During the early part of March the countries began to compete with her; but relations between Russia and England drew almost to a crisis on account of Russia's attitude towards Manchuria, and for a time seemed to threaten a serious interruption of the pending negotiations. But on April 3, on account of the attitude of the other powers towards the Russian occupation of Manchuria, the Chinese government notified Russia of her refusal to sign the Manchurian convention, and the difficulties growing out of the railway concessions having been amicably settled, this was averted. On April 26 it was announced that the Empress Dowager had appointed a board of national administration to relieve her of her public functions, and to inquire into the subject of reforms. Throughout the entire affair the attitude of the United States government was that of dignified conservatism, insisting upon the preservation of the integrity of the Chinese Empire, the modification of unreasonable demands, and such policy as might insure permanent safety and peace to China. China and the Powers. A clear exposition of the Chinese situation in 1900 is given in the following article written by Lord Charles Beresford: None of the powers has greater interests at stake in China, whether existent or prospective, than Great Britain and the United States. As will be seen by my Report on the China Mission, the latest figures I was able to obtain during my visit to China in 1898 showed that these two powers had over 72 per cent. of the whole of the foreign trade with China in their hands; all the other powers combined having only 28 per cent. between them, of which Japan possesses the larger share. the American nation, which is probably about the latest of these competitors, has already out-distanced all rivals, and obtained 8 per cent. of the whole trade, as against 28 per cent. of all other nations combined (including Japan). Viewed in this light, it will be seen that the disproportion between the trade of Great Britain and the United States is less real than apparent. There are one or two other factors which have to be taken into consideration in studying these statistics, which, like all figures, are more or less misleading. The first point is that not only is a very large proportion of American trade carried in British bottoms, but, in addition, a considerable amount is consigned to the old-established British firms in China, and therefore is rightly treated as British commerce by the Chinese customs. This trade in American goods is very large, I am told; and, while it is rightly classified as British, being British owned, and carried in British ships to Chinese ports, yet its place of origin is none the less American. The second point is, that this 8 per cent. of actual American trade as against 64 per cent. of nominal British trade has been obtained in a comparatively few years, and the proportionate increase of trade in the last two or three years would therefore be found to be in favor of America. The third, and still more important, point is that, while the British volume of trade is still growing, there is no doubt that in several directions, notably in drills, jeans, and sheetings, the trade of the United States has steadily gone ahead in China, while in British trade there has been a decline. The cotton piece-goods trade as a whole declined during 1897, but, in the items quoted above, there was actually an increase of nearly 500,000 pieces, all of American manufacture. It is perfectly true that, upon examining these figures, there seems to be a great disproportion between 64 per cent. It is apparent, therefore, that the interof trade possessed by Great Britain, and est of the United States in the foreign the 8 per cent. possessed by the United trade of China is not only an increasing States. It must be remembered, how one, but is also a proportionately greater ever, that it was Great Britain who open- interest than that of all European comed up, made possible, and developed the petitors, with the exception of Great Britforeign trade of the Chinese Empire. For ain, and this despite the fact that most many years Great Britain held an almost of them had the start of the United States undisputed commercial position in that in competing with Great Britain for the country. Subsequently, other European China market. I was pleased to find that on the whole commerce. The situation we are now facthe American press, as the representative ing comes under the last-named head. In of public opinion in the United States, my humble opinion, in the present state warmly endorsed the views which I ex- of affairs with regard to China, it would pressed relative to the open door, in my be better in the commercial interests of speeches on my way back to Great Britain, both the United States and Great Britain and all appeared to be very much inter- that they should support China, and so ested in the China problem. Despite this prevent the total collapse of this immense interest, however, I was unable to obtain empire, together with the consequent disany definite expression of opinion in favor organization of trade and the expenditure of an active policy in Chinese affairs. of blood and money which will be required to restore law and order and to re-establish that confidence without which trade cannot flourish. The commercial community of any country knows