Mr. Van Buren to Mr. Van Ness. [Extract.] DEPARTMENT OF STATE, Washington, October 2, 1829. One of the considerations which the ministers of the United States who preceded you at the court of his Catholic Majesty were advised to press upon his government, as an inducement for him to terminate the contest with his late colonies, is the preservation of his insular possessions in the West Indies, which still constitute a part of the Spanish monarchy. Cuba and Porto Rico, occupying, as they do, a most important geographical position, have been viewed by the neighboring States of Mexico and Colombia as military and naval arsenals, which would at all times furnish Spain with the means of threatening their commerce, and even of endangering their political existence. Looking with a jealous eye upon these last remnants of Spanish power in America, these two States had once united their forces; and their arm, raised to strike a blow which, if successful, would forever have extinguished Spanish influence in that quarter of the globe, was arrested chiefly by the timely interposition of this government, which, in a friendly spirit towards Spain, and for the interests of general commerce, thus assisted in preserving to his Catholic Majesty these invaluable portions of his colonial possessions. The government of the United States has always looked with the deepest interest upon the fate of those islands, but particularly of Cuba. Its geographical position, which places it almost in sight of our southern shores, and, as it were, gives it the command of the Gulf of Mexico and the West India seas, its safe and capacious harbors, its rich productions, the exchange of which, for our surplus agricultural products and manufactures, constitutes one of the most extensive and valuable branches of our foreign trade, render it of the utmost importance to the United States that no change should take place in its condition which might injuriously affect our political and commercial standing in that quarter. Other considerations, connected with a certain class of our population, make it the interest of the southern section of the Union that no attempt should be made in that island to throw off the yoke of Spanish dependence, the first effect of which would be the sudden emancipation of a numerous slave population, the result of which could not but be very sensibly felt upon the adjacent shores of the United States. On the other hand, the wisdom which induced the Spanish government to relax in its colonial system, and to adopt with regard to those islands a more liberal policy, which opened their ports to general commerce, has been so far satisfactory in the view of the United States as, in addition to other considerations, to induce this government to desire that their possession should not be transferred from the Spanish crown to any other power. In conformity with this desire, the ministers of the United States at Madrid have, from time to time, been instructed attentively to watch the course of events and the secret springs of European diplomacy, which, from information received from various quarters, this government had reason to suspect had been put in motion to effect the transfer of the possession of Cuba to the powerful allies of Spain. It had been intimated at one time that the armed interference of France in the affairs of that country would extend over her insular possessions, and that a military occupation of Cuba was to take place for the alleged purpose of protecting it against foreign invasion or internal revolutionary movements. A similar design was imputed to the government of Great Britain, and it was stated that in both cases a continuance of the occupation of the island was to constitute, in the hands of either of those powers, a guarantee for the payment of heavy indemnities claimed by France, on the one hand, to cover the expenses of her armies of occupation, and by Great Britain, on the other, to compensate her subjects for spoliations alleged to have been committed upon their commerce. The arrangements entered into by Spain with those two powers, by means of treaties of a recent date, and providing for the payment of those indemnities, although removing the pretext upon which the occupation of Cuba would have been justified, are not believed entirely to obviate the possibility of its eventually being effected. The government of the United States considers as a much stronger pledge of its continuance under the dominion of Spain the considerable military and naval armaments which have recently been added to the ordinary means of defence in that island, and which are supposed fully adequate for its protection against any attempt on the part of foreign powers, and for the suppression of any insurrectionary movement on that of its inhabitants. Notwithstanding these apparent securities for the maintenance of the Spanish authority in the island of Cuba, as it is not impossible that Spain, in her present embarrassed and dependent situation, might be induced to yield her assent to a temporary occupation of it, as a pledge for the fulfilment of her engagements, or to part with her right of property in it for other considerations, affording immediate relief in the hour of her distress, it is the wish of the President that the same watchfulness which had engaged the attention of your predecessors in relation to this subject should be continued during your administration of the affairs of the legation of the United States at Madrid, and that you should take special care to keep this department informed of every occurrence whose tendency, direct or indirect, might, in your judgment, bring about any change in the present condition of the island of Cuba. Your predecessors, who had been repeatedly instructed to that effect, have availed themselves of every fit opportunity to make the wishes and policy of the United States with regard to the Spanish islands fully known to the government of his Catholic Majesty, whom you will find, already possessed of every information which you will have it in your power to communicate upon this head; but it is not improbable that the same inquisitiveness which has hitherto been manifested on the part of that government in relation to it, may again be evinced by the Spanish ministers, who, affecting to construe the avowed anxiousness of the United States into a determination not to suffer the possession of Cuba to pass into the hands of other powers, have inquired how far this government would go in sustaining that determination. Should similar inquiries be made of you by the ministers of his Catholic Majesty, you are authorized to say that the long-established and well-known policy of the United States, which forbids their entangling themselves in the concerns of other nations, and which permits their physical force to be used only for the defence of their political rights and the protection of the persons and property of their citizens, equally forbids their public agents to enter into positive engagements, the performance of which would require the employment of means which the people have retained in their own hands; but that this government has every reason to believe that the same influence which once averted the blow ready to fall upon the Spanish islands would again be found effectual on the recurrence of similar events; and that the high preponderance in American affairs of the United States as a great naval power, the influence which they must at all times command as a great commercial nation, in all questions involving the interests of the