State v. La Chall. In the case of State v. Burke, 73 N. C. 83, it is held that it is not necessary to charge in an indictment for robbery the kind and value of the property taken. In the opinion the court said: "In robbery the kind and value of the property is not material, because force or fear is the main element of the offense. Thus, where a man was knocked down and his pocket rifled, but the robber found nothing except a slip of paper containing a memorandum, an indictment for robbing him of the paper was held to be maintainable. Rex v. Bingley, 5 C. & P. 602." In People v. Chuey Ying Git, 100 Cal. 437, 34 Pac. 1080, it is said: "Robbery is the felonious taking of personal property in the possession of another, from his person or immediate presence and against his will, accomplished by means of force or fear. Pen. Code, sec. 211. Robbery and grand larceny, when the property is taken from the person of another, or when the property taken is a horse, etc., do not depend upon the value of the property taken. Pen. Code, sec. 487. Hence it was unnecessary to specify the value of the personal property taken." People v. Townsley, 39 Cal. 405; State v. Burke, 73 N. C. 83; Williams v. State, 10 Tex. App. 8; State v. Howerton, 58 Mo. 581; McClain's Cr. Law, secs. 472, 481. There is no provision in section 4175 of the Revised Statutes of 1898 of Utah which makes the value of the property taken an essential element of the crime. As the value of the property alleged to have been taken was not of the essence of the crime charged, it was not necessary to allege it, and therefore the amendment of the original information by inserting the words "in current United States silver coin" was unnecessary and not prejudicial to the defendants. Section 211 of the California Penal Code is the same as section 4175 of the Revised Statutes of 1898 of this State. In the case of People v. Riley, 75 Cal. 98, 16 Pac. 544, the indictment charging the defendant with the crime of robbery omitted the statutory words "and against his will." The Supreme Court of that 2 State v. La Chall. State, in the opinion in that case, said: "The information charges that the defendants, on a day named, etc., did 'unlawfully, willfully, and feloniously, and by means of fraud and force, take from the person, possession,' etc. It is claimed the judgment should have been arrested because the information is fatally defective, in that it omits the statutory words 'and against his will.' Pen. Code, sec. 211. But the information is sufficient. Pen. Code, sec. 960. A robbery 'accomplished by means of force and fear' must have been accomplished 'against the will' of the person robbed." State v. Patterson, 42 La. Ann. 934, 8 South. 529; State v. Kegan, 62 Iowa 106; 17 N. W. 179; 1 McClain's Cr. Law, sec. 475. It is stated in 18 Enc. Pl. and Pr. 1227, that "it is generally held that an averment of force or intimidation implies that the property was taken against the will of the person robbed, and renders an express averment to that effect unnecessary." The original information sufficiently charged the defendants with the crime of robbery, and the insertion of the words "and against his will" was unnecessary, and not, therefore, prejudicial to the defendants. The appellants contend that the verdict of the jury 3 was not warranted by the evidence. There was evidence which strongly tended to show the guilt of the accused. Whenever this is so the appellate court has no authority to disturb the verdict. The record fails to disclose any reversible error. It is ordered that the judgment be, and the same is hereby, affirmed. BARTCH and MCCARTY, JJ., concur. Richardson & Boynton Co. v. Utah Stove & Hdw. Co. THE RICHARDSON & BOYNTON COMPANY, a Corporation, Appellant, v. THE UTAH STOVE & HARDWARE COMPANY, a Corporation, Respondent. No. 1555. (77 Pac. 1.) Appearance: What Constitutes: Foreign Judgment: Collateral Attack. Under Rev. St. 1898, section 3334, providing that a defendant appears in an action when he answers, demurs, or gives the plaintiff written notice of his appearance, and which is substantially the provision of the Illinois statute, where a corporation domiciled in Utah and sued in Illinois appeared and filed a pleading asserting that it had been sued by a wrong name, without challenging the court's jurisdiction, it submitted to the jurisdiction of the Illinois court, precluding it from assailing the judgment in an action thereon in Utah. (Decided June 17, 1904.) Appeal from the Third District Court, Salt Lake County.