most objectionable and offensive policies of the government that had preceded it.

"No tangible relief was afforded the vast numbers of unhappy reconcentrados, despite the reiterated professions made in that regard and the amount appropriated by Spain to that end. The proffered expedient of zones of cultivation proved illusory. Indeed, no less practical nor more delusive promises of succor could well have been tendered to the exhausted and destitute people, stripped of all that made life and home dear and herded in a strange region among unsympathetic strangers hardly less necessitous than themselves.

"By the end of December the mortality among them had frightfully increased. Conservative estimates from Spanish sources placed the deaths among these distressed people at over 40 per cent from the time General Weyler's decree of reconcentration was enforced. With the acquiescence of the Spanish authorities a scheme was adopted for relief by charitable contributions raised in this country and distributed, under the direction of the consul general and the several consuls, by noble and earnest individual effort through the organized agencies of the American Red Cross. Thousands of lives were thus saved, but many thousands more were inaccessible to such forms of aid.

'The war continued on the old footing, without comprehensive plan, developing only the same spasmodic encounters, barren of strategic result, that had marked the course of the earlier Ten Years' rebellion as well as the present insurrection from its start. No alternative save physical exhaustion of either combatant, and therewithal the practical ruin of the island, lay in sight, but how far distant no one could venture to conjecture.

DESTRUCTION OF THE MAINE.

"At this juncture, on the 15th of February last, occurred the destruction of the battleship Maine, while rightfully lying in the harbor of Havana on a mission of international courtesy and good will-a catastrophe the suspicious nature and horror of which stirred the nation's heart profoundly.

"It is a striking evidence of the poise and sturdy good sense distinguishing our national character that this shocking blow, falling upon a generous people, already deeply touched by preceding events in Cuba, did not move them to an instant, desperate resolve to tolerate no longer the existence of a condition of danger and disorder at our doors that made possible such a deed by whomsoever wrought. Yet the instinct of justice prevailed and the nation anxiously awaited the result of the searching investigation at once set on foot.

"The finding of the naval board of inquiry established that the origin of the explosion was external by a submarine mine, and only halted through lack of positive testimony to fix the responsibility of its authorship.

"All these things carried conviction to the most thoughtful, even before the finding of the naval court, that a crisis in our relations with Spain and toward Cuba was at hand. So strong was this belief that it needed but a brief executive suggestion to the congress to receive immediate answer to the duty of making instant provision for the possible and perhaps speedy probable emergency of war, and the remarkable, almost unique, spectacle was presented of a unanimous vote of both houses on the 9th of March, appropriating $50,000,000 for the national defense and for each and every purpose connected therewith, to be expended at the direction of the president.

"That this act of provision came none too soon was disclosed when the application of the fund was undertaken. Our forts were practically undefended. Our navy needed large provision for increased ammunition and supplies and even numbers to cope with any sudden attack from the navy of Spain, which comprised vessels of the highest type of continental perfection. Our army also required enlargement of men and munitions.

"The details of the hurried preparation for the dreaded contingency are told in the reports of the secretaries of war and of the navy, and need not be repeated here. It is sufficint to say that the outbreak of the war, when it did come, found our nation not unprepared to meet the conflict.

"Nor was the apprehension of coming strife confined to our own country. It was felt by the continental powers, which, on April 6, through their ambassadors and envoys, addressed to the executive an expression of hope that humanity and moderation might mark the course of this government and people, and that further negotiations would lead to an agreement which, while securing the maintenance of peace, would affirm all necessary guarantees for the re-establishment of order in Cuba.

"In responding to that representation I also shared the hope that the envoys had expressed that peace might be preserved in a manner to terminate the chronic condition of disturbance in Cuba so injurious and menacing to our interests and tranquillity, as well as shocking to our sentiments of humanity; and, while appreciating the humanitarian and disinterested character of the communication they had made on behalf of the powers, I stated the confidence of this government, for its part, that equal appreciation would be shown for its own earnest

and unselfish endeavors to fulfill a duty to humanity by ending a situation the indefinite prolongation of which had become insufferable.

EFFORTS TO AVERT WAR PROVE VAIN.

"Still animated by the hope of a peaceful solution and obeying the dictates of duty, no effort was relaxed to bring about a speedy ending of the Cuban struggle. Negotiations to this object continued actively with the government of Spain, looking to the immediate conclusion of a six months' armistice in Cuba with a view to effecting the recognition of her people's rights to independence. Besides this, the instant revocation of the order of reconcentration was asked, so that the sufferers, returning to their homes and aided by united American and Spanish effort, might be put in a way to support themselves and, by orderly resumption of the well nigh destroyed productive energies of the island, contribute to the restoration of its tranquility and well being.

'Negotiations continued for some little time at Madrid, resulting in offers by the Spanish government which could not but be regarded as inadequate. It was proposed to confide the preparation of peace to the insular parliament, yet to be convened under the autonomous decrees of November, 1897, but without impairment in any wise to the constitutional powers of the Madrid government, which, to that end, would grant an armistice, if solicited by the insurgents, for such time as the general-in-chief might see fit to fix.

"How and with what scope of discretionary powers the insular parliament was expected to set about the 'preparation' of peace did not appear. If it were to be by negotiation with the insurgents, the issue seemed to rest on the one side with a body chosen by a fraction of the electors in the districts under Spanish control and on the other with the insurgent population holding the interior country, unrepresented in the so-called parliament, and defiant at the suggestion of suing for peace.

"Grieved and disappointed at this barren outcome of my sincere endeavors to reach a practicable solution, I felt it my duty to remit the whole question to the congress. In the message of April 1, 1898. I announced that with this last overture in the direction of immediate peace in Cuba, and its disappointing reception by Spain, the effort of the executive was brought to an end.

"I again reviewed the alternative course of action which I had proposed, concluding that the only one consonant with international policy and compatible with our firm-set historical traditions was intervention as a neutral to stop the war and check the hopeless sacrifice of