HE DOCTRINE AND PRACTICE OF INTER- tervention is the interference of a state or group of st. es in the affairs of another state, for the purpose of pelling it to do or refrain from doing certain acts. Its 1. ntial characteristic is force, either open or concealed. ple mediation or even a formal protest, unless there is sent the intention of enforcing the demand, does not conite intervention.1 he relation of intervention to international law and even rules governing the practice are still in an extremely Jettled state. Most writers content themselves with scussion of the particular conditions under which interion is or is not justifiable, and make no attempt to rmine the place of intervention in a system of interonal law. Almost without exception they treat the st. ect in an a priori" manner. From the premises that nat ons are independent, politically equal and possessed of 1 Hall: International Law, sec. 88. Holtzendorff: Handbuch des Modernen Vlkerrechts, vol. iv, p. 131. A de Floecker: De l'Intervention, chap. 2, sec. 3. "The right of intervention does not exist;" and chap. 3, sec. 9, "Intervention is admissible in certain cases in spite of the absence of a right of intervention." the same rights, they deduce what the doctrine of intervention must be and what the conditions which justify its use.1 Whatever may be said in favor of this deductive method from the ethical standpoint, from the legal and historical point of view it must always remain unsatisfactory. It proceeds from ideals rather than from the facts of history; from the standpoint of what ought to be, rather than from that of what is. States to-day do not base their actions on innate ideas of justice, or upon precepts deduced from considerations of absolute rights antecedent to custom and law, but on rules which can be shown to have been followed by all or most of the states. In every other branch of international law, writers arrive at the doctrine and principles from the practice and precedents established by nations in their dealings with each other. There is no adequate reason why this should not be done with regard to intervention. In the following study the historic method has been pursued. This has involved a careful analysis of the various phases of the practice of intervention, together with a treatment of its evolution and development. From this analysis has been deduced a theory of intervention which differs radically from the doctrine of intervention hitherto advanced. For purposes of presentation the cases of intervention art classified as follows: Intervention : 3 2 1 "We might indeed deem that the search for rules of any kind was hopeless, were it not possible to deduce certain clear and unmistakable precepts from principles admitted on all sides. No one doubts the existence of the right of independence, or the duty of self-preservation, and from these we are able by a process of deduction to obtain what we are in search of." Lawrence, sec. 75. 2An accepted uniform classification does not exist. A recent writer goes even further and declares that no systematic study of the cases of this important branch of international law has yet been made. Intervention between two states does not differ in principle from intervention in the internal affairs of an individual state and is therefore not treated sepa rately. See Hall, sec. 88. 3. To maintain, or establish political institutions. 4. To prevent intolerance and anarchy and to enforce reparation for injury to life and property. 5. To enforce treaty rights and obligations. I. The most striking instance of intervention to prevent hostile acts is the well known case arising out of the propagandistic decree of the French Revolution. After the first excesses of the Revolution, Austria and Prussia issued their manifesto,' declaring their intention and reasons for intervention. This called forth the famous decree of the convention on November 19, 1792. The decree proclaimed that "the French nation would assure fraternity and assistance to all people who wished to recover their liberty." It was immediately followed by orders to the French generals, "not to allow even the shadow of the ancient authorities to remain."' Such a proclamation, if carried into effect, would have involved the very existence of the European governments. Intervention became a necessity, not only for self-preservation but also to prevent attack. In spite of this, England maintained a policy of non-intervention, and as late as December 20, 1792, her ambassador at St. Petersburg sought to avoid the necessity of British intervention on condition that "France rescind any acts injurious to the rights and sovereignty of any other nation, and give in some unequivocal manner a pledge of her intention no longer to foment trouble, or to incite disturbances against other governments. The offer was rejected, and as Pitt declared two 1Annual Register, 1791, p. 190. Martens, Recueil, VI, p. 742. Annual Register, 1792, p. 281. 4 * Pitt's Speech in the House of Lords. Parliamentary Debates, I Series, vol. 28, P. 449. Given in Stapleton. Intervention and Non-intervention, p. 20. years later, "England was forced into war against her will." 1 Numerous other causes of this character, which led to intervention, might be cited, such as the mobilization of troops, the building of fortresses on the frontier and filibustering and hostile attacks on land by armed bands of citizens from another state. An attack, a threatened attack, or preparations from which an intention to attack may be inferred, have been standing grounds for intervention. It should be said, however, that the danger in such cases has always been direct and immediate, not contingent or remote, and the practice seems to recognize the justice of intervention only in the cases where the evil is sufficiently serious to warrant an ultimate recourse to war. When these conditions are present the history of the practice shows that the right of the individual state to independent action, even on its own territory, has been greatly circumscribed. For the better security of all the states the society of nations appears to have recognized a right above that of the individual state. II. Intervention to preserve the balance of power, better than any other part of the subject, illustrates that states are not independent of each other; that they are not politically equal; and that their so-called independence is constantly called in question. With the rise of sovereign states in the sixteenth century the dream of a universal monarch, either emperor or pope, vanished. The very existence of such states depended upon the absence of a ruler who could aspire to such power. Accordingly, there manifested itself very early a jealous disposition to guard against the undue aggrandisement of any one state. The earliest instances of the practice occurred in Italy, where the growth of the free city republics had given 1 Pitt's Speech in the House of Commons, Feb., 1793. Par. Deb. I Series, vol. 30. P. 345. rise to a system of balancing in order to preserve the political equilibrium.' In Northern Europe it appeared first in the wars of the Reformation. Both France and Sweden engaged in the Thirty Years' War to set a limit to the expansion of Austria. After Westphalia France constituted herself the champion of Protestantism in Germany in order to preserve the balance of power, notwithstanding the fact that the traditions of the French court were diametrically opposed to the new faith. Similarly the Grand Alliance had for its object the preventing of the union of France and Spain under one sovereign. In the wars which grew out of this the European principle prevailed over the ambitions of Louis XIV. The union of the crowns of France and Spain was declared dangerous to the peace of Europe. In the Treaty of Utrecht, 1713, the supremacy of the principle of the balance of power was definitely formulated. The third article of the treaty between the Emperor Charles the Sixth and Philip the Fifth of Spain reads: "In order to perpetuate the equilibrium of Europe it shall be established as a rule that the kingdoms of France and Spain shall never be united." But France and Spain were both independent powers, and according to the accepted theory of independence had a right to dispose of their territory as they pleased. Thus, early in the eighteenth century the principle that there is a right higher than that which belongs to the individual nation is definitely recognized in practice. The conditions established by the Treaty of Utrecht continued till the French Revolution. During that time intervention was directed, not against the aggrandisement of Austria or France as nations, but against the too powerful house of Hapsburg or the dynasty of the Bourbons. When Europe was again called upon to assert the principle new forces had begun their work. The identification of 1 Johnson: Europe in the Sixteenth Century, ch. 1. 2 Wakeman European History, 1598-1713, chs. 6 and 7. • Ibid. Dumont: Correspondence diplomatique, vol, 8, pt. 1, p. 339. |