ical. I requested, therefore, to be informed whether the local force in that island was sufficient to defend it against a sudden attack, and whether this government contemplated to increase its force in that quarter. He seemed, at first, to understand this as a sort of offer to protect the island; but, when he was made clearly to understand it, he said the local force was sufficient for the present; that the government would occupy itself immediately with that subject; that they relied upon their own resources and upon us for the security of the island. To this plain remark I could only reply that, without instructions, I could only speak of what I supposed to be the wishes of my government and believed to be the interest of the United States; that we desired no other neighbor in Cuba but Spain; that I felt confident the United States would do every thing in their power, consistent with their obligations, to prevent Cuba from being wrested from Spain; that he was no doubt aware that there could be no understanding between the two governments on this point without a reference to Washington. He said he was aware of that, and should, as soon as the question here, which was varying every moment, was settled, give instructions to the Spanish minister in the United States on this subject.

JOHN QUINCY ADAMS,
Secretary of State.

Mr. Adams to Mr. Nelson.

[Extract.]

DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON,

April 28, 1823. .

In the war between France and Spain, now commencing, other interests, peculiarly ours, will, in all probability, be deeply involved. Whatever may be the issue of this war, as between those two European powers, it may be taken for granted that the dominion of Spain upon the American continents, north and south, is irrecoverably gone. But the islands of Cuba and Porto Rico still remain nominally, and so far really, dependent upon her, that she yet possesses the power of transferring her own dominion over them, together with the possession of them, to others. These islands, from their local position and natural appendages to the North American continent, and one of them, Cuba, almost in sight of our shores, from a multitude of considerations, has become an object of transcendent importance to the commercial and political interests of our Union. Its commanding position, with reference to the Gulf of Mexico and the West India seas; the character of its population; its situation midway between our southern coast and the island of St. Domingo; its safe and capacious harbor of the Havana, fronting a long line of our shores destitute of the same advantage; the nature of its productions and of its wants, furnishing the supplies and needing the returns of a commerce immensely profitable and mutually beneficial,-give it an importance in the sum of our national interests with which that of no other foreign territory can be compared,

and little inferior to that which binds the different members of this Union together. Such, indeed, are, between the interests of that island and of this country, the geographical, commercial, moral, and political relations, formed by nature, gathering, in the process of time, and even now verging to maturity, that, in looking forward to the probable course of events, for the short period of half a century, it is scarcely possible to resist the conviction that the annexation of Cuba to our federal republic will be indispensable to the continuance and integrity of the Union itself. It is obvious, however, that for this event we are not yet prepared. Numerous and formidable objections to the extension of our territorial dominions beyond sea, present themselves to the first contemplation of the subject; obstacles to the system of policy by which alone that result can be compassed and maintained, are to be foreseen and surmounted, both from at home and abroad; but there are laws of political, as well as of physical gravitation; and if an apple, severed by the tempest from its native tree, cannot choose but fall to the ground, Cuba, forcibly disjoined from its own unnatural connexion with Spain, and incapable of self-support, can gravitate only towards the North American Union, which, by the same law of nature, cannot cast her off from its bosom.

In any other state of things than that which springs from this incipient war between France and Spain, these considerations would be premature. They are now merely touched upon to illustrate the position that, in the war opening upon Europe, the United States have deep and important interests involved, peculiarly their own-the condition of Cuba cannot but depend upon the issue of this war. As an integral part of the Spanish territories, Cuba has been formally and solemnly invested with the liberties of the Spanish constitution. To destroy those liberties, and to restore in the stead of that constitution the dominion of the Bourbon race, is the avowed object of this new invasion of the Peninsula. There is too much reason to apprehend that, in Spain itself, this unhallowed purpose will be attended with immediate, or at least with temporary, success. The constitution of Spain will be demolished by the armies of the Holy Alliance, and the Spanish nation will again bow the neck to the yoke of bigotry and despotic sway. Whether the purposes of France or of her continental allies extend to the subjugation of the remaining Ultra-Marine possessions of Spain or not, has not yet been sufficiently disclosed. But to confine ourselves to that which immediately concerns us-the condition of the island of Cuba we know that the republican spirit of freedom prevails among its inhabitants. The liberties of the constitution are to them rights in possession; nor is it to be presumed that they will be willing to surrender them because they may be extinguished by foreign violence in the parent country. As Spanish territory, the island will be liable to invasion from France during the war; and the only reasons for doubting whether the attempt will be made, are the probable incompetency of the French maritime force to effect the conquest, and the probability that its accomplishment would be resisted by Great Britain. In the mean time, and at all events, the condition of the island, in regard to that of its inhabitants, is a condition of great imminent and complicated danger; and without resorting to speculation upon what such a state of

