surrendered for Soletov carries with it an implication, not in the original, that it was the royal family that voluntarily endowed the Archon with the prerogative mentioned, whereas dobelσwv simply means given, presumably, in this case, not by the king, but by the nobles, who were gradually taking power from the king into the hands of their own order. With this correction Kenyon's translation yields the sense of the original, namely, "in his reign the descendants of Kodros gave up their exclusive right to the office of Barihλeus in return for the prerogatives given to the Archon." This implies that the kingship had hitherto been open only to the family of Kodros; the creation of the office of Polemarch, or war-king, has just been mentioned by Aristotle as the first step in the disintegration of the king's power; the office of Archon also, apparently at its first creation, was now endowed with such powers that the ancient royal family no longer cared to maintain their exclusive right to the emasculated kingship; this, therefore, they voluntarily resigned in exchange for an equality of privilege with the other Eupatrid families as regards eligibility to the archonship, which now became the most important magistracy. This interpretation, which is in part that of the Danish scholar, Dr. Hude, adheres to the ordinary meaning of every word, including avrí, and implies a course of events that has an air of historical probability. The only objection to it is that we get no hint of these details from other sources, and that other traditions appear to be inconsistent with them. where Aristotle does not hesitate to disagree with other historians, both by direct contradiction and by the adding of otherwise unknown details. What we seek now is Aristotle's statement simply. The pregnancy of the clause is thoroughly Aristotelian. Moreover, the author does not vouch for the truth of the tradition, but by the es gives the explanation as that of an indefinite minority, ἔνιοι.

But else

In regard to ch. 4 on the Drakonian constitution, which has been looked upon as an interpolation, Dr. Sandys does not appear to reach a definite conclusion. The argument for the genuineness of the passage has been materially strengthened by Bruno Keil's work, Die solonische Verfassung, another contribution to the subject which came too late for more than brief notice. Keil shows how closely the contents of the chapter are interwoven with Aristotle's entire history of the early constitution. Another consideration of a general nature may be mentioned.

What has thrown doubt on the genuineness of the account is the placing of so many institutions in the seventh century that were supposed to be of much later origin-as a Council of 401, the use of the lot, the principle of accountability, the property classes. But the truth is, a general tendency of recent investigations has been to establish an earlier date for more than one phase of Greek civilization. An illustration or two may be taken from the excavations on the Acropolis of Athens and in Peloponnesus. By the fragments of pottery found in the débris of the Persian destruction it has been proved that the finest styles of blackfigured and red-figured vases are to be placed from fifty to a hundred years earlier than the date hitherto assumed; and at Tiryns and Olympia the spade has made necessary a like recasting of some chapters in the history of architecture. The recognition of this general trend has an obvious bearing upon the present question.

We have noted several other passages where we might take exception to the interpretation of Dr. Sandys, particularly in the second part, on ἡ νῦν κατάστασις τῆς πολιτείας, on which little special work has yet been published. But the truth is, as was intimated above, the treatise abounds in problems that are as yet unsolved, some of them perhaps insoluble. Instead of dwelling ungraciously upon the fact that an editor has not in less than two years done everything, we ought rather to recognize gratefully that his edition marks a new stage in our study of the treatise, and is indispensable to the student of Athenian political institutions. T. D. Goodell.

History of the United States from the Compromise of 1850. By James Ford Rhodes. New York, Harper & Brothers, 1893.-8vo, x, 506; ix, 541 pp. Vol. i, 1850-54; vol. ii, 1854-60.

This is a valuable addition to the important works on our political and constitutional history which have appeared in the last two years. Its perusal is calculated to give one a high opinion of the author's ability and fairness. Choosing as he did a recent period, the momentous conflicts of which aroused to a remarkable degree the passions of men, and concerning which voluminous records have accumulated, two dangers evidently beset his path. He was in danger of judging unfairly those whose course he must have strongly disapproved, and he was in

danger of loading his book with details which it must have been hard to reject. He has successfully avoided both these dangers. His historical perspective is excellent, and it is difficult to detect personal bias in his judgments of men at opposite political poles. The smooth and easy flow of the narrative should be especially noted. By judicious selection and skillful arrangement the important events of the period under consideration are placed before us in such a way as to produce an impression of unity which has become somewhat unusual in a work of this kind. With a single exception one looks in vain for those breaks with which some of our well known histories have made us familiar, where one thread is abruptly dropped and another is taken up. The single exception is to be found in chapter four of the first volume. Was not the insertion of that chapter a mistake? Surely there is no need at this late day to prove that slavery was a prodigious wrong to the slave and injury to the master. Besides, the chapter in question contains repulsive details which can serve no useful purpose now when placed before the general reader, and which the student might well have been left to search for in special histories on the subject of slavery.

