duce of the mines.-Fraser v. Swansea Canal Navigation Company, 3 N. & M. 391.

2. (For lost bank note.) The plaintiff lost a bank note, which the defendant tortiously converted to his own use; he subsequently paid the plaintiff part of the proceeds: Held, that the acceptance of such part did not waive the tort, but that the plaintiff might nevertheless sue for the note in trover, the amount received going in reduction of damages. (7 B. & C. 310.)-Burn v. Morris, 4 Tyr. 485.

TURNPIKE ACTS.

1. (Toll, whether imposed on horse or carriage.) By a local act, a toll was imposed on horses drawing carriage, and in default of payment, the collector was empowered to distrain any horse or carriage upon which toll was imposed by that act. No person was to pay more than once a day in respect of any carriage or any horse, and no toll was to be taken in respect of any carriage, horse or beast conveying materials for the road: Held, that the toll was imposed on the horse only, not on the horse and carriage; and therefore that the same horse, passing a second time on the same day with a different carriage and different passengers, was exempt from toll. (2 B. & B. 30; 5 B. & C. 25, 31.)—Niblett v. Pottow, 1 Bing. N. C. 81.

2. (Tolls in respect of breadth of wheels.) Where a local turnpike act directed a higher or lower rate of toll to be collected in respect of the greater or less breadth of wheels, and where, in addition to the tolls under the local act, the additional tolls in respect of breadth of wheels, authorized to be taken by the 13 Geo. 3, c. 84, had been actually imposed and collected (although erroneously): Held, that parties were not relieved from such additional tolls by 4 Geo. 4, c. 95, s. 6.—Pickford v. Davis, 1 Bing. N. C. 141.

UNIFORMITY OF PROCESS ACT.

Assumpsit against an executor. Pleas, plene administravit, and no assets at the time of exhibiting the bill, or since: Held, after verdict, (since the 2 Wm. 4, c. 39,) to refer to the commencement of the suit, (that is, the service of the writ of summons,) not to the time of filing the declaration. —Rees v. Morgan, 3 N. & M. 205.

VENUE.

1. The venue having been changed from London to Hereford, in an action of covenant on a lease, for nonpayment of rent of premises in Hereford, the Court refused to bring it back.—Arden v. Mornington, 4 Tyr. 56. 2. By consent of both parties the venue was laid in London: Held, that no objection could afterwards be taken to the venue, although it ought, under an act of parliament, to have been laid in Surrey.-Furnival v. Stringer, 1 Bing. N. C. 68.

VESTRY.

1. (Qualification and manner of clection to.) 1st. When a parish has adopted the Act for the better regulation of vestries, 1 & 2 Wm. 4, c. 60,

there must be elected, at each of the first three annual elections, one third of the whole number of which the vestry chosen under the act is ultimately to consist; and there must be deducted by lot from the original vestry, at the first election, one third of the number of vestrymen then existing; at the second election, half the number of original vestrymen then existing; and at the third election, all the original vestrymen then remaining.

2nd. If a parish adopting the act is within the metropolitan police district or the city of London, or contain above 3000 resident householders, the qualification for vestrymen is, that they should be resident householders, rated to the poor-rate on an annual rent of not less than 40l.; which rental, however, may be made up of tenements separately held, and not in the vestrymen's own occupation. And the qualification must be perfect at the time of election; but the election of unqualified persons does not avoid that of qualified vestrymen or auditors chosen at the same time.

3d. A parish adopting the act had been previously divided into four districts, for the more convenient collection of the rates, and the same division had been adopted for taking the poll in the election of members of parliament: a small part of the parish was also separated from it, and annexed to an adjoining parish, for ecclesiastical purposes: Held, that the election of vestrymen and auditors might be made in a single place of the parish only.