its own business better than any outsider can teach it, and all I propose to do is to lay plain facts before my American readers, without presuming to dictate to them as to what their line of policy should be. If it were merely a question of the present value of American-Chinese trade being involved, I can quite see that it would pay the United States to remain an unmoved The position and importance of Ameri- spectator of events in the Far East; but can trade with China I have already this is not the case. China is an almost shown to be considerable. The prospects untapped market. It is a vast country, of its development, and the many openings with an enormous population and rich for increasing trade, will be found on read- natural resources, all of which can be deing my Report. The only question which veloped. Can either the United States or remains, and which I propose to shortly Great Britain afford to stand aside and deal with here, is the actual position and see their present trade disturbed, if not prospects of China herself, and how Ameri- lost, and, also, their share in the procan interests are thereby affected. spective development of China as a whole interfered with? There is no doubt what the answer of the commercial classes in Great Britain will be, and I do not think that there will be much difference between their views and those of the business men of the United States, when the latter have carefully examined the data with which my Report will supply them. 66 Some of the American journals which disagreed with me seemed to doubt the wisdom of the policy I suggested in my speeches in America, because, they say, 'if inaugurated it would force the United States into a situation which might lead to war," and therefore the interests involved are not commensurate with the risks and responsibilities likely to be incurred. I can quite understand this argument, and how strongly it must appeal to the people of the United States, who have always endeavored to observe a policy of non-intervention in foreign affairs, unless important interests of the American people were at stake or their sense of justice was appealed to. This is a perfectly intelligible policy on the part of a commercial nation, to which peace is of the highest importance, because of the disturbing effect of war on trade and commerce. But there are occasions on which it is necessary to protect commercial interests by going to war, and there are occasions on which an energetic policy is necessary in order to prevent war and to avoid irreparable damage to trade and There are only two policies open. The one, I contend, will inevitably lead to anarchy and rebellion in China, and possibly to war between the foreign nations whose interests clash in that country. In certain phases of situations, no such thing as a policy of non-intervention is possible. This is one of them. To calmly await events really means to precipitate the dangers we all wish to avoid. Recent action on the part of the various European powers has tended to discredit the Chinese government in the eyes of the people. So-called majeure," she is immediately bullied by other powers to give them compensation for things she had neither the moral right to grant nor the physical power to refuse. This selfish and cowardly policy has been pursued by all the European powers in a minor or major degree. If it is continued much longer, it must inevitably lead to the break-up of the Chinese Empire. I will go further. It has been pursued too long already: events are moving so rapidly that we can no longer adhere to a policy of drift. The effete and corrupt Chinese government has been so severely shaken that, at the moment the people realize its impotence, it must fall. There are only two policies in my opinion to be adopted. The one is to acquiesce in this state of affairs, and so be compelled to join the dishonest "spheres of influence" policy, which means that every one will take as much territory as he can. The second and alternative line of policy is that which I have described as The Open Door, or Equal Opportunity for the Trade of All Nations." I will deal with both. 66 Spheres of Influence.-It amazes me to hear people talk so calmly about the break-up of an empire of over 430,000,000 people. It will be easy to destroy the present governmental system in China, but how is it to be reconstructed? What will become of the guarantees and undertakings of China, and what security have we that the expectant heirs of the Sick Man of the Far East will assume the responsibility for his obligations? The phrase "spheres of influence" is easy to use in theory, but how is the policy it indicates to be carried out in practice? Nominal spheres of influence, such as Germany now possesses in Shantung, or Russia in Manchuria, may exist as long as there is a Chinese government with some authority over the people to maintain law and order; but when that government is overturned and the authority of the hated foreigner is substituted for it, the question becomes less easy to settle than it looks on the face of it. Are the powers going to land armies to conquer or repress 400,000,000 people, who even now show an undisguised hatred and contempt for the foreigner and all his methods? Are you going to destroy an empire which has lasted for 4,000 years, and re place it with something else in a satisfactory manner, within a period of ten, fifteen, twenty, or even a hundred years? What man of common-sense can doubt that such a policy means endless trouble, anarchy, and rebellion; and an interference with trade and commerce which may be felt for years to come? To foreign bondholders it means a loss of between £50,000,000 and £60,000,000 sterling, because the debtor and his guarantee will both have disappeared. 