a keeper should no longer absolve the owner from liability (a).

The construction which has been put upon Acts on similar subjects, even though the language should be different, should for a similar reason be referred to. Thus, the Insolvent Act, 1 & 2 Vict. c. 110, s. 37, which vests in the provisional assignee all the insolvent's debts which become due to him before his discharge, received the same construction as a similar provision in the Bankrupt Act of 6 Geo. 4 (b). The provision of the 9 Geo. 4, c. 14, requiring that an acknowledgment, to take a debt out of the Statute of Limitations, should be signed "by the party charge"able thereby," was held not to include an acknowledgment by his agent, on the ground that when the Legislature intended to include the signature of agents, not only in other Statutes of Limitations, but also in several sections of the Statute of Frauds, one of which was recited in the Act, express words had been used for the purpose (c). So the County Court Act of 1867, which gives jurisdiction in ejectment when the value of the tenement does not exceed twenty pounds, was construed, as regards the measure of value, by reference to the Parliamentary Assessment Act (d).

(a) Lawrence v. King, LR. 2 QB. 205; see also R. v. Moah, Dearsl. 626; Exp. Gorely, 34 LJ. Bcy. 1.

(b) Jackson v. Burnham, 8

Ex. 173, 22 LJ. Ex. 63; Herbert v. Sayer, 5 QB. 965.

(c) Hyde v. Johnson, 2 Bing. NC. 776.

(d) Elston v. Rose, LR. 4 QB. 4.

That which was held a sufficient signature to a will or contract under the Statute of Frauds (a), was held sufficient under the Bankrupt Act, 6 Geo. 4, c. 16, s. 131 (b), under the Statute of Limitations (c), and under the Registration of Voters' Act (d).

But where the Acts are not analogous, the construction which has been put upon one cannot be relied upon as a guide to the construction of another, the same reasons not being applicable (e). For instance, the meaning put on the word "goods" in the reputed ownership clause of the Bankrupt Acts, would be no guide to its meaning in the 17th section of the Statute of Frauds, not only because the words associated with it are different, but because the objects of the Act are wholly different (ƒ).

SECTION V.-THE TITLE-THE PREAMBLE-MARGINAL SCHEDULE PROVISOES AND SAVING

NOTES
CLAUSES.

Originally, bills in Parliament were mere petitions to the King. They were entered on the Rolls of Parliament, with the King's answer; and at the end

(a) Lemane v. Stanley, 3 Lev. 1; Knight v. Crockford, 1 Exp. 190; Herbert v. Treherne, 3 M. & Gr. 343.

(b) Ogilvy v. Foljambe, 3 Mer. 53; Kirkpatrick v. Tattersall, 13 M. & W. 766; Lobb v. Stanley, 5 QB. 574.

(c) Lobb v. Stanley, 5 QB. 574, per Patteson J.

(d) Bennett v. Brunfitt, LR. 3 CP. 28.

(e) Dewhurst v. Fielden, 7 M. & Gr. 187, per Maule J. (f) Humble v. Mitchell, 11 A. & E. 205.

D

of the session, the Judges drew up these records into statutes to which they gave a title. In the execution of their task, they occasionally made additions, omissions, and alterations; and the practice ceased in the reign of Henry VI., when bills in the form of Statutes without titles were introduced (a). The title was first added about the eleventh year of Henry VII. (b). In the House of Lords the title now appears to be treated as a part of the bill. In the Commons, it is not read three times, like the bill; but it is amended in committee, if the amendments made in the bill require it; and it may be, and often is, again amended when, after the bill has been passed, the Speaker puts the final question, "that this be the title" (c).

Nevertheless, singularly enough, the title is regarded by the Courts as not forming part of the Act, and therefore it is not taken into consideration in construing any passage of it (d). If indeed, it has been looked at sometimes to see what was the object of the Legislature (e), and has occasionally been referred to

(a) Per Lord Macclesfield, se defendendo, 16 St. Tr. 1389. May, Parlmy. Pr. Ch. 18.

