the title of the Crown and of the subject accrue on the same day, the title of the Crown is preferred (a).

Sundays are included in all computations of time, except when the time is limited to twenty-four hours, in which case the following day is allowed (b). Thus, where an Act required that a recognizance should be entered into in two days after notice of appeal, and the notice was given on a Friday, it was held that recognizances entered into on the Monday were too late; though Sunday was the last day, and they could not be entered into then (c). Of course, when an Act expressly excludes Sunday, the days given for doing an act are working days only (d).

A continuing act, such as trespass or imprisonment, dates, in the computation of the time allowed for bringing an action in respect of it, from the day of its termination (e).

An offence made punishable, in the language of our old statutes, by "judgment of life or member," is thereby made a felony (f); but when the judgment

(a) R. v. Crump, 2 Ves. 295 ; R. Giles, 8 Pri. 293; Giles v. Grover, 9 Bing, 128.

(b) Burns, J., Tit. Lord's Day.

(c) Exp. Simpkins, 2 E. & E. 392, 29 LJ. MC. 23; Peacock v. Reg. 27 LJ. CP. 224; 4 CB. NS. 264.

(d) Pease v. Norwood, LR. 4 CP. 235.

(e) Massy v. Johnson, 12 East, 67; Hardy v. Ryle, 9 B. & C. 603; Pease v. Chaytor, 3 B. & S. 620; Whitehouse v. Fellowes, 10 CB. NS. 765.

(ƒ) Hawk, c. 40, s. 1.

is "forfeiture of body and goods," or to be at the King's will for body, lands, and goods, the offence is a misdemeanour only (a). When a "second offence" is the subject of distinct punishment, it is an offence committed after conviction of a first (b). When a

case is made triable by "a Court of Record," the Courts of Westminster, but not the Quarter Sessions, are intended (c). The punishment of "fine and ransom" is a single pecuniary penalty (d), and when to be imposed "at the King's pleasure," this is to be done in his courts and by his justices (e). When imprisonment is provided, immediate imprisonment is generally understood (f), and "forfeiture' means forfeiture to the Crown, except when it is imposed for wrongful detention or dispossession; in which cases the forfeiture goes to the benefit of the party wronged (g).

(a) Co. Litt. 391, 3 Inst. 145.

(b) 2 Inst. 468.

(c) 6 Rep. 19, 2 Hale, 29. (d) 1 Inst. 127.

(e) 1 Hale, 375.

(f) 8 Rep. 119; comp. 11 & 12 Vict. c. 43, s. 25, sup. 274.

(g) 1 Inst. 159, 11 Rep. 60.

CHAPTER XII.

SECTION 1.-IMPLIED ENACTMENTS-LOGICAL CONSE

QUENCES.

PASSING from the interpretation of the language of Statutes, it remains to consider what intentions are to be attributed to the legislature, where it has expressed none, on questions necessarily arising out of its enact

ments.

Although, as already stated, the legislature is presumed to intend no alteration in the law beyond the immediate and specific purposes of the Act, these are considered as including all the logical consequences strictly resulting from the enactment. Thus, an Act which declared an offence felony would impliedly give it all the incidents of felony; and it would make it an offence to be an accessory before or after it (a). Where the widow of a copyholder became entitled to dower by custom, it was held that she became entitled to all the incidents of dower, such as, among others, to damages, under the Statute of Merton, when deforced of her dower (b). The Bankrupt Acts, in requiring a (b) Shaw v. Thompson, 4 Rep. 32 b.

(a) 1 Hale, 704, 1 Hawk. c. 38, s. 18.

bankrupt to answer self-criminating questions relative to his trade and affairs, made his answers subject to the general rules of the law of evidence, and consequently admissible in evidence against him, even in criminal proceedings. To hold otherwise would have been, in effect, to suppose that the legislature, in expressly changing the law which had hitherto protected him from answering, intended also to make the further change, by mere implication, of suspending, pro tanto, the ordinary rule as regards the admissibility of selfprejudicing statements (a).

The Judgments Extension Act of 1868, which provided for the execution, in Scotland and Ireland, of judgments recovered in England, was considered as having impliedly abolished the rule of procedure which required that a plaintiff residing out of the jurisdiction should give security for costs; the logical reason for the rule (which was, that if the verdict were against the plaintiff, he would not be within the reach of the process of the Court for costs), having been swept away by the enactment (b).

So, the owner or master of a ship ceases to be liable for the injuries done by the ship through the acts or neglect of a pilot, where the employment of the latter is compulsory by law (c).

(a) R. v. Scott, D. & B. 47, 25 LJ. MC. 128.

(b) Raeburn v. Andrews, LR. 9 QB. 118.

(c) Carruthers v. Sidebotham,

4 M. & S. 77; The Maria, 1 W.
Rob. 95; The Agricola, 2 W.
Rob. 10. Comp. The China, 7
Wallace, 67.

If an Act permitted an encroachment on a public right, or abolished it, it would at the same time incidentally sweep away any private right to individual redress. Thus, when the Conservators of the Thames granted a license to construct a pier in the river, an individual would thereby be deprived of all right of action for any special injury resulting to him from the obstruction to the navigation (a).

Where an Act provided that the costs and expenses incident to passing it, should be paid by the Metropolitan Board, and did not state to whom they should be paid, it was held that they were payable to the promoters only, and not to agents and other persons employed by them (b).

A private Act which, after annexing a rectory to the deanery of Windsor, recited that the dean's residence at the latter place would oblige his frequent absence from the rectory, and required him to appoint a curate to reside there, was deemed to give him, by implication, an exemption from residence (c).

But this extension of an enactment is confined to its strictly logical consequences. An Act which empowered justices to discharge an apprentice from his apprenticeship if ill-treated by his master, would not inferentially empower them to order a return of the (a) Kearns v. Cordwainers' Works, 11 CB. NS. 744. Co., 6 CB. NS. 338, 28 LJ. 285.

(b) Wyatt v. Metrop. B. of

48.

(c) Wright v. Legge, 6 Taunt.