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possession of B., an assignee of the mortgagor, and sold, for tolls claimed to be due to a Canal Company. A clause in the Canal Act limited the commencement of actions for any thing done in pursuance of the act to within six months after the fact committed: Held, that no injury resulted to A. until the sale, and therefore that an action of trover, brought by him within six months of the sale, but not of the seizure, was in time. But semble, that B. must have commenced his action, whether of trespass or trover, within six months of the seizure. (2 H. Bl. 14; 1 Bing. 167.) -Fraser v. Swansea Canal Company, 3 N. & M. 391.

LIMITATIONS, STATUTE OF.

1. (Replication of the statute to plea of set-off, effect of.) A plea of set-off stated that plaintiff made his promissory note payable to A., which was duly indorsed and delivered to defendant after A.'s death by her administrator, and was unpaid. Replication, that the supposed cause of setoff did not accrue to the defendant within six years, in manner and form, &c. Held, that this replication admitted, not only the making of the note, but the indorsement of it by A.'s administrator to the defendant; and that the defendant might therefore avail himself of memorandums of the payment of interest written on the note by A. (before Lord Tenterden's act) to bar the statute of limitations.-Gale v. Capern, 1 Ad. & E.

103.

2. (Payment of interest on note given by parish officers.) A parish vestry passed a resolution to borrow money from A., who advanced it, and took promissory notes for the amount, made by B., C., and D., who were churchwardens and overseers, and who added to their signatures the titles of their offices. Interest was paid upon the notes from the parochial funds, and the accounts containing the item were allowed by the vestry; and B., together with other parishioners, signed the allowance in one instance. A., B., and C., resided constantly in the parish. Within six years after W.'s signature of the allowance (but not within six years from the making of the note) an action was brought upon the note against A., B., and C., and the statute of limitations was pleaded. The jury having found for the plaintiff, the Court sustained the verdict.-Rew v. Pettet, 1 Ad. & E. 196.

3. (Effect of payment of principal and interest.) A testator bequeathed to his two daughters £250 each, to be paid at the age of twenty-one; and till that period the expenses of their board, clothes, and education, to be paid by his executors; and he appointed executors and also trustees, with all necessary powers to carry the will into effect. At a meeting of the trustees and executors for the purpose of settling the testator's affairs, the executors paid over to the trustees a sum of £500 to be set apart for the payment of the above legacies. The trustees lent out that money on a promissory note, which described them as "trustees acting under the will of A. B.:" Held, that payment of principal and interest to one of the legatees was sufficient to take the case out of the Statute of Limitations, so as to enable the trustees to recover upon the note. The Court con

sidered the payment to the legatee as payment to the agent of the trustees. —Megginson v. Harper, 2 C. & M. 322; 4 Tyr. 94.

4. (Continuance of, by writ.) Where a writ of summons, tested in time to save the statute of limitations, was re-sealed in consequence of an alteration in the description of the defendant, and of his residence, and was not served till after the expiration of the six years: Held, that the re-sealing did not amount to a re-issuing of the writ, and that the plaintiff need not show when it took place.- Braithwaite v. Lord Montford, 2 C. & M. 408. And see PRACTICE, 8.

MASTER AND SERVANT.

(Payment to servant, when a good payment to the master.) Payment made

to an apprentice in his master's counting-house, not in the usual course of business, but on a collateral transaction, is not a good payment to the master: e. g. payment by a stakeholder of a deposit in his hands to the apprentice of the party who made the deposit.-Sanderson v. Bell, 2 C. & M. 303.

MONEY HAD AND RECEIVED.

1. The plaintiff, an attorney, agreed for a certain consideration to convey to the defendant an estate, which the defendant had bought on the terms of the vendor and vendee's paying for the conveyance in equal proportions, and agreed also that if the vendor objected to pay any expenses, he, the plaintiff, would not apply to the defendant for any further remuneration. The plaintiff made the conveyance. The defendant agreed with the vendor, that if the latter would pay the whole expense of another transaction between himself and the defendant, he, the vendor, should not pay the plaintiff any of the expenses of the above conveyance: Held, that so much of those expenses as the defendant, as between himself and the vendor, had been allowed to set off against his share of liability on the other transaction, was money had and received to the plaintiff's use, and might be recovered by him, besides the consideration originally agreed upon for making the conveyance.—Nɔy v. Reynolds, 1 Ad. & E. 159.

