On the Interpretation of Statutes

An Act which prohibits the negligent use of furnaces in such a manner as not to make them consume smoke as far as possible," means only so far as the smoke can be consumed consistently with the due carrying on of the business for which the furnace is used, and not as far as it is physically possible to consume it, without regard to the detriment which the business carried on would suffer; the Act not having expressed any intention to interfere with it (a). The Carriers Act (11 Geo. 4 & 1 Will. 4, c. 68), which exempts carriers from responsibility for the loss of certain articles worth more than ten pounds, unless their nature and value are declared, but enacts also that the Act shall not affect any special contract of carriage, was construed not literally, as making the Act inapplicable whenever any special contract was made, but only as not affecting any special contract inconsistent with the exemption provided by the Act (b). The ordinary stipulation in a bill of lading, excepting liability for breakage, leakage, and damage, would be similarly limited in construction, as not extending to any such injury caused by the shipowner or his servants (c).

531; Newton v. Young, 1 B. & P. N.R. 187; R. v. Maulden, 8 B. & C. 78; Waddington v. London Union, 28 LJ. MC. 103; R. v. Stretfield, 32 LJ. MC. 236; Bradford Union v. Wilts, LR. 3 QB. 604. Comp. Harrison v. Stickney, 2 HL. 108.

(a) Cooper v. Woolley, LR. 2 Ex. 88.

(b) Baxendale v. The G. E. R. Co., LR. 4 QB. 245.

It is to be borne in mind that the injustice and hardship which the Legislature is presumed not to intend is not merely such as may occur in individual and exceptional cases only. Laws are made ad ea quæ frequentius accidunt (a); and individual hardship not unfrequently results from enactments of general advantage. The argument of hardship has been said to be always a dangerous one to listen to (6). It is apt to introduce bad law (c); and has occasionally led to the erroneous interpretation of statutes (d). Courts must look at hardships in the face rather than break down the rules of law (e); and if, in all cases of ordinary occurrence, the law, in its natural construction, is not inconsistent, or unreasonable, or unjust, that construction is not to be departed from merely because, in some particular case, it may operate with hardship or injustice (ƒ).

(a) Dig. 1. 9. 3—10.

P. 695; and R. v. Shiles, 1 QB.

(b) Per Cur. in Munro v. Butt, 919, and Welch v. Nash, 8 East, 8 E. & B. 754.

(c) Per Rolfe B. in Winterbottom v. Wright, 10 M. & W. 116; Brand v. Hammersmith R. Co., LR. 2 QB. 241; Adams v. Graham, 33 LJ. QB. 71.

(d) Comp. ex. gr. Perry v. Skinner, 2 M. & W. 471, with R. v. Mill, 10 CB. 379, 1 L. M. &

394, with R. v. Phillips, 35 LJ. MC. 217, LR. 1 QB. 648.

(e) Per Lord Eldon in the Berkeley Peerage, 4 Camp. 419; and in Jesson v. Wright, 2 Bligh, 55.

(ƒ) See per Parker B. in Miller v. Salomons, 21 LJ. Ex. 192.

SECTION III.-CONSTRUCTION AGAINST IMPAIRING OBLIGATIONS, OR PERMITTING ADVANTAGE FROM ONE'S OWN WRONG.

On the general principle of avoiding injustice and absurdity, any construction would be rejected, if escape from it were possible, which enabled a person to defeat a statute, or impair the obligation of his contract by his own act, or otherwise to profit by his own wrong. Thus, an Act which authorised justices to discharge an apprentice under certain circumstances from his indenture, "on the master's appearance before them, would justify a discharge in his wilful absence. The Act, it was observed, must have a reasonable construction, so as not to permit the master to take advantage of his own obstinacy. It would be very hard that, supposing the master was profligate and ran away, the apprentice should never be discharged (a). For similar reasons, an Act (30 & 31 Vict. c. 84) which authorised a justice to summon a parent "to appear with his child" before him, for breach of the Vaccination Act, and " upon his appear'ance," to order the vaccination of the child, if he should find that it had not already undergone that operation, was held to authorise such an order without the appearance of the child, when the parent refused to produce it. A literal construction, making the production of the child a condition precedent to (a) Ditton's Case, 2 Salk. 490.

the making of the order, would have involved the supposition that the Legislature had intended to allow the parent to defeat its object by disobeying the summons which it had ordered (a).

Although the 9 Anne, c. 14, enacted that bills and notes, founded on the consideration of money lost at play, should be "utterly frustrate, void, and of none effect, to all intents and purposes," its operation was confined to preventing the drawer (or any person claiming under him (b)) from recovering from the loser; but it left the instrument unaffected in the hands of an innocent indorsee for value suing the drawer (c). The statute was construed as if the words were voidable as against certain persons only, but were valid as regards others.

So, where an Act provided that if the purchaser at an auction refused to pay the auction duty, when this was made a condition of sale, his bidding should be "null and void to all intents and purposes," it was held that the object of the enactment was completely attained by making the bidding void only at the option of the seller; thus avoiding the injustice and impolicy of enabling a man to escape from the obligation of his contract by his own wrongful act, which a literal construction would have involved (d).

(a) Dutton v. Atkins, LR. 6 QB. 673.

(b) Bowyer v. Bampton, 2 Stra. 1155.

(d) Malins v. Freeman, 4 Bing. NC. 395.

An enactment that a company should not issue any share, that no share should vest until one-fifth of its amount was paid up, and that the shareholder who had not paid up one-fifth should have no right of property in the shares allotted to him, or capacity to transfer them, was considered as limited protection to the public. To construe it as applying also to the benefit of the shareholder, would have been to absolve him from liability to pay up calls until he had paid the requisite proportion; or, in other words, to enable him to profit by his own default-a consequence too unjust and unreasonable to have been intended (a).

On similar grounds, enactments which abridge the effect or avoid conveyances, contracts, and instruments, have generally received a construction more compatible with the obvious object and policy of the Legislature than with the natural meaning of the language. Thus, though the Acts of 1 & 13 Elizabeth made utterly void and of none effect, to all intents, con

structions, and purposes," all leases by ecclesiastical persons and bodies, other than for twenty-one years or three lives, the prohibited leases have always been held valid as against the lessor, when a corporation sole, and even when a corporation aggregate with a head, during the life of its head (6). When it has no head, indeed, the Act receives necessarily its primary and

(a) East Gloucestershire R. Co. v. Bartholomew, LR. 3 Ex.

(b) Bishop of Salisbury's Case, 10 Rep. 606.

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