Sterling v. Lodge. construction would also take away one of the safeguards by which the order is enabled to place each candidate upon his honor at the very time he is being introduced, and require from him a statement respecting the condition of his health, and thereby enable candidates who file applications for a renewal of membership to avoid this test; and in case any candidate of this class becomes ineligible through sickness, or otherwise, between the time his written application is signed and his certificate is ready for delivery, he might, notwithstanding such ineligibilty, become a member, and that, too, without any dissembling on his part. Whereas, construing section 110 as we have, all the provisions of the constitution, the written application, and the benefit certificate are harmonized and given effect. And this construction does not impose upon the applicants for renewal of membership any greater expense, burden, or inconvenience than the construction contended for by plaintiff, unless the mere taking of the obligation by a member is an inconvenience, which we do not think will be seriously contended. In conclusion, we will say that the reason why a recovery cannot be had in this case, as the record now stands, may be briefly summed up as follows: First. Sterling voluntarily and of his own volition permitted his first certificate to lapse, and he thereby became suspended from the order; and the trial court instructed the jury, and properly so, that all rights under said certificate were forfeited, and a recovery could not be had upon it. Second. When the second certificate was received by the local camp, and Sterling notified to appear at the next ensuing lodge meeting of camp 53 for the purpose of taking the obligation and receiving the certificate, he failed to respond to the notice. Nor did he thereafter, even according to plaintiff's theory of the facts in the case, place himself in a position or make it possible for the officers of the camp to accept his money and deliver him the certificate, without a most flagrant violation of the rules and regulations of the or Sterling v. Lodge. der. Third. When Sterling died he was not, in fact, in law, nor in equity, a member of the order, for the reason that for more than 11 months he had not paid or tendered any dues and assessments, except the introduction fee of $5 paid on his application for renewal of membership. Nor had he up to the time of his death done anything, after the receipt of the certificate by the local camp, to relieve him from the payment of dues and assessments. Fourth. At the time of his death more than five months had elapsed since the certificate was received by the local camp, during which time Sterling failed to present himself at any of the lodge meetings to take the obligation and receive his certificate, as required by section 117, which provides that under no circumstances can a candidate defer taking the obligation for more than three months from date of certificate. And, fifth, because the second certificate had not become and was not an operative or completed contract, because not signed by the local consul commander or by Sterling, the applicant, and was not delivered, all of which were conditions precedent to give it effect. For the reasons herein stated, the petition for a rehearing is overruled and denied. STRAUP, J., concurs. BARTCH, C. J. (dissenting).-Notwithstanding this second elaborate opinion, the fact still remains that the lodge has the money for dues, etc., paid it by the deceased in an honest endeavor to obtain insurance for the object of his bounty, while the beneficiary is deprived of it through mere technicalities resulting from the insured having been misled by the agent of the insurer. Upon an examination of all the evidence, and of other provisions of the constitution of the lodge than those referred to in this opinion of my brethren, I am convinced that a rehearing ought to be granted, and therefore dissent from denying the same. INDEX. ABANDONMENT. See PLEADING, 4; WATER and Water Courses,1, 2. ACTION. See EXECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS. ACTS OF BANKRUPTCY. See BANKRUPTCY. ADMINISTRATORS. See EXECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS. ADVERSE POSSESSION: 1. Burden of Proof. Under Revised Statutes, section 2861, provid- 2. Evidence-Deed. Where a warranty deed in favor of defendant 3. 4. Letter. Where in an action to quiet title, plaintiff Sufficiency. Evidence reviewed, and held insufficient to AGENCY. See PRINCIPAL AND AGENT. AIDERS AND ABETTORS. See CRIMINAL LAW, 2, 3. ALIMONY. See DIVORCE. ALLOWANCE. See DIVORCE. APPEAL. See PRACTICE, SUPREME COURT. APPEARANCE. Under Rev. St. 1898, section 3334, providing that a defendant appears (545) APPEARANCE.-Continued of the Illinois statute, where a corporation domiciled in Utah and BALLOTS. See ELECTIONS. BANKRUPTCY. In an action by a trustee in bankruptcy to recover a perference, a charge BENEFICIAL ASSOCIATIONS. 1. Action-Parties. Where a complainant, naming as defendants the 2. 3. A voluntary association cannot be sued in its name as Survivorship. A cause of action in favor of a member BENEFICIAL ASSOCIATIONS.-Continued. 5. 6. An administrator of a deceased member of a bene- ficial association may recover an allowance for funeral expenses Tribunals of Order. While members of a voluntary as- The action of a beneficial association, which knew 7. Forfeiture-Estoppel. A beneficial association, which, with BILLS AND NOTES. See PLEADING, 2. A note secured by mortgage provided for payment of interest in quar- BRIEFS. See PRACTICE, SUPREME COURT, 7. BURDEN OF PROOF. See ADVERSE POSSESSION, 1; LIMITATIONS OF |