66 How are the rival interests of conflicting nations to be amicably adjusted, if such a state of affairs is brought about? Capital has been invested and railways are being built by one power in the "sphere of influence" regarded by another power as peculiarly its own. For instance, in the Yangtse Valley, which if spheres of influence" are marked out, Great Britain will take measures to secure as her own, several nations have lately obtained territorial concessions which have resulted in the disturbance of British firms who owned lands within such concessions. It cannot be doubted that, if the disintegration of China begins, these and other questions will lead to international complications. Where is the United States' sphere of influence to be? I think the answer is very short. The United States' sphere of influence, like that of Great Britain, should be wherever American trade preponderates over that of other powers. If one power is allowed to close the door in the south, and others in the north, no sphere of influence can compensate America and Great Britain for the loss they must sustain. The policy of inaction will, therefore, by allowing the Chinese government to fall to pieces, bring about a condition of affairs which must lead to an expenditure of blood and money to protect the lives and property of foreigners resident in China. It most probably will lead to international complications, and to a European war; and, most certainly, it will mean great disturbance to, if not eventual loss of, trade. The Open Door.-The alternative policy to that which I have just described is that of the "Open Door, or Equal Opportunity for All." This policy was advocated in my recent speeches in America on the China question. I suppose that, even in a protectionist country, such as the United States, no one will deny the advantages of such a policy as applied to American exports to China; and that, whether the American manufacturer prefers to have preferential rights at home or not, it must be to his advantage that he has an equal opportunity with the foreigner abroad, and that no foreigner secures preferential rights in China which would leave American trade in the cold. This being so, only the question of the cost remains to be calculated, and how such a policy is to be carried out if adopt ed. It is upon this point that I think some of the American journals misunderstood my arguments, which probably were not sufficiently clearly stated. I deny that this policy can lead to war, or that it will cost the United States a single cent or a solitary soldier to carry it out. The first thing is to see how this policy is to be undertaken, and then we can estimate the cost of it. It means a policy to be inaugurated now, whereas the alternative policy is a policy of procrastination. This is a most important point, when it is remembered that there are only two powers ready to go to war in China to-day, or who can possibly do so with any chance of success. As time goes on, this will be altered. At the present moment Great Britain, with her enormous fleet in Far Eastern waters, and the 100,000 native troops she can bring up from India within a shorter time than any other power can land an army, combined with her possession of the chief coaling stations, is pre-eminently in a position to deal with the China question by war, if she so desired. Next to her comes Japan, with a fine fleet in close proximity to the scene of operations, and a capacity to land 200,000 troops in China at any moment. Apart from these two, the United States, by her position on the other side of the Pacific, and the object-lesson she has just given the world of her ability to mobilize men and ships rapidly and effectively, has also to be counted with; while, as any trouble in China would probably mean European complications, Germany would have to be regarded as an important factor in the position. Above all, these four powers represent the foreign trade interests of China, the proportion divided up among other nations being so inconsiderable that it has no such strong claims. These four powers, therefore, have a moral right to protect their own interests and the ability to do so. If they agree to combine, not for purely selfish motives, but to guarantee the independence of China and the maintenance of a fair field and no favor for all comers, who can suppose that any other power could reasonably (or even unreasonably) object? The whole raison d'être of such an understanding would lie in the fact that it would be too powerful to attack, and that it could maintain the peace while preserving the open door to all. There would be no menace to other powers in such a combination, because the bond of agreement between the contracting parties would be the preservation of the open door with equal opportunity for all. To China herself the powers would prove friends in need. By guaranteeing her integrity, they would give a new lease of life to the Chinese Empire. They would