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currence, though, for the original phase than what we had planned to and to deliver all the products that we have.

If I could add one other thing, we even brought some things in early in IOC prime as part of our redefinition of a phased program. We had to use TMIS to help us provide that capability. That was not in the plan, but we brought it into the program and implemented and delivered.

Mr. LEWIS. Well, as you are aware, the GAO also reported you have troubles testing the system.

Mr. MOSER. We have not had trouble testing the system. I think that-and I've read the GAO report. It was a difference in the levels of testing. There are three basic levels of testing in TMIS: at a unit or a component level, let me call it that, in that it is an integrated test where we bring the components together, and then as acceptance test.

We did not-and we do this on all programs, and any project manager or program manager will do it. If it is not of the benefit and the correct balance of using resources and risk to conduct-to not conduct the unit or component test until you get to the fully integrated test, that is the right thing to do. We chose not to test some of the off-the-shelf deliverables, components that function all the time, software that functions all the time, until we got to the integrated test.

As the GAO read our plan, they got confused with that. I think if we're at fault in anything, it's not updating a plan, but it has not changed the products of the program, it has not changed the risk of the program.

Mr. LEWIS. Have you resolved any of the deficiencies in the program that they outline?

Mr. MOSER. We have.

Mr. LEWIS. Do you anticipate any cost overruns?

Mr. MOSER. No, sir, we do not.

Mr. LEWIS. That was quite firm.

Mr. MOSER. That was very firm.

Mr. LEWIS. Okay. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, gentlemen.

Mr. NELSON. Mrs. Morella.

Mrs. MORELLA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I know we don't have very much time because we've got a vote coming, but I was particularly interested in looking at page 8 of your report. It seems to suggest that the ELV's, especially the Titan III class vehicles, could play some role in the unmanned logistic flights. I guess you estimate them to be about one a year. I wondered what you're doing to take advantage of it.

Mr. STOFAN. We've been conducting studies over the last two years looking at the use of ELV's in conjunction with the Space Station. We started out with looking at using them for the assembly phase of the station and determined that that was difficult technically and not cost effective at all.

We then looked at the use of ELV's for long-term logistic supply, and we presently are continuing on the studies. Not only are we looking at it, but the Japanese and the Europeans are also looking at the potential of using ELV's for logistics supply when you do not need men there—that is, you do not need a crew changeout. As

long as you need a crew changeout, an ELV will not help you anyway whatsoever, because you'd have to take the Shuttle up. You might as well take the material up along with it.

But if you get to the point where you don't need a crew changeout but you need supplies, then an ELV would be feasible, and these studies are ongoing, and I would expect in the long term that we will end up using ELV's for logistics, and I see no reason why that could not be a commercial endeavor.

Mrs. MORELLA. You know, based on the tremendous backlog in the STS flights, why does there seem to be, if you would agree, sort of an institutional bias against using the Titan III for the logistic missiles?

Mr. STOFAN. I think in looking at last year's and this year's budget, looking to the future and talking with NASA, there is at this time, I would say, no institutional bias against ELV's. In the past, there has been. In the past, the ELV's were discontinued in the Agency and left us in a perhaps undesirable situation. Today, I see no bias within NASA against the ELV's.

Mr. MARTIN. Mrs. Morella, excuse me. For the station itself, the way we've looked at it, putting it together and then supporting it in a steady state operation, five Shuttle flights a year are required to transfer the crew back and forth. The Shuttle bay has enough payload capability to handle most of our logistics up and down weight, and so we factored that in. If we need additional capability, expendable launch vehicles would certainly be required. But fundamentally, we try to minimize the operational phase of the program and reduce the total cost of the activity.

Mrs. MORELLA. Speaking of that, what are the relative costs of an STS flight and the Titan III launch?

Mr. STOFAN. We'll have to supply that for the record. Both of those numbers come out of Dick Truly's organization. I do not know the numbers that they're quoting for the two systems.