general commerce of this hemisphere, would render their consent an essential preliminary to the execution of any project calculated so vitally to affect the general concerns of all the nations in any degree engaged in the commerce of America. The knowledge you possess of the public sentiment of this country in regard to Cuba will enable you to speak with confidence and effect of the probable consequences that might be expected from the communication of that sentiment to Congress, in the event of any contemplateḍ ́change in the present political condition of that island. Mr. Van Buren to Mr. Van Ness. [Extract.] DEPARTMENT OF STATE, This government has also been given to understand that, if Spain should persevere in the assertion of a hopeless claim to dominion over her former colonies, they will feel it to be their duty, as well as their interest, to attack her colonial possessions in our vicinity, Cuba and Porto Rico. Your general instructions are full upon the subject of the interest which the United States take in the fate of those islands, and particularly of the former; they inform you that we are content that Cuba should remain as it now is, but could not consent to its transfer to any European power. Motives of reasonable state policy render it more desirable to us that it should remain subject to Spain rather than to either of the South American States. Those motives will readily present themselves to your mind; they are principally founded upon an apprehension that, if possessed by the latter, it would, in the present state of things, be in greater danger of becoming subject to some European power, than in its present condition. Although such are our own wishes and true interests, the President does not see on what ground he would be justified in interfering with any attempts which the South American States might think it for their interest, in the prosecution of a defensive war, to make upon the islands in question. If, ined, an attempt should be made to disturb them, by putting arms in hands of one portion of their population to destroy another, and which in its influence would endanger the peace of a portion of the United States, the case might be different. Against such an attempt, the United States (being informed that it was in contemplation) have already protested and warmly remonstrated, in their communications last summer with the government of Mexico; but the information lately communicated to us in this regard was accompanied by a solemn assurance that no such measures will, in any event, be resorted to; and that the contest, if forced upon them, will be carried on, on their part, with strict reference to the established rules of civilized warfare. [No. 124.] Mr. Van Ness to the Secretary of State. * [Extract.] LEGATION OF THE UNITED STATES, Madrid, August 10, 1836. SIR: * * A person who has good means of information, has this moment informed me that the agents from the islands of Cuba and Porto Rico, now in Madrid, as well as other persons from there, have secretly aided in promoting the late disorders and changes here, for the purpose of facilitating the declaration and establishment of the independence of those islands. It is said to be believed by them that such a state of anarchy and confusion will exist here, that the accomplishment of their purpose will be an easy task; and I understand it to be their object to have the attempt made very soon. I cannot answer for the truth of this, but the importance of the subject, as it regards the United States, has induced me not to lose a moment in giving you the information. Hon. JOHN FORSYTH, Secretary of State. Mr. Van Ness to the Secretary of State. [Extract.] MADRID, December 10, 1836. SIR: About twenty days ago I observed a piece in one of the principal newspapers of this city, relating to the island of Cuba, in which was stated a falsehood with regard to the President of the United States, which I thought called for a prompt and official denial and contradiction; especially as Mr. Calutrava, not having been in any political office until August last, and probably never having seen the President's last message, might be induced, together with many others now in office, to believe the statement alluded to. I therefore addressed to the editor of the paper, in which the statement had appeared, the following letter, and which I afterwards procured republished in the official Gazette of this city: "LEGATION OF THE UNITED STATES OF America, "To the Editors of the Revista Nacional: "In your paper of the 19th instant, in an article under the head of 'Independence,' treating of the island of Cuba, I have observed, in addition to various unfounded insinuations, the following statement: "There is yet another fact of the gravest importance which fortifies the proofs of the designs to attempt independence. We refer to the last discourse (message) pronounced by the President of the United States to the Congress. In it is asserted, clearly enough, the absolute impossibility that the island of Cuba can continue united to the Metropolis, (mother country,) and the day of its emancipation is announced to be near at hand. The publicity given to this document, so far from being, in our opinion, prejudicial, we consider it useful, for reasons so obvious, that it would be trifling with the good sense of our readers to enumerate them; and as the divulging of it is not a fable, it may with reason be called an infamous calumny.' "If this were one of the ordinary articles which frequently appear in the public papers of Madrid, abounding with error and injustice as it regards the United States, I should not have considered it necessary, and perhaps not even proper, to take notice of it; but as it contains a direct and positive assertion, that the President of the United States has made a public and official declaration of a nature injurious to the rights of her Catholic Majesty, and characterized that declaration as an infamous calumny, I deem it my duty, as the representative of those States at this court, to make a public and formal contradiction of the charge contained in the above extract. The President did not in his last annual message to Congress, nor in any other which I have seen, speak of the probability of a separation of the island of Cuba from the Spanish crown; nor has he even, in any manner, alluded to the question of such separation. Not only is it contrary to the truth that the President has made any suggestion of the kind imputed to him, but it may be asserted with the utmost confidence, that the United States have a peculiar interest in the preservation of Cuba to Spain, and that their desires in this respect are in perfect accordance with their interests. If any proof of this were wanting, other than the nature and circumstances of the case themselves afford, it might be found in the fact that the government of the United States, on at least one occasion, has contributed to avoid a blow, which, but for its friendly intervention, might have injuriously, if not fatally, affected the jurisdiction of Spain over that island. But I have said enough, since my object was merely to expose the want of foundation for the charge which has called forth this communication. "I have the honor to remain your obedient servant, "C. P. VAN NESS." When the Revista published my letter, it was done in a way not to call much attention; and the direction to that paper at the head was left out, so as to afford the inference that it might have originally been addressed to some other paper; and, consequently, that some other |