be entitled to ask, and powerful enough to secure, that reforms for the benefit of China and the improvement of foreign trade should be carried out. The reorganization of China's finances and her army would enable her to stand alone in the near future. It is not necessary to go to Congress, or to the Imperial Parliament, to secure the men necessary to assist China to effect these reforms. As long as the four governments induced China to undertake the reforms in return for their protection, men would easily be secured from all of these countries, and also from other nations, who would assist the Chinese in building up their empire on more stable foundations. The moral and political support of China by the four powers I have named is all that is needed. They need not expend a single shilling, or move a single man, officially, in order to carry it out. All that is required is that China shall be assisted, and, in return for such assistance, shall employ foreigners of all countries who will reorganize her army and her finances on as sound lines as the imperial maritime customs of China is established. CHINA AND THE POWERS-CHINESE-AMERICAN RECIPROCITY Observation of recent events teaches us that, if we continue to leave China to herself without recuperative power from within, or firm and determined assistance from without, her ultimate disintegration is only a question of time. The reforms which are urgently required in China, both for the benefit of that empire and its people, and for the development of the trade of friendly nations, may be shortly summarized as follows: 1. The appointinent of a foreign financial adviser to direct the administration and collection of internal revenue. 2. The reform of currency, so as to af ford a more stable exchange. 3. The establishment and centralization of mints. 4. The abolition of the present octroi and likin charges on goods which have already paid duty at the ports. In return for this, China should be allowed to increase her present tariff. Trade would not be damaged so much by slightly in creased taxation, as it is injured and hindered by the delays and uncertainties of the present fiscal system. 5. The rearrangement of the salt monopoly, and general administrative reform. 6. The establishment and maintenance of a proper military and police, capable of affording that protection to which the foreign merchant is entitled for himself or his goods. 7. The opening up of the country and its resources, by giving greater facilities to native or foreign capital in the de. velopment of the minerals of the country, and improvements in the lines of communication, including postal and telegraphic reforms. long as she retained the foreign officers. The idea that the Chinese are not good soldiers is a great mistake. I was permitted to inspect most of the armies, and all of the forts and arsenals of China, as will be seen by the detailed account in my report, and I am convinced that, properly armed, disciplined, and led, there could be no better material than the Chinese soldier. I leave it to the commercial classes of the United States to say whether it is not worth their while to incur such slight risks for such great profit, and for so good an object. On sound business lines this policy appeals to the American nation; but, in addition to that, are we going to let this opportunity slip of drawing the two Anglo-Saxon nations together for the cause of civilized progress, and the benefit of the world at large? Great nations have great responsibilities, to which they must be true, and when those responsibilities and self-interest go hand in hand, it would be unwise to miss the opportunity. Events are moving very rapidly in the Far East. A decision must be arrived at, and action of some sort taken very soon. It is the duty of Great Britain to lead, and I believe that the United States will not refuse to follow, but that both nations will combine to hoist aloft the banner of civilization and industrial progress, for the benefit of their own people, as well as for the benefit of China, and of the world. Chinese-American Reciprocity. His Excellency Wu Ting-Fang, Chinese minister to the United States, writes as follows: Trade, which lies at the foundation of 8. The right of residence in the interior international intercourse, has an eminently to be conceded to foreigners. 9. The promotion of all reforms and the introduction of all changes which are likely to promote the cause of civilization and the well-being of the Chinese people. Such a coalition as that of the four great trading powers I have mentioned could obtain these reforms with advantage to themselves and benefit to China, and, indeed, the trading world. In a very few years, with this assist ance loyally rendered, China would have an army capable of protecting herself, as selfish origin. It is a constant manœuvre on the part of men to sell dear and buy cheap. Since each party in a commercial transaction seeks only his own advantage, it was for a long time thought that one of them could gain only at the expense of the other. Thus the "mercantile system," which for centuries held Europe spellbound, made gold-getting the end and aim of all commercial activities. The promotion of friendly relations with the object of securing an exchange of benefits was not considered of even secondary importance. Then came the navigation laws, |