4th. The parish had been previously governed by a vestry established under a local act, which defined the qualification of a vestryman, and prescribed an oath to be taken before any vestryman should be capable of acting in the execution of the local act, by which he swore to execute the powers reposed in pursuance of the same, and that he was possessed of the qualification prescribed thereby, which was different from that required by 1 & 2 Wm. 4, c. 60: Held, that this oath was not to be taken by the vestrymen elected under the 1 & 2 Wm. 4.—The King v. Churchwardens of St. Pancras, 1 Ad. & E. 80; 3 N. & M. 425. 2. (Election.) The vestry act, 58 Geo. 3, c. 69, contains a proviso that the act shall not affect the right or manner of voting in any vestry held by ancient usage or by a special act: Held, that this proviso did not except out of the operation of the act a parish in which the inhabitants paying church and poor rates were empowered to elect guardians of the poor; but that to bring a vestry within the exception, it must have a peculiar constitution or power.--The King v. Inhabitants of Clerkenwell, 3 N. &

M. 411.

WARRANT OF ATTORNEY.

The affidavit in support of a motion to enter up judgment on a warrant of attorney, need not now, as before the New Rules, state that the defendant was alive on a day in term.-Cockman v. Hellyer, 1 Bing, N. C. 1.

WARRANTY.

(Of Horse, by Servant.) A warranty given by a person entrusted to sell

primâ facie binds the principal; but the warranty of a person commissioned merely to deliver the thing sold, does not, unless an express authority to warrant be shown. Where, therefore, a horse having been sold by A. to B., A.'s servant, on delivering the horse to B., made certain statements, and signed a receipt for the price, containing a warranty: Held, that A. was not bound by such statements and receipt, no express authority to the servant to give a warranty being shown.- Woodin v. Burford, 2 C. & M. 391.

WAY.

1. (Right of incumbent to, for currying away tithe.) A rector cannot claim a permanent right of way for the purpose of carrying away his tithe, unless by prescription or grant. And the owner or occupier of the soil, provided he does it bona fide for the convenient management of the farm, has a right to vary and stop up a way by which tithe has been carried, although he thereby puts the tithe owner to great inconvenience by compelling him to use a more circuitous route for the purpose. (2 Eagle & Y. 310; 6 Esp. 103; 2 Phill. 391, 399.)—Jumes v. Dods, 2 C. & M. 266; 4 Tyr. 101.

2. (Title conferred by user-Prescription Act-Pleadings.) The assignee of a lease, granted for three lives by a bishop in right of his see, used for more than twenty years, without interruption, a way to and from his premises over a close called "The Acre." The defendant, who was in possession of the Acre under a similar lease, obstructed the way. In an action on the case for this obstruction, Held, that since the 3 & 4 Wm. 4, c. 71, the plaintiff's user conferred no title as against the reversioner (the bishop), nor his lessee, or persons claiming under the lessee during the

term.

A declaration claiming a right of way "by reason of the possession" of certain premises, is supported by proof of the reservation of the way in a conveyance of the premises from a tenant for life to the plaintiff.— Wright v. Walker, 4 Tyr. 502.

WILL.

(Proof of execution.) A bill was filed in Chancery against several defend. ants, whereupon an issue of devisavit vel non was directed, in which the defendants in Chancery were plaintiffs, and the plaintiff in Chancery defendant, respecting a will of M., mentioned in the proceedings, devising real property. The issue was found in the affirmative, and the bill in Chancery was dismissed on the motion of the plaintiff in equity. At the trial of the issue, B., one of the three attesting witnesses to the will, swore to its execution. The plaintiff in Chancery afterwards brought ejectment on his own demise, as heir at law of M., against one of the defendants in Chancery, who claimed as devisee of M., for the property which had been the subject of the issue. B. was then dead. After this action was commenced, judgment was entered up on the issue from Chancery, in the court of law in which it had been tried. An order of court was made in the action of ejectment, that the shorthand writer's and judge's notes of

the evidence of such witnesses on the trial of the issue as should be dead before the trial of the ejectment, should be read on the latter trial. On that trial the defendant gave evidence of these several proceedings, and proved B.'s former evidence from the shorthand writer's notes, and then produced a will, which was identified as the one produced on the first trial: Held, that (whether on general principles of law, or with reference to the order of court above mentioned), this was sufficient proof of the execution of the will, although another attesting witness was alive, and in court ready to be examined; but that the proceedings would not have been of themselves proof of the execution, without proof of the evidence of the deceased witness.-Wright v. Doe d. Tatham, (in the Exchequer Chamber,) 1 Ad. & E. 1; 3 N. & M. 268.