[The information follows:]

In FY 1986 dollars, the estimated average cost per flight of Shuttle Operations for an FY 1994 launch is $156.3 million, based upon 14 shuttle flights per year. A Titan III launch vehicle is projected to cost about $176.0 million in real year dollars or $148.0 million in FY 1986 dollars. Because the Titan III is a commercial launch services buy, it includes the total cost for flight hardware, launch support, the intergration of a spacecraft onto the Titan for a first time mission and re-flight insur

ance.

Mrs. MORELLA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and we're going to miss you, Mr. Stofan, and we look forward to working with Mr. Odom.

Mr. NELSON. Mr. Stofan, thank you very much.

Mr. STOFAN. Thank you.

Mr. NELSON. We appreciate it.

Dr. Martin, Mr. Moser, thank you, and have a good day. The meeting is adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 12:30 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]

1989 NASA AUTHORIZATION

TUESDAY, MARCH 22, 1988

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,

COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE, SPACE, AND TECHNOLOGY,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON SPACE SCIENCE AND APPLICATIONS,

Washington, DC.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:42 a.m., in room 2325, Rayburn House Office Building, the Honorable Bill Nelson (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

Mr. NELSON. Good morning.

Without objection, we shall wave the rule allowing pictures to be taken in the subcommittee hearing.

Mr. Torricelli, we are delighted to have our colleague, a member of this subcommittee, Congressman Bob Torricelli of New Jersey. He is going to be our lead off witness concerning his bill, H.R. 3858, which would create a National Mars Commission to develop a detailed proposal for cooperative exploration of the planet Mars with the Soviet Union.

We have talked at length about such cooperative ventures and such sharing of cost and resources. It was 22 years ago that I shall never forget the experience that we had in the ornate, palatial confines of the old Czar's palace in the Kremlin, and our delegation sat down with the President of the Soviet Union, for a 21⁄2 hour eyeball-to-eyeball meeting discussing the future of the potential of cooperation with our countries in our civilian space program. At that time, that was within the context that the Space Cooperative Agreement had lapsed in 1982, and subsequent it has been reenacted.

One of the most eloquent spokesmen during that meeting was Mr. Torricelli. I was just amazed, the delegation that we had, which had some 12 Congressmen, how when each one spoke, each one spoke as if it were in a preplanned script, so that nothing had been left out, and yet the entire dialogue was spontaneous.

Later on in our hearing, we are going to be hearing from Mr. John Aaron, who is the Acting Assistant Administrator for the Office of Exploration, and Dr. Bill Ballhaus, who is the Acting Associate Administrator for the Office of Aeronautics and Space Technology. And both of these offices represent NASA's new approach toward the funding of basic science and long-range planning. The agency is proposing to augment these projects with space research and technology earmarked for a 75 percent increase in the agency's request to Congress up to a total of about $391 million.

Now because of the underfunding in the past years, this increase is beginning to be more in line with the needs of the agency. We on

this subcommittee have been very critical of the deficiency in this area of funding in the past.

I think it's interesting to note that the National Research Council and the Aerospace Industry Association in reports released late last year noted that, "NASA's investment in basic research and technology development have been lower than the sustaining level required by most industries."

Long-range planning is another area that we're going to look at. NASA has created this Office of Exploration to coordinate the technological development needed to select a long-range goal, and we're looking forward to hearing from Mr. Aaron and hope that he's going to start bringing some of these goals into a clear focus, because they haven't been there in the past.

Now given all of our hopes and our dreams, we are facing the budgetary reality of trying to figure out how we fit all of this within the confines of the amount that is going to be allocated this year. Simply, the funding is not going to be available to do everything that we want to do. So we need every bit of information from you as to what are your specific ideas and your priorities that will help us with this task.

We will insert Mr. Walker's opening statement in the record. Mr. Walker and his colleagues in the GOP are in a caucus right now with the President. So rather than hold up our meeting, we're going to go ahead, and they will be joining us later.

Mr. Torricelli, it's a pleasure to have you here.

[The prepared opening statement of Mr. Walker follows:]

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