legislative body has impliedly granted to it by the Act or charter which constitutes it, the power of removing and keeping excluded from the chamber where it carries on its deliberations, all persons who interrupt its proceedings; for such a power is absolutely indispensable for the proper exercise of its functions. But a power of punishing such offenders for their contempt of its authority is not necessary for this purpose, and so is not granted by implication (a).

The concession of privileges or powers carries with it, often, implied obligations. For instance, an Act which gives a power to dig up the soil of streets for a particular purpose, such as making a drain, impliedly casts on those thus empowered the duty of filling up the ground again, and of restoring the street to its original condition (b).

A public body authorised to make a bridge or towpath and to take tolls for its use, is impliedly bound to keep it in proper repair, as long as it takes the tolls and invites the public to use the work; or at least, to give those whom they invite to use it, due warning of the defect which makes it unfit for use (c).

Ry. Co., LR. 1 CP. 499, and the cases collected there.

(a) Kielly v. Carson, 4 Moo. 163; Fenton v. Hampton, 11 Moo. 347; Doyle v. Falconer,

4 Moo. NS. 219.

(b) Gray v. Pullen, 5 B. & S. 970, 34 LJ. QB. 265.

(c) Winch v. Conservators of the Thames, LR. 7 CP. 458, 9

If statutory authority is given to persons, primarily for their own benefit and profit, rather than for any advantage which the public may incidentally derive ; as to cut through a highway and throw a bridge over the cutting, or to substitute a new road for the old one; the burden of maintaining the new work in repair would impliedly be cast on them, and not on the county or parish (a). Another duty which would also be imposed on them by implication would be that of protecting the public from any danger attending the use of the new work. If it was a swing bridge, for instance, they would be bound to take due precautions to prevent persons from attempting to cross while it was open (b). If the work was a railway, crossing a highway on a level, the company authorised to make it, would be impliedly bound to keep the crossing in a proper state to admit of the use of the highway by carriages, without damage to them (e).

And this implied obligation would not be excluded, on the principle expressum facit cessare tacitum, by the fact that certain duties are expressly imposed by statute on railway companies who make such crossings; ex. gr., to erect and maintain gates where the public road crosses the railway, and to employ men to open and

CP. 378; Nicholl v. Allen, 1 B. & S. 934, 31 LJ. QB., 283, 431.

(a) R. v. Kent, 13 East, 220; R. v. Lindsay, 14 East, 317; R. v. Kerrison, 3 M. & S. 526; R.

v. Ely, 15 QB. 827.

(b) Manley v. St. Helen's Co. 27 LJ. Ex. 159.

(c) Oliver v. N. E. Ry. Co., LR. 9 QB. 400.

shut them, and to keep them closed except when carriages have to cross (a). So, notwithstanding all such express provisions, the company would be bound, by implication, to prevent all passage along the portion of the highway thus intersected, when it was dangerous to cross (b).

But power to pull down the wall of a house without causing unnecessary inconvenience, would not impliedly involve the obligation of putting up a hoarding for the protection of the rooms exposed by the demolition (c).

Sometimes the express imposition of one duty may impliedly impose another. Thus the Ballot Act of 1872, which imposes, in express terms, certain specific duties on the presiding officers at polling stations, casts also on those officers, by implication, the duty of being present at their stations during an election, and of providing the voters with voting papers bearing the official mark required by the Act (d).

The grant of a privilege or of property to one, sometimes impliedly gives a right to another person. Thus, an Act which empowered a hospital to take and hold lands by will, gift, or purchase, without incurring the penalties of the Mortmain Acts, would impliedly em

(a) Id.; G. E. Ry. Co. v. Wanless, LR. 7 HL. 12.

(b) Lunt V. London and N. W. Ry. Co., LR. 1 QB. 277.

(c) Thompson v. Hill, LR.

5 CP. 564.

(d) Pickering v. James, LR. 8 CP. 489.

power persons to devise or convey lands to it; the Act would otherwise be nugatory (a). And yet, it seems that an Act which gave one railway company power to purchase certain lands and to construct a railway, according to the deposited plans and books of reference, would not be considered as impliedly giving another company power to sell any of those lands to it (b).

Again, in giving a judicial power to affect prejudicially the rights of person or property, a statute would be understood as silently implying, when it did not expressly provide, the condition or qualification that the power was to be exercised in accordance with the rule of natural justice that the person liable to be prejudicially affected should first have an opportunity of defending himself (c).

On this ground, under the 4 & 5 W. 4, c. 76, which authorises justices "at their just and proper "discretion" to order out-door relief to an aged or infirm pauper who is unable to work, no such order could be made without summoning those on whom the order was to be made (d). So, where an Act (1 & 2 Vict. c. 80), authorised justices, where it appeared that the

(a) Perring v. Trail, LR. 18 Eq. 88.

(b) R. v. S. Wales Ry. Co., 14 QB. 902.

(c) Bagg's Case, 11 Rep. 99; R. v. Univ. of Cambridge, Stra.

557; Emerson v. Newfoundland, 8 Moo. PC. 157; Thorburn v. Barnes, LR. 2 CP. 384; re Pollard, LR. 2 PC. 106.

(d) R. v. Totnes Union, 7 QB. 690.

appointment of special constables had been occasioned by the behaviour of persons employed by railway or other companies, in executing public works, to make an order on the treasurer of the company to pay the special constables for their services, which order, if allowed by a Secretary of State should be binding on the company; it was held that no such order could be validly made without giving the company notice, and an opportunity of being heard against it (a).

The Metropolitan Local Management Act, which requires that before the foundations of a building are laid, a seven days' notice shall be given to the district board, and authorises that board to demolish any building erected without such notice, was construed as impliedly imposing on the board the condition of giving the presumed defaulter a hearing, before proceeding to the demolition of his building; and a district board, which had confined itself to the letter of the Act, and had demolished a building respecting which it had received no notice, without first calling on the owner to show cause against its doing so, was held liable in an action as a wrong doer (b). A statute which required justices to issue a distress warrant to enforce a rate or other charge, even though it directed them to issue it, on proof of demand and non-payment," would nevertheless be construed as impliedly requiring that

(a) R. v. Cheshire Lines Committee, LR. 8 QB. 344.

(b) Cooper v. Wandsworth

Board, 14 CB. NS. 180, 32 LJ.
CP. 185.