Moreau v. Du Bellet (Tex.) Receiver Appointed by Multnomah County v. Oregon Nat. Bank (U. S. C. C. Oreg.) Banks and Banking -Insolvency-County Murray v. Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co. (Iowa) Federal Nelson v. Barnett (Mo.) Administration-Trial-Settle- ment-Right of Widow, ann. case, 50. Nelson v. Hanson (Iowa) Limitations of Actions-Ac- New York, L. E. & W. R. Co. v. Commonwealth of Oakes v. Cattaraugus Water Co. (N. Y.) Corporate People v. Stokes (Cal.) Criminal Law-Division of Price v. Harrell (Pa.) Judgments-Foreign Judgments Primrose v. Western Union Tel. Co. (U. S. S. C.) Tele- graph Company-Mistake in Transmitting Message -Limiting Liability, R. D. 62. Quirk v. Muller (Mont.) Illegal Contract-Procurement Randall v. Packard (N. Y.) Determination of the Value of an Attorney's Services, Ed. 21. Reagan v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co. (U. S. S. C.) Ju- Ricker, In re (N. H.) Right of Women to Practice Law, Ed. 235. Rochester Distilling Co. v. Rasey (N. Y.) Chattel Mort- Rogers v. Kennebec Steamboat Co. (Me.) Liability of Carrier to One Travelling on a Free Pass, Ed. 375. Saito, In re (U. S. C. C. Mass.) Native of Japan no Right to Naturalization, Ed. 235. Saunders v. Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co. (S. Dak.) Pre- sumption of Negligence from Fact of Injury, Ed. Scott v. McNeal (U. S. S. C.) Letters of Administration Dale Supreme Council Catholic Knights v. Fidelity Casualty Co. (U. S. C. C. of App.) Principal and Surety- Sutton Mfg. Co. v. Hutchinson (U. S. C. C. of App.) erty-Mortgage to Directors, R. D. 402. State v. Buswell (Neb.) Legal Status of Christian State v. Fox (Md.) Death by Wrongful Act-Sale of Judge of the Supreme Court, Ed. 157. State v. Harrison (N. Car.) Criminal Law-Evidence- Homicide-Confessions, R. D. 482. State v. Kelly (N. H.) Criminal Practice-Burglary- State v. Parsons (Mo.) What Constitutes an Original State v. Perley (Me.) Criminal Law-Robbery-Indict- State v. Mason (Oreg.) Criminal Libel-Evidence- State v. Robinson (La.) Criminal Law-Former Jeop State v. Taylor (La.) Criminal Law-Forgery-Signa- State v. Waugh (Kan.) Contempt of Court, Ed. 375. Stone v. Clay (U. S. C. C. of App.) Gaming-Horse Race-Interpretation of Contract, R. D. 236. Talcott v. First National Bank (Kan.) Banks and Terry v. White (Minn.) Common Law Marriage-Evi- Thomas v. City National Bank (Neb.) National Bank- Sister State-Res Judicata-Alimony, R. D. 400. Tripp v. Northwestern Livestock Ins. Co. (Wis.) In- Walker v. Corkins (Mo.) Corporation-Bond Invest. ment Company-Effective Incorporation, R. D. 113. Walker v. Hannibal & St. J. R. Co. (Mo.) Railroad Companies-Negligence of Baggage Man-Acts Out- side of his Authority, R. D. 158. Walker v. Jameson (Ind.) Municipal Corporation- Assessment-Sanitary Regulations, R. D. 178. Welch v. Maine Central Railroad Company (Me.) Mas White v. Norfolk & S. R. Co. (N. Car.) Master's Lia- Promoters-Interest in Sale to Companies, R. D. Yoakum v. Kroeger (Tex.) Liability for Injuries re- sulting from Fright or Nervous Shock, Ed. 463. LIST OF LEADING ARTICLES IN VOLUME 39. No. 1. Following Trust Funds Under the Socalled Modern Doctrine of Equity. By John C. Baird, 4. No. 2. Discretionary Power of an Agent. By C. A. Bucknam, 27. No. 3. The Law of Malpractice. By George Lawyer, 46. No. 4. Can a President Approve a Bill after the Adjournment of Congress? By Max B. May, 68. No. 5. Situs of Shares for the Purpose of Taxation. By Seymour D. Thompson, 86. No. 6. Privileged Communications to Physicians and Surgeons. By William L. Evans, 114. No. 7. Next. of Kin. By D. B. Van Syckel, 144. No. 8. The Effect of Municipal Ordinances upon Civil Liability Between Private Parties. By J. L. Hopkins, 165. No. 9. The Doctrine of Estoppel as Applied to Married Women. By O. F. Hershey, 181. No. 10. Implied Powers of the President of a Business Corporation. By Seymour D. Thompson, 200. No. 11. Licenses Among Individuals. By S. S. Merrill, 220. No. 12. Priority over Mortgage of Debts Contracted by Railroad Before Receivership. By Lyne S. Metcalfe, Jr., 241. No. 13. The Estate of Dower at Common Law and by Statute. By George Lawyer, 257. No. 14. Injuries Sustained in Wrongdoing. By Oscar Hallam, 279. No. 15. Who May be Appointed Guardians. By Nathan Newmark, 299. No. 16. The Province of Juries in Criminal Cases. By Ward B. Coe, 321. No. 17. The Servant of one Master as the Special Servant of Another. By Lyne S. Metcalfe, Jr., 341. No. 18. Criminal Libel-Changes in the Rules of Evidence and Burden of Proof. By Samuel Maxwell, 360. No. 19. The Character of the Evidence Required to Convict of Adultery. By Arthur P. Will, 381. No. 