WITNESS. See SUBPOENA.

WRIT OF ERROR.

(Waiver of, by agreement.) The plaintiff and defendant, by their respective attornies, agreed that a question disputed between them should be raised by demurrer, in order to a more speedy adjustment of it; and that whatever the decision of the court on the argument might be, each party should pay his own costs, and such decision should bind the parties. Judgment having been given on the demurrer for the plaintiff: Held, that it was not competent for the defendant to sue out a writ of error thereon.-Brown v. Lord Granville, 4 Moo. & S. 333.

WRIT OF TRIAL ACT.

1. The writ of trial under the 3 & 4 Wm. 4, c. 42, s. 17, is to be directed to the judge of the court of record in those places in which there is a court of record, and to the sheriff where there is no such court.

A writ of trial was directed to the mayor of C., and the cause was tried by his deputy. The Court refused to set aside the proceedings on a suggestion that the cause ought to have been tried by the mayor himself, it not being shown that he had no power to appoint a deputy.Clark v. Marner, 3 Moo. & S. 171.

2. The sheriff or judge to whom a cause is sent under this act, has no power of certifying under the 43 Eliz. c. 6, to deprive a plaintiff of costs. — Wardroper v. Richardson, 1 Ad. & E. 75.

EQUITY.

(Containing 5 Simons, Part 2; 5 Bligh, Part 5; and 1 Mylne & Keene, Part 3.)

ANNUITY.

A testatrix gave to L., during his life, an annuity, to be paid and payable half-yearly out of real estate, clear of all taxes and outgoings: Held, that the annuitant took clear of the legacy duty.-Louch v. Peters, M. & K. 489. ASSETS.

A testator, by his will, devised his real estate to trustees, their heirs and assigns, on trust to sell, and declared that the money arising from the sale should sink into and become part of his personal estate, and he gave and bequeathed the same, and all his stock, crop, goods and effects whatsoever, to the trustees, their executors and administrators, on trust, after converting the same into money, and paying all his debts, funeral, and testamentary expenses, to pay certain legacies, and to dispose of the residue in manner therein mentioned: Held, that this was substantially a devise of the real estate for the payment of all debts, and within the fourth section of the Statute of Frauds; and, therefore, that the produce was equitable assets. (Silk v. Prince, 1 Bro. C. C. 138; Barker v. May, 9 B. & C. 489.)-Soames v. Robinson, M. & K. 500.

BANKRUPTCY.

1. (Fraud.) A trader, on his marriage, received a fortune of 5,000l. with his wife, and settled a sum in stock in trust for himself for life, with limitations over for the benefit of his wife and children in the event of his becoming bankrupt or insolvent. And it was provided, that, if he should survive his wife, and the issue of the marriage should fail, and he should then be or should have been a bankrupt, fifteen sixty-sixths of the stock should belong to the wife's next of kin in blood. No part of the 5,000%. was settled; but the whole of the settled fund was the husband's property, and it did not appear, from any of the expressions in the settlement, what was the consideration for the provision as to fifteen sixty-sixths of the stock: Held, that the limitations over in the event of the bankruptcy of the husband were good as to fifteen sixty-sixths of the trust fund, that being the proportion of the trust fund which the wife's fortune would have purchased, but were void as to the remainder. (Higginson v. Kelly, 1 Ball & B. 252.)—Lester v. Garland, Sim. 205.

2. (Certificate.) M. granted an annuity to L. for the life of L., and covenanted to charge it upon all such property as he, M., should, in the event of A.'s decease, become entitled to by will or otherwise. M, became a