doubt should be given to the subject, and against the Legislature which has failed to explain itself (ƒ). But it yields to the paramount rule that every statute is to be expounded according to the intent of them that made it (g); and that all cases within the mischiefs aimed at are to be held to fall within its remedial influence (h). SECTION II.-STATUTES ENCROACHING ON RIGHTS, OR IMPOSING BURDENS. Statutes which encroach on the rights of the subject, whether as regards person or property, receive a strict construction. Thus, the Act 21 Edw. 1, de malefactoribus in parcis, which authorized a parker to kill trespassers whom he found in his park, and who refused to yield to him, was construed as strictly limited to a legal park, that is, one established by prescription or Royal Charter, and not merely one by reputation (i). A harbour Act, which imposed a penalty on (f) See Hull Dock Co. v. Browne, 2 B. & Ad. 59; per Pollock in Nicholson v. Fields, ubi sup.; and per Bramwell B. in Foley v. Fletcher, 28 LJ. (g) 4 Inst. 330, 11 Cl. & F. 143, 2 Peters, 662. cr any (h) Fennell v. Ridler, 5 B. & C. 409; The Industry, ubi sup. See R. v. Charretie, 13 QB. 447; Vine v. Leeds, inf. 259; R. v. Zulueta, sup. 122; R. v. Morris, sup. 180; Re Fergusson, sup. p. 204, and the cases in pp. 80, 87. (i) 1 Hale, 491; 3 Dyer, 326 b. S 66 66 66 person" who placed articles "on any quay, wharf, or landing place, within ten feet of the quay head, or on any space of ground immediately adjoining "the said haven, within ten feet from high-water mark," so as to obstruct the free passage over it, was held to apply only to ground over which there was already a public right of way, but not to private property not subject to any such right, and in the occupation of the person who placed the obstruction on it (a). Notwithstanding the comprehensive nature of the general terms used, it was not to be inferred that the Legislature contemplated such an interference with the rights of property as would have resulted from construing the words as creating a right of way. But an Act (33 & 34 Vict. c. 29, s. 14), which enacted that every person" convicted of felony" should for ever be disqualified from selling spirits selling spirits by retail, and that if any such person should take out, or have taken out a licence for that purpose, it should be void, was held to include a man who had been convicted of felony before, and had obtained a licence after the Act was passed. Although the expression "convicted " of felony" was ambiguous, as it might either include persons who had been already convicted, or only those who should thereafter be convicted, it was considered that the object of the Act was to protect the public from having beerhouses kept by men of bad character, (a) Harrod v. Worship, 1 B. & S. 381, 30 LJ. MC. 165; diss. Wightman J. and that the Act was to be construed in the sense which best advanced the remedy and suppressed the mischief. This construction gave, in a certain sense, a retrospective operation to the enactment (b). Statutes which impose pecuniary burdens, also, are subject to the rule of strict construction. It is a well settled rule of law that all charges upon the subject must be imposed by clear and unambiguous language, because in some degree they operate as penalties (c). The subject is not to be taxed unless the language by which the tax is imposed is perfectly clear and free from doubt (d). In a case of doubt the construction most beneficial to the subject is to be adopted (e). Thus, it was held that an Act which imposed a stamp on every writing given on the payment of money, whereby any sum, debt, or demand" was "acknowledged to have been paid, settled, balanced, or other"wise discharged," was held not to extend to a receipt given on the occasion of a sum being deposited (ƒ). Where an Act imposed a stamp duty on newspapers 66 (b) Vine v. Leeds (JJ.), QB. HT. 1875; diss. Lush J. (c) Per Bayley J. in Denn v. Diamond, 4 B. & C. 243; per Park J. in Doe v. Snaith, 8 Bing. 152. (d) Per Cur. in Hull Dock Co. v. Browne, 2 B. & Ad. 59; per Pollock C. B. in Nicholson v. Fields, 31 LJ. Ex. 233; Parry v. Croydon Gas Co., 11 CB. NS. 579; 15 Id. 568. (e) Per Lord Lyndhurst in Stockton R. Co. v. Barrett, 11 Cl. & F. 602; per Parke B. in Re Micklethwaite, 11 Ex. 456, 25 LJ. 19. (f) Tomkins v. Ashby, 6 B. & C. 541. See also Wroughton v. Turtle, 11 M. & W. 561. 66 66 and defined a newspaper as comprising "any paper containing public news, intelligence, or occurrences to be dispersed and made public," and also any paper containing any public news, intelligence, or occurrences, or any remarks or observations "thereon published periodically or in parts "or numbers, at intervals not exceeding twenty-six days," and not exceeding a certain size, it was held that a publication, the main object of which was to give news, but was published at intervals of more than twenty-six days, was not liable to the stamp duty as a newspaper (a). An Act which imposes a stamp duty on every charter party, or memorandum, or other writing between the captain or owner of a vessel "and any other person, relating to the freight or conveyance of goods on board," does not extend to a guarantee for the due performance of a charter party (b). And yet, where an Act, after imposing a stamp on contracts, exempted those which were made relative to the sale of goods, a guarantee for the payment of the price on such a sale was held included in the exemption (c); the same words being susceptible of meaning different things when used to impose a tax, or to exonerate from it (d). 66 66 (a) Atty.-Genl. v. Bradbury, East, 242. 7 Ex. 97, 21 LJ. Ex. 12. (d) Per Blackburn J., LR. 2 (b) Rein v. Lane, LR. 2 QB. QB. 151, citing Curry v. Edensor, 3 TR. 527, and Warrington v. Furbor, ubi sup. 144. (c) Warrington v. Furbor, 8 At the same time, such Acts, like penal Acts, are not to be so construed as to furnish a chance of escape and a means of evasion (a). In America, indeed, revenue laws are not regarded as penal laws in the sense that requires them to be construed with great strictness in favour of the defendant. They are regarded rather in their remedial character; as intended to prevent fraud, suppress public wrong, and promote the public good; and are so construed as to most effectually accomplish those objects (b). It is said that all statutes which give costs are to be construed strictly, on the ground that costs are a kind of penalty (c). There is little authority in support of the proposition. On the other hand, the power of ordering the payment of costs has been sometimes construed on the principle of beneficial and liberal construction; as where, for instance, they have been imposed on persons who were strangers to an action of ejectment, but at whose instance it was brought or defended (d). Enactments, also, which impose forms and solemnities on contracts on pain of invalidity are con (a) U. S. v. Thirty-six barrels of wine, 7 Blatchf. 459. (b) Cliquot's Champagne, 3 Wallace, 145. (c) Cone v. Bowles, 1 Salk. 205. (d) Hutchinson v. Greenwood, 4 E. & B. 324; Mobbs v. Vandenbrande, 33 LJ. QB. 177; comp. Evans v. Rees, 2 QB. 334; Anstey v. Edwards, 15 CB. 212; Hayward v. Gifford, 4 M. & W. 194. See also R. v. Pembridge, 3 QB. 901, sup. 52, and 201. |