things must produce upon a people so situated, we know that its approach has already had a powerful effect upon them, and that the question, what they are to do upon contingencies daily pressing upon them and ripening into reality, has for the last twelve months constantly excited their attention and stimulated them to action. Were the population of the island of one blood and color, there could be no doubt or hesitation with regard to the course which they would pursue, as dictated by their interests and their rights: the invasion of Spain by France would be the signal for their declaration of independence. That even in their present state it will be imposed upon them as a necessity, is not unlikely; but among all their reflecting men it is admitted as a maxim fundamental to all deliberation upon their future condition, that they are not competent to a system of permanent self-dependence ; they must rely for the support of protection upon some force from without; and in the event of the overthrow of the Spanish constitution, that support can no longer be expected from Spain-their only alternative of dependence must be upon Great Britain or upon the United States. Hitherto the wishes of this government have been that the connexion between Cuba and Spain should continue as it has existed for several years; these wishes are known to the principal inhabitants of the island, and instructions, copies of which are now furnished you, were some months since transmitted to Mr. Forsyth, authorizing him in a suitable manner to communicate them to the Spanish government. These wishes still continue, so far as they can be indulged with a rational foresight of events beyond our control, but for which it is our duty to be prepared. If a government is to be imposed by foreign violence upon the Spanish nation, and the liberties which they have asserted by their constitution are to be crushed, it is neither to be expected nor desired that the people of Cuba, far from the reach of the oppressors of Spain, should submit to be governed by them. Should the cause of Spain herself issue more propitiously than from its present prospects can be anticipated, it is obvious that the trial through which she must pass at home, and the final loss of all her dominions on the American continents, will leave her unable to extend to the island of Cuba that protection necessary for its internal security and its outward defence.

Great Britain has formally withdrawn from the councils of the European alliance in regard to Spain; she disapproves the war which they have sanctioned, and which is undertaken by France, and she avows her determination to defend Portugal against the application of the principles upon which the invasion of Spain raises its only pretence of right. To the war as it commences, she has declared her intention of remaining neutral; but the spirit of the British nation is so strongly and with so much unanimity pronounced against France, their interests are so deeply involved in the issue, their national resentments and jealousies will be so forcibly stimulated by the progress of the war, whatever it may be, that, unless the conflict should be as short and the issue as decisive as that of which Italy was recently the scene, it is scarcely possible that the neutrality of Great Britain should be long maintained. The prospect is that she will be soon engaged on the side of Spain; but in making common cause with her, it is not to be supposed that she will yield her assistance upon principles altogether disinterested and

gratuitous. As the price of her alliance, the two remaining islands of Spain in the West Indies present objects no longer of much possible value or benefit to Spain, but of such importance to Great Britain that it is impossible to suppose her indifferent to the acquisition of them.

