On the Interpretation of Statutes

clearly to have been intended. Thus, the 5 Geo. 4, c. 113, which made it felony for "any persons" to deal in slaves, or to transport them, or equip vessels for their transport, was held to apply to British subjects on the coast of Africa, the notorious scene of the crime which it was the object of the Act to suppress (a); if not in every other part of the world also (); though it was not in express terms said to be applicable abroad.

SECTION II. -PRESUMPTION AGAINST A VIOLATION OF

INTERNATIONAL LAW.

Under the same general presumption that the Legislature does not intend to exceed its jurisdiction, every statute is to be so interpreted and applied, as far as its language admits, as not to be inconsistent with the comity of nations, or with the established rules of international law (c). If, therefore, it designs to effectuate any such object, it must express its intention with irresistible clearness, to induce a Court to believe that it entertained it; for as long as any other possible construction remains, it would be adopted, in order to avoid imputing such an intention to the Legisla(a) R. v. Zulueta, 1 Car. & K. 215; Santos v. Illidge, 28 LJ. CP. 317; overruled on another point, 29 LJ. 348; 8 C.B. N.S. 861.

(b) See per Bramwell B. 29

LJ. CP. 352.

(c) Per Maule J. in Leroux v. Brown, 22 LJ. CP. 3; Bluntschli, Voelkerrecht, s. 847; per Dr. Lushington in TheZollverein, Swab. 98.

ture (a). All general terms must be narrowed in construction to avoid it (b).

For instance, it is an admitted principle of public law that, except as regards pirates jure gentium, and, perhaps, nomadic races and savages who have no political organisation (c), a nation has no jurisdiction over offences committed by a foreigner out of its territory; including in this expression its own ships, and the ships of its subjects on the high seas, and foreign ships on its waters; and the general language of any criminal statute would be so restricted in construction as not to violate this principle. Thus, the 9 Geo. 4, c. 31, s. 8, re-enacted by the 24 & 25 Vict. c. 100, s. 10, which enacted that when any person, feloniously injured abroad or at sea, died in England, or receiving the injury in England, died at sea or abroad, the offence should be dealt with in the county where the death or injury occurred, would not authorise the trial of a foreigner who inflicted a wound at sea in a foreign ship, of which the sufferer afterwards died in England (d). An Act of Parliament which authorised the commanders of our ships of war to seize and prosecute "all ships and vessels" engaged

(a) Per Cur. in U. S. v. Fisher, 2 Cranch, 390; Murray v. Charming Betsy, 2 Cranch, 118.

(b) Per Lord Stowell in Le Louis, 2 Dods. 229.

(d) R. v. Lewis, Dears. & B. 182, 26 LJ. MC.; and see R. v. Depardo, 1 Taunt. 26; R. v. De Mattos, 7 C. & P. 458, Nga Hoong v. R., 7 Cox, 489; R. v.

in the slave trade, would be construed as not intended to affect any right or interest of foreigners contrary to the law of nations (a). Though speaking in just terms of indignation of the horrible traffic in human beings, it spoke only in the name of the British nation. Its prohibition of the trade as contrary to the principles of justice, humanity, and sound policy, applied only to British subjects; it did not render it unlawful as regarded foreigners (b). It was even held that a foreigner who was not prohibited by the law of his own country from carrying it on, was entitled to recover in an English Court damages for the seizure of a cargo of his slaves by a British man-of-war; our Courts being open to all aliens in amity with us, and the only question, therefore, being, whether the act of the man-of-war was wrongful, and what injury the plaintiff had sustained from it (c).

So, although a foreigner who contracts debts and commits an act of bankruptcy in England, would be liable to the English Bankrupt Laws, he would not fall within them if he committed the act of bankruptcy abroad (d). And an Act which gave salvage reward for saving lives has been held not to extend to the salvage of life on a foreign ship more than three marine miles from our shore (e).

(a) Le Louis, 2 Dods. 214; The Antelope, 10 Wheat. 66; see also R. v. Serva, 1 Den. 104. (b) Per Best J. 3 B. & A. 358. (c) Madrazo v. Willes, 3 B. &

A. 353.

(d) Exp. Crispin, LR. 8 Ch.

374.

(e) The Johannes, Lush. 112, 30 LJ. P. M. & A. 91.

So, as it is a rule of all systems of law that real property is exclusively subject to the laws of the State within whose territory it lies, any Bankrupt Act which dealt in general terms with a bankrupt's real estate, would be construed as not extending to his lands abroad (a). This rule would apply equally to lands in our colonies, unless it were expressly shown that the Act was intended to reach them (b).

It is also a general principle that personal property has, except for some purposes, such as probate, no other situs than that of its owner; the right and disposition of it are governed by the law of the domicile of the owner, and not by the law of their local situation (c). The Bankrupt Acts, therefore, which effect an assignment of a bankrupt's personal property, would properly be construed as applying to such property everywhere (d). So, when an Act imposes a burden in respect of personal property, it would be construed, as far as its language permitted, as not intended to contravene the general principle. Thus the 36 Geo. 3, c. 52, which imposed a duty on

(a) Selkrig v. Davies, 2 Rose, 311, 2 Dow. 250; Cockerell v. Dickens, 3 Moo. P. C. 133. See also Sill v. Worswick, 1 H. Bl. 665; Phillips v. Hunter, Id. 402; Hunter v. Potts, 4 TR. 182; Story, Confl. L. ss. 428, 551, &c.

(b) See Re Hewitt's Estate, 6 W. R. 537; Re Scofield, 22 LT. 322; Re Groom, 11 LT. NS. 336.

every legacy given by any will of any person out of his personal estate," and the Succession Duty Act, 16 & 17 Vict. c. 51, which imposes a duty on every " disposition "of property" by which "any person" becomes "en"titled to any property on the death of another," would not apply where the deceased was a foreigner, or even a British subject domiciled abroad, though the property was in England (a). But they would affect personal property abroad, if the deceased was domiciled in England, though a foreigner (b). The Interpleader Act does not empower our Courts to bar the claim of a foreigner residing abroad (c).

It is hardly necessary to add, however, that if the language of an Act of Parliament unambiguously and without reasonably admitting of any other meaning, applies to foreigners abroad, or is otherwise in conflict with any principle of international law, the Courts must obey and administer it as it stands, whatever may be the responsibility incurred by the nation to foreign powers, in executing such a law (d); for the Courts can

(a) In re Bruce, 2 Cr. & J. 436; Arnold v. Arnold, 2 M. & Cr. 256; Thomson v. The Adv.Genl. 12 Cl. & F. 1; Wallace v. The Atty.-Genl. LR. 1 Ch. 1; Atty-.Genl. v. Campbell, LR. 5 HL. 524.

(b) Atty.-Genl. v. Napier, 6

Ex. 217.

M. & W. 277.

(d) Per Cur. in The Marianna Flora, 11 Wheat. 40; The Zollverein, Swab. 96; The Johannes, Id. 188, 30 LJ. P. M. & A. 94; The Amalia, 32 LJ. P. M. & A. 193. As to the Hovering Acts (now the 16 & 17 Vict. s. 212), see Le Louis, 2 Dods. 245; Church v. Hubbard, 2 Cranch, 187.

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