(b) Barrington Obs. Stat. 403. (e) May, Parlmy. Pr., see pp. 501, 506, 519, 521, ed. 1873.

(d) Poulter's case, 11 Rep. 33 b.; per Treby C. J. in Chance v. Adams, 1 Lord Raym. 77; Mills v. Wilkins, 6 Mod. 62; ver Lord Hardwicke in Atty.

Genl. v. Weymouth, Ambl. 22; per Lord Mansfield in R. v. Williams, 1 W. Bl. 95; per Lord Cottenham in Hunter v. Nockolds, 1 Mc. N. & G. 651; Salkeld v. Johnson, 2 Ex. 283; Graves v. Ashford, LR. 2 CP. 417; Hadden v. The Collector, 5 Wallace, 107.

(e) Ex. gr., per Cur. in Johnson v. Upham, 2 E. & E. 250,

by the judges as bearing on the construction of the Act (a), this has been excused on the ground that the mind, when labouring to discover the design of the Legislature, naturally seizes on everything from which aid can be derived (b).

No greater effect is to be given to the marginal notes of the sections; neither they nor the punctuation being parts of the Act (c). Formerly, the bill was at one of its stages engrossed without punctuation on parchment (d). This practice was discontinued in 1849, since which time the record of the statutes is a copy printed on vellum by the Queen's printer (e).

The preamble has been said to be a good means to find out the meaning of a statute, and, as it were, a key to the understanding of it (f); and as it usually states or professes to state, the general object and intention of the Legislature in passing the enactment, it may legitimately be consulted for the purpose of solving any ambiguity, or fixing the meaning of words

28 LJ. QB. 257 ; Taylor v. Newman, 4 B. & S. 89, 32 LJ. MC. 186.

(a) See ex. gr. per Wigram V. C. in Wood v. Rowcliffe, 6 Hare, 191; per Grose J. in R. v. Gwenop, 5 TR. 135; see Free v. Burgoyne, 5 B. & C. 400, 2 Bligh, NS. 78.

(b) Per Cur. in U. S. v. Fisher, 2 Cranch, 386; U. S. v.

Palmer, 3 Wheat. 631.

(c) Claydon v. Green, LR. 3 CP. 511; Barrington, Obs. on Stat. 394; see Barrow v. Wadkin, 24 Beav. 327.

(d) 1. Bl. Comm. 183.
(e) May, Parl. P. Ch. 18.

(f) Bac. Ab. Stat. I. 2, Co. Litt. 79a, 4 Inst. 330; Halton v. Cove, 1 B. & Ad. 558; Beard v. Rowan, 9 Peters, 317.

which may have more than one, or determining the scope or limit of the effect of the Act, whenever the enacting part is in any of these respects open to doubt. Thus, in the 26 Geo. 3, c. 107, s. 3, which empowered every person who had served in the militia and was married, to set up in trade in a corporate town, as freely as soldiers might under an earlier enactment, and declared that "no such militiaman" should be removeable from the town until he became chargeable, it being open to doubt whether the expression "such militiaman" included all married militiamen, or only married militiamen who had set up in trade in towns, the preamble of the earlier Act showed that the latter was the true construction, as it stated that the mischief to be remedied was the state of the law which prevented soldiers from setting up in trade in corporate towns, and thus showed that the enactment was confined to men settled in trade (a). So, as an Act which authorized aliens who "shall "have been resident" in the country for two years to hold land, might either be limited to persons who had so resided before the passing of the Act, or extend to those who should at any time reside for the required time, the preamble was resorted to in order to determine which of the two meanings was the most agreeable to the policy and object of the Act (b); and as it recited that aliens were prevented by law from holding

(a) R. v. Gwenop, 5 TR. 145. (b) Beard v. Rowan, 9 Peters, 301.