was passed, it would follow that in thus giving the County Court this jurisdiction, the Statute also gave, by mere implication, to the Admiralty Court, not only appellate, but original jurisdiction also; besides introducing the anomaly of dealing with small cases on different principles of law from large ones; while the apparent object of the enactments was merely to distribute the existing Admiralty jurisdiction (a).

SECTION II.-THE CROWN NOT AFFECTED IF NOT NAMED.

On probably similar ground rests the rule commonly stated in the form that the Crown is not bound by a Statute unless named in it. It has been said that the law is prima facie presumed to be made for subjects only (b); at all events, the Crown is not reached except by express words, or by necessary implication, in any case where it would be ousted of an existing prerogative (c). It is presumed that the Legislature does not intend to deprive the Crown of any prerogative, right or property, unless it expresses its intention to do so in explicit terms, or makes the

(a) See on this subject Everard v. Kendall, LR. 5 CP. 428; Simpson v. Blues, LR. 7 CP. 290; Gaudet v. Brown, LR. 5 PC. 134, and the cases there cited. See also Smith v. Brown, LR. 6 QB. 729.

(b) Willion v. Berkley, Plowd.

236.

(c) Inst. 191, Atty.-Genl. v. Allgood; Parker, 3 Bac. Ab. Prerogative, E. 5 (c); Co. Litt. 436.; Chit. Prerogative, 382 ; Ayscough's Case, Cro. Car. 526; R. v. Wright, A. & E. 437.

inference irresistible. Thus, the compulsory clauses of Acts of Parliament, which authorise the taking of lands for railway or other purposes, such as are contained in the Lands Clauses Act of 1845, would not apply to Crown property, unless made so applicable in express terms or by necessary inference (a). Again, as it is a prerogative of the Crown not to pay tolls or rates, or other burdens in respect of property, it was long since established that the Poor Act of the 43 Eliz., which authorises the imposition of a poor-rate on every "inhabitant and occupier" of property in the parish, did not apply to the Crown, or to its direct and immediate servants, whose occupation is for the purposes of the Crown, and so is, in fact, the occupation of the Crown itself (b). Thus, property occupied by the servants of the State for public purposes, as the Post Office (c), the Horse Guards (d), the Admiralty (e), and even by local police (f), by the judges, as lodgings at the assizes (g), by a county court (h), or for a jail (¿), or

(a) Re Cuckfield Board, 19 Beav. 153, 24 LJ. Ch. 585.

(b) Per Lord Westbury and Lord Cranworth in Mersey Docks Co. v. Cameron, 11 HL. 443, 35 LJ. MC. 22, 25; Amherst v. Somers, 2 TR. 372; R. v. St. Martin's, LR. 2 QB. 493.

(c) Smith v. Birmingham, 7 E. & B. 483.

(d) Amherst v. Somers, 2 TR. 272.

(e) R. v. Stewart, 8 E. & B. 360.

(f) Lancashirev. Shelford, E. B. & E. 230.

(g) Hodgson v. Carlisle, 8 E. & B. 230.

(h) R. v. Manchester, 3 E. & B. 336.

(i) R. v. Shepherd, 1 QB. 170. See the judgment of Blackburn J. in Mersey Docks Co. v. Cameron, 11 HL. 443, 35

I

by the commissioners of public works and buildings in respect of a toll-bridge of which they were in occupation as servants of the Crown (a), was held exempt from poor-rate. And property in the occupation of the Sovereign would, also, not be liable to the common law burden of church rates; one reason assigned being that they could not be enforced (b). So, the Royal Dockyards at Deptford were held not assessable to the land tax (c). But if the tax attached to the land, and not to its owner or occupier, this rule would not be applicable; and land charged with it in the hands of a subject, would not become exempted on vesting in the Sovereign (d).

On the same general principle, the numerous Acts of Parliament which have, at various times, taken away the writ of certiorari, have always been held not to apply to the Crown (e). So, the 13 Geo. 2, c. 18, s. 5, which limits the time for issuing that writ to six months from the date of the conviction (ƒ), and the 12 & 13 Vict. c. 45, s. 5, which authorises the Quarter Sessions to give costs to the successful party

LJ. MC. 10. Leith Comm. v. Poor Inspectors, LR. 1 Sc. Ap. 17.

(a) R. v. McCann, LR. 3 QB. 677.

(b) Per Dr. Lushington in Smith v. Keats, 4 Hagg. 279. (c) Atty.-Genl. v. Hill, 2 M. & W. 160.

(d) Colchester v. Kewney, LR. 1 Ex. 368.

(e) See ex. gr. R. v. Cumberland, 3 B. & P. 354; R. v. Allen, 15 East, 333.

(f) R. v. Farewell, 2 Stra. 1209; R. v. James, 1 East, 303n.

in any appeal (a), do not apply to the Crown, (the prosecutor), but only to the defendant. On the same ground, it would seem, the 4 Anne, c. 16, s. 4, which authorised a "defendant or tenant," with the leave of the Court, to plead several matters, was held not to extend to defendants in suits by or on behalf of the Crown (b); nor was the right of the Crown to remove into the Exchequer a cause in any other court touching the revenue of the Crown, affected by the County Court Act (c). So, the provision of the Statute of Frauds which made writs of execution binding on the goods of the judgment debtor only from the time of the delivery of the writ to the sheriff for execution, was held not to affect the earlier rule of law, (which bound the goods from the teste of the writ,) where an extent was issued at the suit of the Crown (d). The Statute of Amendments of 4 Ed. 3, st. 1, c. 6, which provided that clerical errors in records should be amended at once, without giving advantage to "the party" who had challenged the misprision, did not include the Crown; for, it was said, it had never been named "a party" in any Act of Parliament (e).

(a) R. v. Beadle, 26 LJ. MC. 111, 7 E. & B. 492.

(b) Atty.-Genl. v. Allgood, Parker, 1; Atty.-Genl.v. Donaldson, 7 M. & W. 422, 10 M. & W. 117; R. v. Abp. of York, Willes, 533; Hall v. Maule, 4 A. & E. 283.

(c) Mountjoy v. Wood, 1 H. & N. 58.

(d) R. v. Wynn, Bunb. 39; R. v. Mann, 2 Stra. 754; Barden v. Kennedy, 3 Atk. 739; Giles v. Grover, 1 Cl. & F. 74; Uppom v. Sumner, 2 W. Bl. 1251.

(e) R. v. Tuchin, 2 Lord

The Crown, however, is sufficiently named in a statute, within the meaning of the maxim, when an intention to include it is manifest. For instance, the 20 & 21 Vict. c. 43, which entitles (by section 2), either party, after the hearing, by a justice, of "any "information or complaint" which he has power to determine, to apply for a case for the opinion of one of the Superior Courts; and after authorising (by section 4) the justice to refuse the application, if he deems it frivolous, provides that it shall never be refused when made by, or under the direction of the AttorneyGeneral, and directs (by section 6) the Superior Court, not only to deal with the decision appealed against, but to make such order as to costs as it deemed fit, was held by the Queen's Bench to include the Crown, and to authorise an order against it for the payment of costs. The language of the second section was wide enough to include the Crown; and as the fourth referred to the Crown as plainly as if it had spoken expressly of Crown cases, the language of the sixth authorising costs was construed as applying to such cases also, as well as to cases between subject and subject (a).

But where the Crown is not expressly named, the inference that the statute was intended to include it, must not be doubtful. For instance, where a local

Raym. 1066. See also Tobin v. R., 14 CB. NS. 505, and Thomas v. R., LR. 10 QB. 44.

(a) Moore v. Smith, 28 LJ. MC. 126.