Rubino shows in his first chapter, "Of the Transferring (Uebertragung) of the Roman Magistracy," that office was conferred in all instances by a personal act (creare, renunciatio) on the part of a magistrate; that no magistrate could create an officer with higher powers than he himself possessed, nor could any but the highest magistrate (consul, interrex, dictator) create one with powers equal to his own; that without this renunciatio election by the people gave no power; that office thus conferred was sacred, and could never (in the flourishing period of the Republic) be taken away, the first instance being that of Marcus Octavius, B. C. 133. There was therefore an analogy to ordination in the Roman and English churches, the officer receiving by this act a consecration (Weihe), which he could lose only by personal abdication. It will be seen that this is quite inconsistent with hereditary monarchy and divine right, as it has been understood in modern times. This consecration is not transferred by descent, but by a personal act of renunciatio on the part of the incumbent, based on the previously expressed will of the people, and at the death of the consecrated magistrate it of course expires. It is theocratic in its nature, resting on the will of the gods, which it was believed bestowed the consecration at first, and renewed it at every stage, by giving the possession of the auspices. Who then possessed the auspicia maxima when the consecration had expired through the death of the king or other chief magistrate? Rubino answers, that, when the consecration has expired in any individual chief magistrate, it must be renewed in some other individual (as interrex) by the patrician part of the Senate, since in this case the auspices, and the power of obtaining a fresh consecration from the gods, belong for the moment to this body.*

* We give his own words in the most important passage on this point (p. 86): "Wenn durch den Tod des Königs das Haupt, welchem die Auspicien angehörten, hinweggenommen war, dann wurde es als sicher angenommen, dass in der Mitte der patricischen Senatoren sich der befinde, welchem die Götter zunächst die Fortleitung ihrer Herrschaft über Rom übertragen würden, und daher hatte die Gesammtheit derselben, obgleich entblösst von aller Magistratswürde, oder wie der Kunstausdruck lautete, privatim, für diesen Moment und für ihn allein die Auspicien."

Thus far all is clear, and to the Romans, to whom this consecration was a real thing, true. But the thing proved is that the patricians, not the king, as Rubino assumes, were practically the source of power, and that the government was thus, not a monarchy, but an aristocratic republic. He continues his argument in the third chapter, and on the views there advanced as to the construction of the Senate and the origin of the patricians rests his whole theory. These views are, that the patres were in early as in later times identical with the Senators; that these were appointed by the king from a previously existing body of nobility, and that those thus set apart became the heads of the patrician gentes, the patricians being the descendants of the patres, and receiving their rank from the king through them. Now that the king appointed the Senators from his own free will may be granted as proved, but that the patricians were only the descendants of the Senators thus appointed is far from being made out. Rubino himself acknowledges that the Senators must have been selected from a body of nobles already existing; but what becomes of the rest of these nobles, perhaps equally wealthy, educated, and well-born, he nowhere tells us. We must suppose that they fell into the condition of clients, belonging as subordinates to the gentes of their patrons, and competent to rise themselves by a similar arbitrary appointment, or the dying out of an old gens, to the patrician rank. But it is very far from proving this to adduce half a dozen passages in which Romulus is said to have appointed a hundred patres, meaning by these Senators, and three passages † where the patricii are called the descendants of these patres. Numberless instances may be brought up where patres does not mean the Senators, but the patricians.‡ And that a few antiquaries derived the word patricius from pater, as signifying descent, is a frail founda

*Rubino, p. 185.

*

† Cicero de Rep. II. 12. Livy, I. 8. Dionysius, II. 8.

One of the most striking is Livy, IV. 4. For other passages, as well as an able criticism of Rubino's theory, see Becker's Handbuch der römischen Alterthümer, II. 1. p. 140 and following.

tion for so important a theory. Dionysius and Livy† themselves mention other derivations. Apart from the difficulty of believing that an arbitrary choice by the king could establish a body like the Roman patriciate, we must claim, in view of these facts, that only the assumption that the monarchy was founded by Romulus, the heir of Alba, the descendant of Eneas, Capys, and the gods themselves, and that on him the auspices descended from heaven, can add the link wanting to complete Rubino's argument. This is assumed by Bachofen in his sketch of the history of the constitution, and in his hands the theory gains in beauty and consistency. But Rubino has no belief in Romulus, and scarcely mentions his It is not proved, then, that the patricians were descended from Senators appointed arbitrarily by the king, and consequently it is not proved that the patrician body received its being from the king, the auspices, and the divine consecration from the gods through him. On the other hand, it is acknowledged that a body of nobility existed before the Senate was instituted, and that from this the Senate was appointed. Why is not this then the patrician body? It is acknowledged, too, that the patricians were practically the possessors of the auspices, and thus the medium through which the divine consecration was conferred, and that thus Rome was essentially an aristocracy, not an absolute monarchy.

name.

