foreign ship was precluded, in a collision suit, from imputing to the British ship with which the collision occurred, a breach of any of those rules; on the ground that it had no right to benefit by rules by which it was not, itself, bound (a). (a) The Zollverein, Swab. 96. CHAPTER VII. SECTION I.REPUGNANCY.-REPEAL BY IMPLICATION. ACTS IN THE NEGATIVE. AN author must be supposed to be consistent with himself; and, therefore, if in one place he has expressed his mind clearly, it ought to be presumed that he is still of the same mind in another place, unless it expressly appears that he has changed it (a). In this respect, the work of the Legislature must be treated in the same manner as that of any other author; and the language of every part of a statute must be so construed, as far as possible, as to be consistent with every other part. The law, therefore, will not allow the revocation or alteration of a statute by construction of general words, when these may have their proper operation without it (b). But it is impossible to will contradictions; and if two passages are absolutely repugnant, the earlier stands impliedly repealed by the latter (c). Leges posteriores priores contrarias abrogant. Ubi duæ contrariæ leges sunt, semper (a) Puff. L.N. b. 5, c. 12, s. 9. (b) Per Bridgman C. J. in Wyn v. Lyn, Bridg. Rep. by Bannister, 117. antiquæ obrogat nova (a). To impute repugnancy, however, is to impute ignorance, or carelessness of expression, or confusion of thought; and not only, therefore, is repeal by implication not favoured (b), but any construction involving it is to be rejected in favour of any other which the language will rationally bear. When the later of the two enactments is couched in terms which are negative in form or in effect, it is difficult to avoid the inference that the earlier one is impliedly repealed by it. For instance, if an Act exempts from licensing regulations the sale of a certain kind of beer, and a subsequent one enacts that “no "beer" shall be sold without a licence, it would obviously be impossible to save the former from the repeal implied in the latter (c). But even negative Acts may admit of a construction not involving this effect. Thus, where an Act provided that the charges for distresses should not exceed those set forth in its schedule, and the schedule stated that in a distress for rent under 201., no more than 6d. in the pound should be paid for appraisement, "whether by one broker or more," it was held that the earlier law was not thereby repealed, which required that all appraisements should (a) Livy, b. 9, c. 34. 63a. (c) Read v. Story, 30 LJ. MC. 110, 6 H. & N. 423 ; remedied by 24 & 25 Vict., c. 21, s. 3. be made by two brokers. The later Act might possibly have referred to the employment of a single appraiser by consent; and "loose words in a schedule" were not considered weighty enough to alter the previous state of the law (a). It must also be borne in mind that two statutes expressed in negative terms may be affirmative inter se, though negative as regards a third, at which they are avowedly aimed. They may make two holes in the earlier Act, which can stand side by side without merging into one (b). For instance, the 12 Anne, st. 2, c. 16, having made void all loans at more than five per cent., the 3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 98, enacted that "no" bill or note payable at three months or less should be void for usury; and the 2 & 3 Vict. c. 37, that "no" bill or note payable at twelve months or less should be void on that ground, but with the additional provision that the Act was not to apply to loans on real security; and it was held that the lastmentioned Act did not repeal the 3 & 4 Will. 4. The negative words, in which both were expressed, had reference to the Act of Anne; but inter se, they were affirmative statutes, and the proviso of the later one, therefore, did not affect the the Act of William IV. (c). (a) Allen v. Flicker, 10 A. & E. 640. (b) Per Maule J. in Clack v. short loans dealt with by The 3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 27, Sainsbury, 2 L. M. & P. 627, 631. (c) Clack v. Sainsbury, ubi sup.; Nixon v. Phillips, 7 Ex. s. 42, which provided that no action for rent, or for interest on money charged on land should be brought after six years, and the 3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 42, passed three weeks later, which provided that no action for rent reserved by lease under seal, or for money secured by bond or other specialty, should be brought after twenty years, were construed as reconcileable, by holding that the later enactment was an exception out of the former. Thus, the effect of the conjoined enactments was that no more than six years' arrears of rent or interest were recoverable, except where they were secured by covenant or other specialty, in which case twenty years' arrears were recoverable (a). SECTION II.-CONSISTENT AFFIRMATIVE ACTS. When the later enactment is worded in affirmative terms only, without any negative expressed or implied, it does not take away the earlier law (6). The governing principle in all these cases is to construe the Acts, if possible, as reconcileable and capable of co-existence. Thus, an Act which authorised the Quarter Sessions to try a certain offence, would not be construed as wholly repealing an earlier one which 188, 21 LJ. Ex. 88; Exp. Warrington, 3 De G. M. & G. 159, 22 LJ. Bank. 33. (a) Hunter v. Nockolds, 1 Mc. N. & Gord. 640, Paget v. Foley, 2 Bing. NC. 679, Sims v. Thomas, 12 A. & E. 535, Humfrey v. Gery, 7 CB. 567. Comp. Round v. Bell, 30 Beav. 121. (b) Co. Litt. 115a, 2 Inst. 200. |