2. (For proceeds of stock sold under forged power of attorney.) A stockholder, whose stock has been sold without his knowledge under a forged power of attorney, may maintain an action for money had and received against the party who holds the proceeds of the sale. (6 B. & C. 551; Style's Rep. 347; 12 East, 409.)-Marsh v. Keating, (in the House of Lords,) 1 Bing. N. C. 198.

3. In 1810 the defendant's wife died seised of certain freehold land, with which was intermixed also certain copyhold, to which she had been admitted in 1804. She left surviving her the defendant and an only daughter, who was shortly after admitted to the copyhold, and married in 1815. The defendant remained in possession ever since, of the freehold as tenant by the curtesy, and also of the copyhold, letting both at an entire rent, and never recognizing any right in his daughter or her husband to either the copyhold land or the rent. The husband sued him

for money had and received. No title was proved, except from the court-rolls of the manor: and it was insisted that the defendant's possession must be taken to have continued for the protection of his daughter's right, and that he was therefore her agent for receipt of the rent of the copyhold, and liable in this form of action to refund it: Held, however, that the action could not be maintained without actual proof of such agency, or of some recognition by him of his daughter's right, so as to establish a priority between the plaintiff and defendant, and avoid the question of title, which would otherwise have arisen.-Clarance v. Marshall, 4 Tyr. 147.

4. A broker, employed by two of three part-owners of a ship to sell it, paid those two their shares of the proceeds, but refused to pay the third his share without their consent, though he had admitted the amount to be in his hands: Held, that the owner could not sue him for money had and received.-Hatsall v. Griffith, 4 Tyr. 487.

PARTNERSHIP,

1. (Illegal partnership, avoidance of.) Where parties enter into a contract of partnership in contravention of the law, it is void, and will confer no right on either party as against the other. Two persons carried on business as pawnbrokers under a partnership deed. The business was solely conducted by one of them, whose name alone appeared over the door and on the printed tickets and duplicates used in the trade, and in whose name only the license was granted. Semble, that though the parties might have made themselves liable to the penalties imposed by the stat. 39 & 40 G. 3, c. 99, yet that as there was no actual agreement to carry on the partnership in such a manner as to contravene the law, the contract was not void.-Armstrong v. Lewis, 4 Moo. & Sc. 1; 2 C. & M. 274.

2. (Right of action between partners.) A. and B. entered into partnership to work a coal mine. It was worked out, and the pit filled up. A. then said he would join in no more coal-pits; and they agreed to divide the utensils and materials, each taking half in value, article by article, according to a valuation to be made. The valuation having been made, B. agreed to take the whole according to it, and accordingly took possession of the whole: Held, that A. had an immediate right of action for the value of a moiety. (2 T. R. 476; Holt's N. P. C. 368; 3 Bing. 54; 2 Bing. 170.) Held also, that as the valuation was merely for the information of the parties, and not binding on them, it did not require a stamp.-Jackson v. Stopherd, ? C. & M. 361.

3. (Right of contribution between partners.) A plaintiff recovers against three partners in trade on their joint contract, and takes in execution one only, who thereupon pays the whole sum-recovered. He cannot recover at law against his co-defendants for contribution: his only remedy is in equity, as in a case of a voluntary payment by one partner of a debt due from himself and his co-partners upon their joint contract. (8 T. R. 186; 7 Bing. 708.)-Sadler v. Hickson, 3 N. & M. 258.

4. (Liability of retired partner.) A., B., and C. trading under the firm of A. and sons, were indebted to D. A. retired from the partnership, which continued to be carried on under the same name, B. and C. undertaking to liquidate the concerns. B. subsequently left the partnership, and a new partner was taken in, and a notice of the previous dissolution was then inserted in the Gazette, but there was no proof that the plaintiff ever saw it. The business was still carried on under the former style of A. and Sons, no notice being given of the introduction of the new partner, and D. continued his account with them under that name. About a year afterwards, in a letter to A., D. said he was aware that since the dissolution he had no claim against him, A.; but there was nothing to show any act on the part of D. by which he expressly accepted the substituted credit of the new partnership: Held, that A. was not discharged from his liability. (4 Price, 200; 3 B. & A. 611; 5 B. & C. 196.)—Kirwan v. Kirwan, 4 Tyr. 491.