20. Limitations on the Value of Human Life. By Jas. J. H. Hamilton, 403. No. 21. Payment of Forged Check or Note. By W. W. Thornton, 420. No. 22. Criminal Indictments as Prescribed by Codes. By Lyne S. Metcalfe, Jr., 446. No. 23. The Liability of a Master for the Negligence of a Fellow-Servant as Applied in the Courts of Illinois. By James P. Harrold, 467. No. 24. Evidence Against Prisoners of Previous Misdeeds. By Lyne S. Metcalfe, Jr.. 486. No. 25. Works of Charity and Necessity Within the Meaning of the Statutes Forbidding Labor on Sunday. By Percy Edwards, 507. Central Law Journal. ST. LOUIS, MO., JULY 6, 1894. That newspapers have no absolute right to obtain copies of the proceedings in a divorce suit for the purpose of publication is a well settled proposition lately recognized by the Supreme Court of Rhode Island, in In re Caswell. At common law every person is entitled to the inspection, either personally or by his agent, of public records, provided he has an interest therein which is such as would enable him to maintain or defend an action for which the document or record sought can furnish evidence or necessary information. It is not essential, however, "that the interest be private, capable of sustaining a suit or defense on his own personal behalf, but it will be sufficient that he act in such suit as the representative of the common or public right." By statute of the United States and also several of the States, the necessity of interest has been done away with, and any person may examine public records, and take memoranda therefrom. In re Chambers, 44 Fed. Rep. 786; State v. Rachac, 37 Minn. 372, 35 N. W. Rep. 7; Hanson v. Eichstaedt, 69 Wis. 538, 35 N. W. Rep. 30; Lum v. McCarty, 39 N. J. Law, 287; Newton v. Fisher, 98 N. C. 20, 3 S. E. Rep. 822. As there is no such statute in Rhode Island the court considered that the common law rule, as above stated, is in force. Whether they were willing to go to the full extent thereof, they did not feel called upon to decide. But they concluded that it was clearly within the rule to hold that no one has a right to examine or obtain copies of public records from mere curiosity, or for the purpose of creating public seandal. To publish broadcast the painful, and sometimes disgusting, details of a divorce case, not only fails to serve any useful purpose in the community, but, on the other hand, directly tends to the demoralization and corruption thereof, by catering to a morbid craving for that which is sensational and impure. All will agree with the court that "the judicial records of the State should always be accessible to the people for all proper purposes, under reasonable restrictions as to the time and mode of examining the same; Vol. 39-No. 1 but they should not be used to gratify private spite or promote public scandal.” The Australian Law Times, discusses in an entertaining manner the question whether or not a young lady who breaks her leg at a dance can maintain an action against her partner on the ground that it was caused by his clumsiness. The writer intimates the opinion that a man who asks a girl to dance does not undertake to return her to her chaperon in as good order and condition as he receives her "act of God and the Queen's enemies excepted"-but that at most his liabilities are those of a gratuitous bailee not extending beyond gross negligence. Or looking at the case from another side, that there is no implied warranty on his part that he is reasonably fit for the purpose for which he offers himself as a partner for a dance, as there is no sufficient consideration moving from her to him to support such a warranty. A further point raised is whether or not she did not voluntarily assume the risk of his unfitness. The writer adds that these questions were very fully gone into "in the somewhat analogous case of the bailment of a cab-horse, Fowler v. Locke, L. R. 7 C. P. 272, 9 C. P. 751, note, 10 C. P. 90." The United States Circuit Court of Appeals of Louisiana, has decided against the claims of certain relatives of the Italians who were killed in New Orleans in 1891 in the assault in the parish prison, for the recovery of damages from the city for their death. The opinion of the court was delivered by Judge Pardee, the other two judges concurring. The court decided that under the treaty of 1871 with Italy, Italians resident in this country are entitled to exactly the same sort of legal protection as citizens, and no more; that there is no common law right to sue a State or city for damages for the loss of either life or property through riots; that for such a right to exist it must be created by statute; that a statute makes the city of New Orleans liable for damage done by mobs to property, but makes no mention of municipal liability for the loss of life; that therefore this liability does not exist, and horrible as the crime was, there is no remedy for it in a civil action. NOTES OF RECENT DECISIONS. RECEIVERS-LEASE EXTENDING BEYOND RECEIVERSHIP.