In illustration of the author's judicial temper and graceful style, observe the way in which his inevitable censure of Calhoun is put. "It is indeed wondrous pitiful to contemplate Calhoun who had fine ability and sterling morality in private life, thus held captive by one idea, and that idea totally at variance with the moral sentiment of the nineteenth century. In other service he would have been a useful statesman, but he must be judged by the fruits of his two favorite dogmas, the extreme states-rights theory of 1832, and the slavery extension doctrine of 1848. The two, thoroughly disseminated throughout the South, became prime elements of political faith. Their working forced her onward to secession, and induced a proud, high-spirited people to battle for an idea utterly condemned at the tribunal of modern civilization" (vol. i, p. 95). Notice also the delicate touch in the few following words which so clearly portray the diplomatic nature of Seward on the occasion when President Taylor followed Fillmore's advice rather than his own in making certain nominations to office. "He did not retire to his tent, but patiently bided his time. He voted for the confirmation of his adversaries, and then went to work with serenity to supplant his rival in the favor of the President." (Vol. i, p. 101.)

The author appropriately gives much space to Webster's political career, with a just estimate of its importance, and of the motives which probably directed it. In one particular, however, the correctness of his opinion of the seventh of March speech may well be questioned. Webster had opposed the application of the Wilmot proviso to the newly acquired territory of New Mexico on the ground that the soil and climate were unfavorable to agriculture, and therefore slave labor could not be profitably employed; hence the actual exclusion of slavery would be secured without congressional enactment. Under this condition of affairs, to insist on the proviso would simply anger the South to no practical purpose. This view he summed up in the words, "I would not take pains uselessly to re-affirm an ordinance of nature, nor to re-enact the will of God. I would put in no Wilmot proviso for the mere purpose of a taunt or reproach." Of this Mr. Rhodes says, "It is probable that the matured historical view will be that Webster's position as to the application of the Wilmot proviso to New Mexico was statesmanship of the highest order. . . . . . It was understood that neither cotton, tobacco, rice, nor sugar could be raised, and no one in 1850 maintained that slave labor was profitable save in the cultivation of those products." (Vol. i, pp. 149, 150). But in Lodge's life of Webster (p. 319) we are reminded that mining had from ancient times been considered a profitable form of slave labor, and we are told "that this form of employment for slaves was eagerly desired by the South; that the slave-holders fully recognized their opportunity, announced their intention of taking advantage of it, and were particularly indignant at the action of California because it had closed to them this inviting field." This statement is supported by citations from speeches in Congress as reported in the Congressional Globe. Thus, Mr. Clingman of North Carolina on January 22d, said, "But for the anti-slavery agitation our Southern slaveholders would have carried their negroes into the mines of California in such numbers that I have no doubt but that the majority there would have made it a slave holding state."

Passing by the erroneous statement pointed out above, was Webster's course one of "highest statesmanship?" It was essentially this. He set out to save the Union by yielding ground to those who he feared would destroy the Union if they were thwarted in their purpose of steadily advancing the slave power. Fixing his eyes on the physical conditions of the new territory,

and believing that the concession would prove barren of direct material result, he apparently did not look forward to the immense moral effect of a refusal by Congress to declare a new piece of the national domain consecrated to freedom. The highest statesmanship is that which most accurately divines the tendency of events, and is thus enabled to secure the most enduring results. The compromise of 1850 did produce quiet for a short time, but as we all know, it was only the lull which precedes the storm. Lincoln was the man who in advance of the other great leaders of his day saw and proclaimed most clearly that: "this government cannot endure permanently half slave and half free -it will become all one thing or all the other," and he shaped his course accordingly. This was statesmanship of a higher order than that exemplified in the Clay compromise and the seventh of March speech. C. H. SMITH.

BOOKS RECEIVED.

Adeney, Walter F., M.A. The Expositor's Bible. (Ezra, Nehemiah, and Esther.) Edited by the Rev. W. Robertson Nicoll, M.A., LL.D. New York, A. C. Armstrong & Son, 1893.

Boies, Henry M. Prisoners and Paupers. A study of the abnormal increase of criminals and the public burden of paupers in the United States. The Causes and Remedies. New York and London, G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1893. xiii, 318 pp.

Briggs, Charles Augustus. The Higher Criticism of the Hexateuch. New York, Charles Scribner's Sons, 1893.

The Case Against Professor Briggs. 1893.

The Defense of Professor Briggs. Before the Presbytery of New York. New York, Charles Scribner's Sons, 1893.

Caird, Edward. The Evolution of Religion. "Gifford Lectures," Macmillan & Co., 1893. 2 vols.

Calderwood, Henry. Evolution and Man's Place in Nature. London and New York, Macmillan & Co., 1893.

Clark, George H. Oliver Cromwell. Boston, D. Lathrop & Co., 1893.

Clark, Henry. English Prose. New York, Macmillan & Co., 1893. Contributions to North America Ethnology. vol. vii. Riggs, Stephen R. A Dakota English Dictionary, Washington, Government Printing Office, 1890.

Fisher, G. P. Manual of Natural Theology. 1893.