include a lunatic (a). It would be in the last degree unreasonable to infer from the mere use of a wide but elastic expression, an intention to repeal the general principle of law that a lunatic is not responsible for his acts done during the loss of his reason. The word "person," therefore, would be limited to those who were in all respects accountable to our criminal law. For the same reason, an Act which provided that a mayor should not, by reason of his office, be ineligible as a town councillor or alderman, would not be construed as making him eligible when he acted in the judicial capacity of returning officer at the election; for it would not be a just construction of the general language used, or a legitimate inference from it, that the legislature intended to repeal by a mere side wind the principle of law that a man cannot be a judge in his own case (b). A statute which authorized "any " justices of the peace to try certain offences, would not authorize a justice to try any out of the territorial limits of his jurisdiction (c), or in which he had an interest, or which he was incapacitated by any other general principle of law from hearing (d), or to hear them by any other course of proceeding than that established by law (e).

(a) Eyston v. Studd, Plowd. 465, Bac. Ab. Stat. I. 6.

(b) R. v. Owens, 2 E. & E. 86, 28 LJ. QB. 316; R. v. Tewkesbury, LR. 3 QB. 639.

(c) Re Peerless, 1 QB. 153.

(d) Bonham's Case, 8 Rep. 118a; Great Charte v. Kennington, 2 Stra. 1173.

(e) Dalt. c. 6, s. 6.

SECT. II.-RESTRICTIVE EFFECT OF THE PRESUMPTION.

The most common effect of this presumption is to restrict the meaning of the language. Thus, the 39 Eliz. c. 5, which gave to "all persons" seised of lands in fee, power to found hospitals, would not be construed as conferring that power on corporate bodies which were disabled from alienation; though the word persons" properly includes corporations, and the power in question extended to those corporate bodies which possessed the power of alienation, such as municipalities (a). The Wills Act of Hen. 8, which empowered "all persons" to devise their lands, did not legalise a devise of land to a corporation (b), nor would it have enabled lunatics or minors to make a will, even if the 33 & 34 Hen. 8, s. 14 had not been passed to prevent a different construction (c). The object of the legislature was, obviously, only to confer a new power of disposition on persons already of capacity to deal with their property, not to release from disability from disposing or taking those who were under such incapacity. The Statute of Limitations, however, would include all persons whether under incapacity to sue or

(a) 2 Inst. 721, Corp. of Newcastle v. The Atty.-Genl., 12 Cl. & F. 402.

(b) Jesus College Case, Duke, Charit. Uses, 78; Braneth v.

Havering, Id. 83; Christ's Hospital v. Hawes, Id. 84.

(c) Beckford v. Wade, 17

Ves. 91.

not, unless expressly exempted (a). In making copyholds devisable, the Wills Act, 1 Vict. c. 26, was construed as not intended to interfere with the relation of lord and tenant; and it was consequently held that devised copyholds did not vest immediately in the devisee, but remained in the customary heir until the devisee's admittance (b).

So, it was held that the provision of the Statute of Limitations, 3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 27, s. 26, which deprives the owner of lands of the right of suing in equity for their recovery, on the ground of fraud, from a purchaser who did not know or have reason to believe that any such fraud had been committed, was to be construed subject to the presumption that the legislature had not intended, by its general language, to subvert the established principles of equity on the subject of constructive notice, and was therefore read as meaning that the purchaser did not know or have reason to believe, either by himself, or by some agent whose knowledge or reason to believe is, in equity, equivalent to his own (c).

A charitable provision for the support of " maimed " soldiers would not extend to soldiers who had been maimed in the service of a foreign state, or in punishment for a crime (d). A statute which enacted that

(a) Id. 92, Buckinghamshire

v. Drury, Wilm. 194.

(b) Garland v. Meade, LR. 6 QB. 411; see also Bishop v.

Curtis, 18 QB. 878.

(c) Vane v. Vane, LR. 8 Ch. 383.

(d) Duke, Charit. Uses, 134.

every conveyance" in a particular form should be "valid," would not receive the sweeping effect, so foreign to its object, as that of curing a defect of title (a). The 12 Car. 2, c. 17, which enacted that all persons presented to benefices in the time of the Commonwealth, and who should conform as directed by the Act, should be confirmed therein, "notwithstanding any act or thing whatsoever," was obviously not intended to apply to a person who had been simoniacally presented (b). It is obvious that a literal construction would, in these cases, have carried the operation of the Act far beyond the intention.

So, the sixth section of the Habeas Corpus Act which, for the prevention of unjust vexation by reiterated commitments for the same offence, enacts that no person who has been discharged on habeas corpus shall be imprisoned again for "the same offence," except by the Court wherein he is bound by recognizances to appear, or other Court having jurisdiction in the cause, would not extend to a case where the discharge was made on the ground that the commitment had been made without jurisdiction, though the offence for which he was arrested on the second occasion was the same; for this was obviously beyond the object of the Act (c),

(a) Ward v. Scott, 3 Camp. 232,

284.

(b) Crawley v. Philips, Sid.

(c) Atty.-Genl. v. Kwok Ah Sing, LR. 5 PC. 179.

66

The 1 & 2 Vict. c. 110, s. 13, which enacts that a judgment against any person" shall operate as a charge on lands, "rectories, advowsons, tithes and hereditaments" in which the judgment debtor has any interest, was held to apply only to lay rectories, advowsons and tithes; for the Act showed no intention of interfering with the 13 Eliz. c. 10, which makes void all chargings of ecclesiastical property in ecclesiastical hands (a). It was read as applying only to those debtors who had the power of charging their property. The Toleration Act, which exempts dissenters from prosecution in the ecclesiastical Courts for not conforming to the Church of England, does not exempt a clergyman of the Church who had seceded from it, from prosecution in those Courts for performing the Anglican church service in a dissenting chapel not licensed by the bishop; for this is a breach of discipline, and not within the scope and object of the Act (b). The Statute 27 Geo. 3, c. 44, which enacted that no suit should be commenced in any ecclesiastical court for incontinence or brawling after the expiration of eight months from the commission of the offence, would apply only to suits which might be brought against laymen as well as against clergymen ; and would therefore apply to a suit against a clergyman, when its object was the reformation of (b) Barnes v. Shore, 8 QB. 640.

(a) Hawkins v. Gathercole, 6 MacN. De G. & G. 1, 11; 24 LJ. Ch. 332.