-In Chicago Deposit Vault Co. v. McNulton, 14 S. C. Rep. 915, decided by the Supreme Court of the United States it appeared that the order appointing a receiver of a railroad authorized him to make all contracts necessary in carrying on its business, subject to the supervision of the court, and to make payments of current expenses and other designated charges. It was held that this conferred no authority to enter into a lease of offices, involving large expenditure, extending beyond the receivership; that the court's approval of his reports, showing payments of rent for offices but not disclosing the existence of such lease, was not a confirmation thereof; and that the lessor had no equitable right to the rent after termination of the receivership, as against purchasers of the railroad under decree of the court. The court said inter alia: It is undoubtedly true that a receiver, without the previous sanction of the court, manifested by special orders, may incur ordinary expenses or liabilities for supplies, material or labor needed in the daily administration of railroad property committed to his care as an officer of the court; but it seems equally well settled that the courts decline to sanction the exercise of this discretion on the part of receivers in respect to large outlays, or contracts extending be. yond the receivership, and intended to be binding upon the trust. The receiver being an officer of the court, and acting under the court's direction and instructions, his powers are derived from and defined by the court under which he acts. He is not such a general agent as to have any implied power, and his authority to make expenditures and incur liabilities like the one in question must be either found in the order of his appointment, or be approved by the court, before they acquire validity and have any binding force upon the trust. In Cowdrey v. Railroad Co., 93 U. S. 352, it was held that a receiver is not authorized, without the previ ous direction of the court, to incur any expenses, on account of property in his hands, beyond what is ab solutely essential to its preservation and use, as contemplated by his appointment. Accordingly, the expenditures of a receiver to defeat a proposed subsidy from a city, to aid in the construction of a railroad parallel with the one in his hands, were properly disallowed in the settlement of his final account, although such road, if constructed, might have diminished the future earnings of the road in his charge. This same general principle is recognized in Union Trust Co. v. Illinois M. R'y Co., 117 U. S. 434, 479, 6 Sup. Ct. Rep. 809, where debts for considerable sums of money, borrowed by the receiver without previous authority from the court, were not allowed any priority out of the trust fund, although the moneys borrowed were applied to pay expenses of the receivership, such as supplies, repairs and pay rolls, and to replace moneys which had been so applied, for the reason that no order of the court had been obtained to borrow funds for those purposes. In Lehigh Coal & Navigation Co. v. Central R. Co., 35 N. J. Eq. 426, it was said that "the receiver may undoubtedly appropriate moneys in his hands, belonging to the trust, to such purposes connected with the trust as he may think proper, always taking the risk that the court will finally approve his action; but he has no authority to bind the trust by contract with.out the authority of the court. Until his contracts are approved and ratified by the court, the court is at liberty to deal with them as to it shall appear just, and may either modify them, or disregard them entirely. All persons dealing with receivers do so at their peril, and are bound to take notice of their incapacity to conclude a binding contract without the sanction of the court." This states the correct rule upon the subject, especially in respect to contracts involving large outlays, and which may extend beyond the life of the receivership. The same general rule is stated in Beach on Receivers (section 257) as follows: "But a receiver is not allowed to exercise his discretion in applying the funds in his hands. These he holds strictly subject to the direction of the court, and only to be disposed of upon its order. Neither can he enter into contracts without the approval of the court. Although, as receiver, he may enter into negotiations and make such agreements as would be binding upon him as an individual, yet, in order to affect the fund in his hands, his acts must be ratified by the court. This rule is so well established that it has been decided that all persons contracting with a receiver are chargeable with knowledge of his inability to contract, and enter into contracts with him at their own peril, and that the court has unquestioned power to modify, or even vacate his agreements." To the like effect is a statement of the rule made in section 186 of High on Receivers. JUDGMENTS-FOREIGN JUDGMENTS CONCLUSIVENESS.