personal knowledge know the facts therein set forth to be true.

Upon receipt of said affidavit your office took up the case for consideration and by letter of October 28, 1887, suspended both the original entry and the cash certificate with permission to the claimant to make new proof during the life-time of the entry when she can show full compliance with the law in every respect. "From the claimant's own statements" your predecessor said, "she has not lived on the tract more than two and one half months, from the date of settlement, and during that time was absent on two occasions for several days at a time. The improvements are very meagre and the proof is not of a character to justify this office in issuing a patent thereon."

The case is brought before me by the appeal of the claimant from your said decision which in a general way, alleges error in holding that the residence and improvements shown were not sufficient.

Payment of the consideration and compliance with the requirements of the law as to residence, cultivation and improvements are the matters of substance, which authorize the commutation of a homestead entry. Louis W. Bunnell (7 L. D., 231). The proof should show affirmatively compliance with the law. United States v. Skahen (6 L. D., 120).

The claimant alleges settlement April 29, and made proof December 15, 1883, and says that from the former date until September 1, "from two to three times a month she went home on said tract and stayed all night and sometimes over Sunday;" after the date last named her affidavit leaves the impression and should be understood as asserting, that she was actually residing upon the tract until she made proof and was absent only temporarily on several occasions for not longer than three or four days at one time. It thus appears that presence upon the tract was the exception and absence the rule. She alleged poverty as the cause of her absence but nevertheless avails herself of the privilege of purchasing the land by commuting at nearly the earliest moment pos sible. This Department held in the case of Andrew J. Healey (4 L. D., 80), that:

No fixed rule can be formulated as to what shall constitute good faith. The facts and circumstances surrounding each case should be carefully considered and if the acts of the entryman, as shown by the evidence do not clearly indicate bad faith, the entry should not be forfeited.

In carefully examining the circumstances in this case, I find that the proof was made a little more than six months after the date on which settlement is alleged and it therefore invites especial scrutiny. Frances M. Cull (5 L. D., 348); R. M. Chrisinger (t. L. D., 347). I also find that.'

the two witnesses to the proof do not live near the land and this fact is an element of weakness. Whitcomb v. Boos (5 L. D., 448). The house is not described with particularity as it should be (Fred. King, 4 L. D., 253), nor is any information given as to what was placed in it; the im provements are very meager and are valued at $50. I further find that absence was the rule and presence the exception and where poverty is pleaded as the excuse for absence from the land, the commutation of a homestead is a circumstance that makes against the good faith of the claimant. Whitcomb v. Boos, supra. In the case of L. and B. Knippenberg (4 L. D., 477) it was held that:

In commutation homestead cases, the settler may be excused for temporary absences under certain circumstances but in such cases where absence is the rale the claimant must conclusively show his good faith as to residence before the officers of the government can be justified in parting with title to public land so sought to be acquired.

The proof in this case does not satisfy me that the claimant has com plied with the requirements of the homestead law and it is rejected. Inasmuch as the original entry has been merged in the cash entry (Greenwood v. Peters, 4 L. D., 237), and the cancellation of the final certificate would involve the cancellation of the original entry, I see no reason for disturbing your decision suspending the final certificate and allowing her to make new proof, under her original entry, during the life-time of the entry. Samuel H. Vandivoort (7 L. D., 86).

Your decision is affirmed.

INDEX.