-Hon. T. D. Lewis, Judge. Action on a judgment. From a judgment in favor of the defendant, the plaintiff appealed. REVERSED. lant. Messrs. Sutherland, Van Cott & Allison for appel If a defendant is sued by a wrong name and he appears by his right name it is proper to declare against him in the name by which he appears. Oakley v. Giles, 3 East 167; Doo v. Butcher, 3 T. R. 611; 1 Chit. Pl. (16 Am. Ed.), 342. Richardson & Boynton Co. v. Utah Stove & Hdw. Co. In the early common law practice, when the defendant was misnamed the proper method of taking advantage of the misnomer was by plea in abatement. 1 Chit. Pl. 245, 247. But as early as the Statute of 3 and 4, William IV, ch. 42, sec. 11, pleas in abatement for misnomer were abolished in England, which act also provided that plaintiff's declaration might be amended by inserting the true name of the defendant. 14 Ency. Pl. and Pr., 304. And the statute of this State permits the court to correct "a mistake in the name of the party." Rev. Stat., sec. 3005. This statute is conclusively presumed to have been in force in Illinois. Bank v. Bank, 9 Utah 87; Sutherland, Stat. Cons., sec. 184. And Chitty, in his work on Pleading, at page 462, says; "Where misnomer either of the plaintiff or defendant was truly pleaded the plaintiff might in general amend his declaration on payment of costs." Such a doctrine of course means that the misnomer did not permanently abate the action, but that the amendment cured the error so that the action could proceed. At common law the power to amend in case of a misnomer depended not upon the question whether the amendment changed the name, but whether or not it changed the party. If the amendment only cured a mistake in the name of the real party by or against whom the suit was prosecuted, it could be made even after plea in abatement. And under the statutes of amendment so common in all the states, all kinds of misnomer are amendable when the change does not result in an alteration of the real party. Final v. Bachus, 18 Mich. 218; Elliott v. Clark, 18 N. H. 421; 14 Ency. Pl. and Pr., 304-5. In Weaver v. Jackson, 8 Blackf., (Ind.) 5, a misnomer of the defendant's correct name was corrected by amendment after plea in abatement. Richardson & Boynton Co. v. Utah Stove & Hdw. Co. In Shackman v. Little, 87 Ind. 181, a like amendment was allowed after motion to quash the summons. In Chicago, etc. R. Co., v. Johnston, 89 Ind. 88, misnomer of the defendant corporation was amended. In Martin v. Coppock, 4 Neb. 173, it was held that an amendment of a summons correcting a misnomer of · a party related back to the time of service of summons. See also: Elliott v. Clark, 18 N. H. 421; Cheshire v. Wagon Co., 89 Ga. 249; Nelson v. Barker, 3 McLean (U. S.) 379; s. c., Fed. Cas. No. 10101; Bullard v. Bank, 5 Mass. 99; Heslep v. Peters, 4 Ill. 45; Parry v. Woodson, 33 Mo. 347; Webber v. Bolte, 51 Mich. 113; Welch v. Hull, 73 Mich. 47; McDonald v. Swett, 76 Cal. 257. In this case it will be observed from an inspection of the exemplified copy of the record introduced in evidence that the single defect in the defendant's name was remedied by amendment after serving a copy of the written motion to amend on the defendant's attorneys. We insist, therefore, that the defendant appeared generally in the Illinois court, and that, therefore, that court having jurisdiction over the subjectmatter of the action, also acquired jurisdiction over the person of the defendant, with full power to pass on all questions presented during the progress of the case, including the power to correct the slight misnomer in the defendant's name. We repeat again that this is a collateral attack on this judgment. The defendant now claims that, being a foreign corporation, it was not subject to be sued in the Illinois courts. It never, however, asserted that claim in the circuit court of Cook county, Illinois, when the action was brought against it. Even if its claim was a valid one it did not choose to state the facts to the Illinois court and call into exercise the powers of that court in passing upon its claim. We therefore insist that it is elementary law that this judgment cannot now be collaterally attacked by setting up a defense which might have been raised in the original action. Snow v. Mitchell, 37 Kan. 636; Covington etc. Bridge Co. v. Sar |