PATENT.

Case for invading the plaintiff's patent-right to certain machinery for drying calicoes, &c. where the specification, after setting forth the mode in which the cloth was to be extended for the purpose of drying, proceeded to state that it might be taken up again by the same machinery. The jury found that the invention was new and useful on the whole, but that the machine was not useful in some cases for taking up goods. The Court sustained a verdict for the plaintiff.-Haworth v. Hardcastle, 1 Bing. N. C. 182.

PAUPER. See PRACTICE, 11.

PAWNBROKER. See PARTNERSHIP, 1.

PLEADING.

1. (Replication-New assignment-Conclusion with verification or to the country.) Declaration by indorsee against acceptor of a. bill. Plea, that defendant, to accommodate the drawer, and without any consideration, wrote a qualified acceptance on blank paper, and delivered the paper to the drawer, for the purpose of his drawing thereon a bill at nine months; that he drew a bill at six months, which was the bill declared upon, and indorsed it without consideration to S., who indorsed it without consideration to plaintiff, both S. and plaintiff well knowing all the above facts. The plaintiff new-assigned, that the bill pleaded was not the same bill as that declared on, but another, for that the bill declared on was accepted generally, and the defendant never accepted the same in any qualified manner. Plea, setting out as before a qualified acceptance on blank paper for the same purpose as before mentioned, and alleging the same facts as to the drawing and indorsing of a bill, which the plea stated to be the bill above newly assigned; omitting however to state that the bill was given without consideration, but stating that the indorsements were made without any sufficient consideration, and that the indorsees

knew that the bill of exchange mentioned in the last plea was not the bill above newly assigned, but another and a different one; concluding to the country. Demurrer: Held, that this replication admitted the existence of the bill mentioned in the preceding plea, and ought therefore to have concluded with a verification.

The plaintiff had leave to amend, and then replied "that the defendant did not write his qualified acceptance on the said blank paper as in the last plea mentioned, in manner and form," &c., concluding to the country. Demurrer: Held, that the replication amounted in substance to an allegation that no qualified acceptance was written on the bill declared upon, and was in effect an answer to the whole plea, and issue might properly be tendered upon it.-Heydon v. Thompson, 1 Ad. & E. 210; 3 N. & M. 319.

2. (Verification of plea in abatement.) A defendant in assumpsit pleaded in abatement the non-joinder of another party as a joint contractor, and his affidavit of verification stated that they were partners during the period within which the cause of action was laid in the special counts of the declaration to have accrued, but did not show that the partnership continued down to the time laid in the common counts: Held, that it was therefore insufficient.-Dibbin v. Wilson, 3 N. & M. 260.

3. Nil habuit in tenementis is no plea in an action of debt for use and occupation. (1 Wils. 208, 314; 6 T. R. 62.)—Curtis v. Spitty, 1 Bing. N. C. 15.

And see LIMITATIONS, STATUTE OF, 1; TRESPASS, 1; WAY, 2.

POOR-RATE.

1. (Extinguishment and rateability of tithes.) An act of parliament enacted that the tithes of a parish should be held in fee by A., who was owner of part of the lands in the parish, and that A.'s lands should be charged with an annuity payable to the vicar for the time being, who had previously enjoyed the small tithes, and who, by an agreement recited in the act, was to receive such annuity in lieu of all his vicarial dues: Held, that the tithes were not extinguished, and therefore the vicar was not rateable to the poor in respect of such annuity.-The King v. Churchwardens and Overseers of Great Hambleton, 1 Ad. & E. 145.

2. (Rating of tithes.) Tithes, for which compositions have been entered into by the respective occupiers, may still be rated in the hands of the rector in one entire sum. On his refusal to pay such rate, the justices are bound, on the application of the overseers, to issue their warrant for levying it, however inconvenient to the rector, and however contrary to former practice, such mode of rating may be.-The King v. Justices of Sussex, 3 N. & M. 263.

3. (Right of appeal, where right of action barred by.) Where a party is rated to the poor-rate for property not wholly in his occupation, he is not bound to appeal, but may bring trespass or replevin if distrained on. But if the distress be taken under one warrant void on the ground of

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