the above section, repealed so much of it as related to the Secretary of State, and enacted that the justices should order the payment of such sum as they should, themselves, direct. Five years later, the Act of Geo. 4 was totally repealed. It was held that the justices had authority to make the order under the Act of 3 & 4 Vict. (a), and that perhaps even the right of appeal had been impliedly preserved (b).

SECTION VI.- -GENERALIA SPECIALIBUS NON DEROGANT.

It is but a particular application of the general presumption against an intention to alter the law beyond the immediate scope of the statute, to say that a general Act is to be construed as not repealing a particular one by mere implication (c). A general later law does not abrogate an earlier special one. It is presumed to have only general cases in view, and not particular cases which have been already provided for by a special or local Act, or, what is the same thing, by custom (d). Having already given its attention to the particular subject, and provided for it, the Legislature is reasonably presumed not to intend to alter that

(a) R. v. Stepney, LR. 9 QB. 383.

(b) Per Blackburn J. Id. (c) Thorpe v. Adams, LR. 6 CP. 125; R. v. Champneys, Id. 384.

(d) Herbert's Case, 3 Rep. 136 note U.; Gregory's Case, 6 Rep. 196; R. v. Pugh, Doug. 188; Hutchins v. Player, Orl. Bridg. 272; Plowd. 36.

special provision by a subsequent general enactment, unless it manifests that intention in explicit language (a). It is, therefore, a received maxim of statutory interpretation that generalia specialibus non derogant. The general statute is read as silently excluding from its operation the cases which have been provided for under the special one.

Thus, after the 13 Eliz. c. 10 had declared all leases of ecclesiastical property void, other than for twentyone years or three lives, leases of house property in towns were excepted from its operation by the 14 Eliz. c. 11; and when, four years later, the 18 Eliz. c. 11, after reciting that a practice had already begun of granting reversionary leases of church property, enacted that "all leases hereafter to be made" by ecclesiastics, of church "lands, tenements and here"ditaments," should be void, if the old lease was not expired or determined within three years from the grant of the new; it was held that this last Act did not apply to the property dealt with by the 14 Eliz. (b).

Where an Act took away the right of bringing an action respecting certain disputes, which were referred to the summary adjudication of justices; it was held that the subsequently established County Courts ac

(a) Per Wood V. C. in Fitzgerald v. Champneys, 30 LJ. Ch. 782, 2 Jo. & H. 54.

(b) Per Sir O. Bridgman, in Wyn v. Lyn, Bridg. R. by

Bannister, 122. This case is not reported in the original edition of Bridgman's judgments, and the Court seems to have

been equally divided.

quired no jurisdiction to try such cases, under the general authority to try "all pleas" (a).

66

The General Turnpike Act, 3 Geo. 4, c. 126, which empowers turnpike trustees to let the tolls, and provides that all contracts for letting them shall be valid, though not by deed, "any Acts of Parliament or law to the contrary thereof notwithstanding," was held unaffected by the 8 & 9 Vict. c. 106, which in the most general terms declares that "a lease, required by "law to be in writing, of any tenements and hereditaments, shall be void unless made by deed." It was not to be supposed that the Legislature intended by the later Act to interfere with the policy of the earlier one, which was emphatically that a deed should not be required for turnpike tolls (6); though it would have been necessary by the general law of the land (c). An Act which declared all debtors to be subject to the bankrupt laws, would include debtors who had the privilege of Parliament from personal arrest; but any provisions of those Acts which authorised the arrest of bankrupts would be held inapplicable to a person entitled to the privilege. Unless it expressed a contrary intention plainly, it would be presumed that the Legislature did not intend to interfere with it (d).

(a) Exp. Payne, 5 D. & L. 679.

(b) Shepherd v. Hodsman, 18 QB. 316, 21 LJ. QB. 263.

(c) R. v. Salisbury, 8 A. & E. 716.

(d) Newcastle v. Morris, LR. 4 HL. 66.

The Act for abolishing fines and recoveries which, in the most comprehensive terms, authorises "every "tenant in tail" to bar his entail in a certain manner, would not be construed as applying to the tenant in tail of property entailed by special Act of Parliament, such as the Shrewsbury, Marlborough, Wellington, and other special Parliamentary entails (a). An Act which authorised " any person" to sell beer, who obtained a licence for the purpose, would not repeal the custom or local law of a borough which disqualified all persons who were not burgesses from selling beer (b). So, the 50 Geo. 3, c. 41, which empowered licensed hawkers to set up in any trade in the place where they resided, was held not to give them that privilege in a borough where, by custom, or by-law, strangers were not allowed to trade (c). Where a railway company had authority, under a special Act, to take certain lands in the metropolis for executing their works on them, it was held that its powers were unaffected by the Metropolis Local Management Act, 18 & 19 Vict. c. 120, which was passed shortly afterwards, giving the same powers to a public body (d). So, an Act which authorised the lord of a manor and his heirs to break up the pavement of

(a) Per Wood V. C. in Fitzgerald v. Champneys, ubi sup. See Abergavenny v. Brace, LR. 7 Ex. 145; and comp. Re Cuckfield Board, 19 Beav. 153.

(b) Leicester v. Burgess, 5 B.

& Ad. 246.

(c) Simson v. Moss, 2 B. & Ad. 543.

(d) London and Blackwall R. Co. v. Limehouse Board, 3 Kay & Johns, 123, 26 LJ. Ch. 164.

the streets of a town, for the purpose of laying down water-pipes to convey water to and through the town, from his estate, would not be affected by a subsequent Act which vested the same streets and pavements in a public body, and empowered it to sue any person who broke them up (a).

It is hardly necessary to add, however, that where a contrary intention is expressed or manifested, the maxim under consideration ceases to be applicable. Thus, the Prescription Act, 2 & 3 Will. 4, c. 71, abolished the custom of London which authorised the owner of an ancient house to build a new one on its old foundations to any height, though thereby obscuring the ancient lights of his neighbour (6). It has been held that the Dower (c) and Inclosure (d) Acts apply to gavelkind lands, though this local customary tenure is not expressly mentioned in either Act. Though the sheriffs of the Counties Palatine of Lancaster and Durham were expressly forbidden by the 7 & 8 Geo. 4, c. 71, to arrest on mesne process issuing from the Courts of Westminster, for less than 50%., this enactment was held repealed by the 1 & 2 Vict. c. 110, which after abolishing generally all arrests for debt, (a) Goldson v. Buck, 15 East, 173. 372.

(b) Salters' Co. v. Jay, 8 QB. 109; R. v. Mayor of London, 13 QB. 1; Merchant Taylors v. Truscott, 11 Ex. 855, 25 LJ. Ex.

(c) Farley v. Bonham, 2 Jo. & H. 177, 30 LJ. Ch. 239 ; and see sup. p. 24.

(d) Minet v. Leman, 7 De G. M. & G. 340, 24 LJ. Ch. 239.

M