object of the Act being only to protect creditors against sham bills of sale, and being completely attained by requiring the registration of the first-mentioned trusts; while the registration of any others was foreign to the purposes of the Act (a). So, the general language of the Merchant Shipping Act of 1854, s. 299, which provides that, if damage arises to person or property from non-observance of the sailing rules, it should be considered as the wilful default of the person in charge of the deck at the time, was confined by a due regard to the object in view, to the regulation of the rights of the owners of ships in cases of collision, and therefore held not to affect the relations between the master and his owners, so as to make the former guilty of barratry, which would have been altogether foreign to the scope of the Act (b).

The enactment (16 & 17 Vict. c. 59, s. 19) which makes presentment of any draft on a banker payable to order or on demand, if purporting to be indorsed (though a forgery) by the payee, a sufficient authority to the banker to pay the amount, is in the same way limited in its effect, as in its object, to the relations between banker and customer; and does not prevent the latter from recovering his money from the person who received it (c). The 16th secIron Screw Co., LR. 1 CP. 600, 3 CP. 476.

(a) Robinson v. Collingwood, 34 LJ. CP. 18, 17 CB. NS. 777. See also Hodson v. Sharpe, 10 East, 350.

(b) Grills v. The General

(c) Ogden v. Benas, 43 LJ. CP. 259.

tion of the Companies Clauses Consolidation Act, which provides that no shareholder shall be entitled to transfer any share after a call, until he has paid up all calls due on all his shares, is only a protection to the company, giving it a lien or charge upon the shares; but it does not affect the validity of a transfer, as regards the creditors of the company, if the company has assented to it (a). So, it has been held that the provisions of a railway Act which place the management of the company's affairs in the hands of a certain number of directors, were intended for the protection of the shareholders merely, and that it was not open to a stranger to object that they had not been complied with (b). The 153rd section of the Companies Act of 1862, which declares "void" every transfer of shares in a company which is being wound up, unless the Court otherwise orders, was held not to prevent a broker who had bought and paid for shares in a company so situated from recovering from his principal the money so paid (c).

In the same way, the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Acts, which, in clear and unequivocal terms vested in the assignee all the property, both present and future, of the bankrupt or insolvent, were held only to establish the right of the assignee to the future property, as between himself and the bankrupt or

(a) Littledale's Case, LR. 9 Ch. 257..

(b) Thames Haven Co. V.

Rose, 4 M. & Gr. 552.

(c) Chapman v. Shepherd, LR. 2 CP. 228.

insolvent; but not to affect the right of the bankrupt or insolvent, as between himself and his debtor, unless the assignee interfered, to sue for a debt which accrued due after the vesting of the property in the assignee; and the provision contained in the Acts that the bankrupt or insolvent should not have the power to recover such debts, was similarly limited in effect (a). The Bankruptcy Act of 1869, which enacts (sect. 23) that the trustee in bankruptcy may disclaim any interest of the bankrupt, and that the property is to be deemed surrendered on the day of the disclaimer, was held not to affect the right of the lessor to sue the original lessee from whom the bankrupt held by assignment (b); these rights and liabilities being foreign to the scope of the Act. And yet, as the Act did not provide that in such a case the surrender should re-vest the property in the lessee, it would seem to vest it in the lessor, and thus to entitle the latter to both the property and the rent (c). The 38th section of the Companies Act of 1867, which requires that every prospectus shall specify all contracts entered into by the company, and declares every prospectus which does not specify them fraudulent on the part of the promoters and directors who knowingly issued it, as regards persons taking shares, was held to be only a protection to

(a) Herbert v. Sayer, 5 QB. 965; Jackson v. Burnham, 8 Ex. 173.

(b) Smyth v. North, LR. 7

Ex. 242.

(c) Per Bramwell B. Id.

shareholders, but not to create any duty towards bondholders (a).

So, the Stamp Acts, which exclude unstamped documents from being given in evidence, have been held not to extend to cases where the validity of the document is impugned on the ground of fraud or illegality (b). So, the 30 Vict. c. 23, s. 7, which invalidates all contracts of sea assurance unless expressed in a policy, and (s. 9) prohibits pleading or giving in evidence any policy which is not stamped, does not prevent the admission of the "slip" in evidence on a collateral question of fraud or misrepresentation (c).

In the same spirit, the operation of the Act 7 Anne, c. 12, which, with the view of securing the inviolability accorded by the law of nations to the ambassadors of foreign states, enacted that all writs and processes whereby an ambassador or his servant might be arrested, or his goods seized should be null and void, was held not to extend beyond what might be necessary for the protection of the rank, duties, and religion of the ambassador; and not to protect his servant, who rented a house, part of which he let in lodgings, from having his goods taken by distress for non-payment of a parochial rate. Such a house was

(a) Cornell v. Hay, LR. 8 CP. 328.

(b) R. v. Hawkesworth, 1. TR. 450, 2 East, PC. 955; R. v.

Gompertz, 9 QB. 824; Ponsford

v. Walton, LR. 3 CP. 167.

(c) Ionides v. The Pacific Insurance Co., LR. 7 QB. 517.

not one merely necessary for the servant's residence ; and to extend the operation of the Act to such a case would have been to cover ground foreign to its scope and object (a).

SECT. III.-ENLARGING EFFECT OF THE PRESUMPTION AGAINST DISTURBING THE LAW.

Although the presumption against an intention to alter the general law is usually restrictive, in various ways, of the meaning of the language of a statute, there are some few cases in which it has the opposite effect, and the language is read in a larger sense than would popularly be given to it.

For instance, a statute which requires something to be done by a person, would be complied with, in general, if the thing were done by another for him. and by his authority; for it would be presumed that there was no intention to prevent the application of the general principle of law that qui facit per alium facit per se; unless there was something either in the language or in the object of the statute which showed that a personal act was intended. On this ground, an Act of Parliament which requires that notice of appeal shall be given by churchwardens, is complied with if given by their attorney (b). So, the

(a) Novello v. Toogood, 1 B. & C. 554.

(b) R. v. Middlesex, 1 L. M.

& P. 621; R. v. Carew, 20 LJ. MC. 44n.; R. v. Kent, 8 QB. 315.