-The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania decide in Price v. Harrell, that in an action on a foreign judgment defendant may, notwithstanding the recitals of the record show that there was no service on or appearance by him. Mitchell, J., says: How far section 1 of article 4 of the Constitution of the United States, and the act of congress of May 26, 1790, passed to carry it into effect, operate to preclude a defendant from offering evidence against the judgment of one State when sued upon it in another, has been the subject of much discussion and difference of opinion. A distinction has always been made, however, between facts going to the jurisdiction of the court and those relating to the merits, and the tendency has been strong to open the door to evidence upon the former. The earlier view was that the mere presumption in favor of jurisdiction might be contradicted, but that evidence could not be received against the affirmative recitals of jurisdictional facts in the record. In Hampton v. M'Connel, 3 Wheat. 234, Chief Justice Marshall said: "Whatever pleas would be good to a suit thereon in such State, and none others, could be pleaded in any other court in the United States." And a similar view is indicated by the decisions in Mills v. Duryee, 7 Cranch, 481 (as to which see the remarks of Bradley, J., in Thompson v. Whitman, 18 Wall. 462), and Landes v. Brant, 10 How. 348, 371: "It was undoubtedly the purpose [of the constitutional provision] to give to the judicial proceedings of each State the same faith and credit in every other State to which they were entitled in the State in which they took place." Story, Const. § 1310, note. In Thompson v. Whitman, 18 Wall. 457, however, the question came directly before the Supreme Court of the United States, and Justice Bradley, admitting that there was no previous express decision on the point made an elaborate review of all the authorities, and announced for the court the conclusion that jurisdiction was always open to question, even upon facts affirmatively asserted in the record. This decision was affirmed and followed in Knowles v. Code Co., 19 Wall. 58, and Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U. S. 714, and has been considered as settling the law, by the highest court on the subject. The great weight of authority in the State courts is to the same effect, and so are the text books. McDermott v. Clary, 107 Mass. 501; Gilman v. Gilman, 126 Mass. 26; Wright v. Andrews, 130 Mass. 149; Sewing Machine Co. v. Radcliffe, 66 Md. 511, 8 Atl. Rep. 265; Manufacturing Co. v. Chambers, 75 Md. 614, 23 Atl. Rep. 1024; Eager v. Stover, 59 Mo. 87; Napton v. Leaton, 71 Mo. 358; Whart. Confl. Laws, § 823; Story Confl. Laws, § 609; Story Const. (M. M. Bigelow's Ed. 1891) § 1310, note a; 12 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law, 148x, and cases there cited. Our own cases have not been in entire harmony. In Wetherill v. Stillman, 65 Pa. St. 105, the earlier doctrine was enforced with great strictness, and, the record reciting an appearance by counsel, it was held -Sharwood, J., dissenting-than an affidavit by defendant that he had never been served with process, or authorized any one to appear for him was not suffi cient to prevent judgment; Thompson, C. J., saying: "The recital shows conclusively the jurisdiction of the parties; consequently the defendant's affidavit in this particular amounted to nothing against the record to which it referred." In Noble v. Oil Co., 79 Pa. St. 354, however, it was held that, notwithstanding the recital in the record of an attachment in rem in New York, it might be shown that the property was not there, and the court therefore acquired no jurisdiction. And in Guthrie v. Lowry, 84 Pa. St. 533, it was distinctly held that, "whatever doubts may have been at one time entertained, it is now an incontrovertible position that the record may be contradicted by evidence of facts impeaching the ju risdiction of the court;" citing, among others, the cases in 18 and 19 Wall. supra, though