For these reasons we do not hesitate to reject Rubino's theory, but at the same time would acknowledge our very great indebtedness to his discussions on the practical administration of the monarchy. They have been of essential aid to all subsequent writers. Particularly Bachofen, who wrote the chapter on the Law in his and Gerlach's History, has followed Rubino's theory in its principal points, looking at it, however, more from the Roman point of view as a real consecration received by Romulus, and holding Niebuhr's opinion as to the identity of patres and patricii. This is the finest chapter in the book, -rich and suggestive in thought, earnest in tone, eloquent in language; we can

heartily recommend it, as indeed the whole volume, to those who desire merely a reproduction of the thoughts and opin ions of the Romans themselves. Schwegler's work will be consulted by those who wish to study individual points. But to Mommsen's we would refer those who wish the pith and spirit of Roman history. With many of his views we cannot agree, but we are sure that no one can read his rich, thoughtful pages without gaining a truer and more living knowledge of early Rome.

ART. XI. The British Poets. Edited by Professor CHILD, of Harvard University. A Complete Collection, from Chaucer to Wordsworth. Boston: Little, Brown, & Co. 1856.

1853

Is there a word in our language more difficult of definition than poetry? To define it is not to say what poetry ought to be, but to determine the characteristics possessed in common by compositions which the world insists on calling poetical. The derivation of the word gives no clew to its meaning; for there are very many romances and prose fictions that display the highest grade of creative power,- nay, who can deny that Scott showed larger and more versatile ability, as a TonTns, a maker, in Ivanhoe than in Marmion? But, on the other hand, mere rhythm does not make poetry; for we often read prose that is more rhythmical than verse sometimes is, while we withhold the name of poetry from the most euphonious versification, if made up of detail, burlesque, or doggerel. Artificial measures, resolvable into feet, do not constitute poetry; for the transfusion of the poetry of one language into the prose form of another does not make it prose to the reader's consciousness. No translation of the Hebrew Psalms has succeeded in stripping them of the poetic element; nor does the impossibility of determining the Hebrew metres, or even the denial that there were any, suggest a doubt as to the class of compositions to which those Psalms be

long. For ourselves, we have no question that poetry is older than metre or intentional rhythm. Its sentiments are such as naturally seek for themselves a musical utterance; oral repetition probably wore the world's earliest poems smooth, and indented them with cæsuras and cadences; and when poetry and music, as they passed from infancy, discovered their twin-sisterhood, they chose thenceforward to show their consanguinity by wearing like apparel.

If we make a thorough generalization of what has been universally accepted as poetry, we shall find its sole characteristic its logical differentia to be this: a double purpose in the author, the aim, not only to convey thought or sentiment, but to produce pleasurable emotions by the form in which it is conveyed. Prose derives its rhetorical merit from the singleness of its aim. Conciseness and perspicuity have for their mission, not the delight of the ear, but the prompt and full transfusion of the author's into the reader's mind. True eloquence craves not attention to its form or its subsidiary ideas; but its aim is to intensify the intellectual perception by means of vivid emotion. When the attention is arrested and diverted by the process of communication, the writer ceases to be eloquent, and is merely grandiloquent. But it is the essence of poetry to make the reader linger and loiter by the way, to attract and charm him by the collocation of words, by the grouping of imagery, by accessories which demand his sympathy and admiration independently of the mental or moral impression to which they are auxiliary. Thus descriptive prose, no matter how ornate, has for its design the presentation of an actual scene just as it is to the inward sense; while descriptive poetry presents the scene wreathed and interpenetrated with adornings, which belong to it not in fact, but by the law of fitness and congeniality, yet which are to be associated with it and received as appertaining to it. In fine, prose is the fruit served for actual use, and considered as fruit alone; poetry is the flower-garland twined around it and hanging over it, in such combinations of grace and beauty that it shall attract the eye more strongly than the fruit woos the appetite.