The motives of Great Britain for desiring the possession of Cuba are so obvious, especially since the independence of Mexico and the annexation of the Floridas to our Union; the internal condition of the island since the recent Spanish revolution, and the possibility of its continued dependence upon Spain, have been so precarious, the want of protection there, the power of affording it possessed by Great Britain, and the necessities of Spain to secure, by some equivalent, the support of Great Britain for herself, have formed a remarkable concurrence of predispositions to the transfer of Cuba, and during the last two years rumors have been multiplied that it was already consummated. We have been confidentially told, by indirect communication from the French government, that more than two years since Great Britain was negotiating with Spain for the cession of Cuba, and so eager in the pursuit as to have offered Gibraltar, and more, for it in exchange. There is reason to believe that, in this respect, the French government was misinformed; but neither is entire reliance to be placed on the declaration lately made by the present British Secretary for Foreign Affairs to the French government, and which, with precautions indicating distrust, has been also confidentially communicated to us, viz: that Great Britain would hold it disgraceful to avail herself of the distressed situation of Spain to obtain possession of any portion of her American colonies. The object of this declaration, and of the communication of it here, undoubtedly was to induce the belief that Great Britain entertained no purpose of obtaining the possession of Cuba; but these assurances were given with reference to a state of peace then still existing, and which it was the intention and hope of Great Britain to preserve. The condition of all the parties to them has since changed; and however indisposed the British government might be ungenerously to avail themselves of the distress of Spain to extort from her any remnant of her former possessions, they did not forbear to take advantage of it by order of reprisals given to two successive squadrons despatched to the West Indies, and stationed in the immediate proximity to the island of Cuba.

By measures thus vigorous and peremptory, they obtained from Spain an immediate revocation of the blockade which her generals had proclaimed on the coast of Terra Firma, and pledges of reparation for all the captures of British vessels made under cover of that military fiction. They obtained, also, an acknowledgment of many long-standing claims of British subjects upon the Spanish government, and promises of payment of them as a part of the national debt. The whole amount of them, however, as well as that of the reparation and indemnity promised for the capture of British property under the blockades of General Morales and by the Porto Rico privateers, yet exists, in the form of claims, and the whole mass of them now is acknowleged claim, for the satisfaction of which pledges have been given to be redeemed hereafter, and for which the island of Cuba may be the only indemnity in the power of Spain to grant, as it will undoubtedly be to Great Britain the most satisfactory indemnity which she could receive.

The war between France and Spain changes so totally the circumstances under which the declaration above mentioned of Mr. Canning was made, that it may, at its very outset, produce events, under which the possession of Cuba may be obtained by Great Britain, without even raising a reproach of intended deception against the British government for making it. An alliance between Great Britain and Spain may be one of the first fruits of this war. A guaranty of the island to Spain may be among the stipulations of that alliance; and, in the event either of a threatened attack upon the island by France, or of attempts on the part of the islanders to assume their independence, a resort to the temporary occupation of the Havana by British forces may be among the probable expedients through which it may be obtained, by concert, between Great Britain and Spain herself. It is not necessary to point out the numerous contingencies by which the transition from a temporary and fiduciary occupation to a permanent and proprietary possession may be effected.

The transfer of Cuba to Great Britain would be an event unpropitious to the interests of this Union. This opinion is so generally entertained, that even the groundless rumors that it was about to be accomplished, which have spread abroad, and are still teeming, may be traced to the deep and almost universal feeling of aversion to it, and to the alarm which the mere probability of its occurrence has stimulated. The question both of our right and of our power to prevent it, if necessary by force, already obtrudes itself upon our councils, and the administration is called upon, in the performance of its duties to the nation, at least to use all the means within its competency to guard against and forefend it.

It will be among the primary objects requiring your most earnest and unremitting attention, to ascertain and report to us every movement of negotiation between Spain and Great Britain upon this subject. We cannot, indeed, prescribe any special instructions in relation to it. We scarcely know where you will find the government of Spain upon your arrival in the country, nor can we foresee, with certainty, by whom it will be administered. Your credentials are addressed to Ferdinand, the King of Spain, under the constitution. You may find him under the guardianship of a Cortes, in the custody of an army of faith, or under the protection of the invaders of his country. So long as the constitutional government may continue to be administered in his name, your official intercourse will be with his ministers, and to them you will repeat, what Mr. Forsyth has been instructed to say, that the wishes of your government are that Cuba and Porto Rico may continue in connexion with independent and constitutional Spain. You will add that no countenance has been given by us to any projected plan of separation from Spain, which may have been formed in the island. This assurance becomes proper, as by a late despatch_received from Mr. Forsyth, he intimates that the Spanish government have been informed that a revolution in Cuba was secretly preparing, fomented by communications between a society of Free Masons there and another of the same fraternity in Philadelphia. Of this we have no other knowledge; and the societies of Free Masons in this country are so little in the practice of using agency of a political nature on any occasion, that we think it most