in the particular case the foreign court was held, as a matter of law, to have had jurisdiction. This would seem to be a formal recognition and adoption, even if partially obiter, of the later, and presently prevailing doctrine. But in Lance v. Dugan (Pa. Sup.) 13 Atl. Rep. 942, the court again reverted in a brief per curiam to the old rule, saying that, as the record showed a service on defendants, the judgment was conclusive, notwithstanding an affidavit in denial. In this condition of the law we have the point in the present case for final settlement. Whatever our individual views upon the true spirit of the constitutional provision, we have no hesitation in conforming to the prevailing rule. It would be sufficient to say that it is now the established rule in the Supreme Court, which is the ultimate authority on all questions depending on the Constitution and Statutes of the United States. But, in addition to that, the same rule now prevails in the courts of a majority of the States, and it is a question on which uniformity is desirable. It would be contrary to sound policy to deny to our own citizens a defense against judgments obtained in other States out of a comity which such States refused to us. An apt illustration is afforded by the present case, in which it appears that the court of chancery in Maryland denied the appellant relief against the original judgment on the ground that the same defense would be open to him here. The affidavit of defense avers that the appearance recited in the record of the judg ment sued on was merely constructive, and that in fact the appellant was not served with process, did not appear, and had no knowledge of the suit unti recently, when demand was made upon him for payment. These being facts going to the jurisdiction of the court, the record could be contradicted in regard to them. The affidavit presented a prima facie de fense, and was sufficient to prevent judgment. Judg ment reversed, and procedendo awarded. NEGLIGENCE-ACCIDENTAL SHOOTING WHILE HUNTING.—In Hawkins v. Watkins, 28 N. Y. Supp. 867, decided by the Supreme Court of New York, it was held that one who negligently shoots another while hunting is liable for the injury caused thereby, though he did not know of the presence of such other perThe court said in part: son. This action was for negligence. The plaintiff claimed, and the evidence given in his behalf disclosed, that, on the 14th day of October, 1889, he and his brother went to the head of Cayuga lake, duck hunting; that they took with them two tame ducks to be used as decoys; that, while they were preparing to anchor them as such decoys, one of them escaped from the boat in which they were, and the plaintiff and his brother pursued it; that, while doing so, the defendant shot at them and seriously injured the plaintiff; that the accident occurred a few minutes before 6 o'clock in the morning; that it was clear, and broad daylight, being about fifteen or twenty minutes before sunrise; that between the place where the defendant stood when he fired and the boat in which the plaintiff and his brother were there was nothing to obstruct the defendant's vision, so that, if he had looked before firing, he would have seen the plaintiff, his brother, and the boat in which they were at the time. The evidence of the defendant was somewhat in conflict with that of the plaintiff, and tended to show that it was not sufficiently light at the time to enable him to see the plaintiff, and that his vision was obstructed by the limbs of the trees and shrubs that stood between him and the plaintiff. The question whether the transaction was as claimed by the plaintiff, or as claimed by the defendant, was submitted to the jury, and it found in favor of the plaintiff. Therefore, in examining the question of the defendant's negligence and the plaintiff's freedom from contributory negli gence, we must regard the facts proved by the plaintiff as the established facts in this case. Assuming the transaction to have occurred in the manner testified to by the plaintiff and his witnesses, it is quite obvious that both the question of the defendant's negligence and the question of the plaintiff's freedom from contributory negligence were questions of fact that were properly submitted to the jury, and that its findings thereon should be regarded as final. The appellant, however, insists that the rule of law applicable to this case is that "one who is hunting in a 'wilderness' is not bound to anticipate the presence, within range of his shot, of another man, and is not liable for an injury caused unintentionally by him to a person of whose presence he was not aware," and |