Circuit, and derived considerable assistance from them, and on several occasions have been kept from mistakes by the information and references, which I found readily from the good arrangement of the work, which I consider a very valuable one.' And the highest authority known to the law of England, has added his testimony to that of his brother: Having availed myself,' he writes, of a period of comparative leisure, and having gone through the fourth volume of Mr. Robinson's Practice, I have the greatest satisfaction of bearing witness to the learning, care, and ability, which this volume, in common with its predecessors, exhibits. The work, which is one of great practical utility, will become a standard work, and will do great honor and credit to its learned author, and will add another item to the debt which the legal profession in this country owes to American jurists, in illustrating the law of the two nations.' Such words of praise coming from across the broad Atlantic, must be grateful to any author. They are as honorable to the great men from whom they come, as they are flattering to the learned lawyer of whom they are written. If it be the highest meed of praise laudari a laudatis, it is surely no less praiseworthy in an English Judge, eminent for his great learning, to confess publicly that he on several occasions has been kept from mistakes' on circuit, by the production of an American writer, and in another, still more distinguished by his position, to declare his belief that that production would become a 'standard work,' and would increase the debt of the legal profession of England to the jurists of this country. ART. VIII.—1. Campaigns of the Army of the Potomac. By William Swinton. New York: C. B. Richardson. 1866. 2. The Twelve Decisive Battles of the War. By William Swinton. New York: Dick & Fitzgerald. 1867. 3. Notes on the Rebel Invasion of Maryland and Pennsylvania and the Battle of Gettysburg. By M. Jacobs. Philadelphia: Lippincott & Co. 1864. 4. The Rebellion Record. By Frank Moore. New York: D. Van Nostrand. 1864. 5. Report of the Joint Committee on the Condact of the War, at the Second Session, 38th Congress. Washington. 1865. 6. Address of Hon. Edward Everett at the consecration of the National Cemetery at Gettysburg. Boston: Little, Brown & Co. 1864. 7. Southern History of the War. New York: C. B. Richardson. By Edward A. Pollard. 1865. S. Lee and his Lieutenants. By Edward A. Pollard. New York: E. B. Treat & Co. 1867. 9. The Great Rebellion. By J. T. Headley. Hartford: The campaign of 1863 in the east, though marked by less activity and fewer great battles than either the preceding or the succeeding one, has been looked upon as by no means inferior to either of them in interest and importance. Indeed, there is no portion of the history of the late war about which more has been written and spoken, than about Chancellorsville and Gettysburg. These two mighty conflicts seem to be invested with an unusual share of that dramatic interest which hangs around the events of the late struggle. We remember well the intense anxiety which filled both sections of the country, when the two armies plunged into the depths of the 'Wilderness,' as if to hide their mortal combat from the view of men; with what breathless suspense the result was waited for, as, day after day, the mysterious forest resounded with the roar of the contest; what disappointment filled the North when, finally, the largest and best equipped force yet put in the field had been thrown back over the Rappahannock, shattered and broken; what mingled joy and sorrow pervaded the South when the magnificent skill and audacity of her great chieftain had again brought victory, but, in doing so, had paid as the price, Stonewall Jackson. Other circumstances contribute to the interest of Gettysburg. It marks the period of the most formidable irruption made by Southern arms into Northern territory. In weight of artillery, and number of men actually engaged, it probably exceeded any battle of the war. On its issue hung, perhaps, the fate, for the time, of one or more of the large Northern cities. The very date of its occurrence, on the eve of the 4th of July, has added to the impression it has made. It has seemed to many, the turning point of a contest, of which the remainder was but a tremendous death-struggle. No wonder, then, that it has been a favorite theme of the orators, and poets, and historians, of at least one-half the country. But notwithstanding the interest that centred on Gettysburg, the general conception of the aims, character, and results, of this campaign, is, we think, far from correct. Of course, the contemporary accounts are marked with that distortion of facts, which is the natural consequence of excited passions; but even in the numerous historical estimates which, since the war, have been made of its chief events, we have found no lucid and temperate account of the plans and purposes of the principal actors in the drama, or of the facts themselves which marked its progress. The books placed at the head of this article, are but a few of the many which have furnished pictures of this important period, colored by every shade of passion, prejudice, and ignorance. It is not our purpose to review them in detail, but rather to correct some of their errors by a simple statement of facts. In the first place, but small reference has been had to the facts of the case, and the condition of the combatants, in the motives usually ascribed to the Confederate leader in the initiation of this conflict. Thus, this invasion is commonly set forth as the great effort on the part of the Confederacy, to transfer permanently the seat of war in the east from Southern to Northern territory. It is considered not as an 'irruption,' but as a deliberate attempt, by the subjugation and the holding of one or more Northern States, to conquer a peace on Northern soil. It is held up as an example of the fatal change of policy on the part of the South, from 'defensive' to 'offensive' warfare. Thus Mr. Swinton, the fairest and ablest of the Northern historians, says: "The plan of operations devised by Gen. Lee, was far from the character of a roving expedition. This was invasion, pure and simple, an audacious enterprise, designed to transfer the seat of war from Virginia to the North country, to pass the Susquehannah, to capture Washington, Baltimore, and Philadelphia; in a word, to conquer a peace on the soil of the loyal States.' And again, 'thus was baulked and brought to naught, the scheme of Confederate invasion, an invasion undertaken by an army powerful in numbers, and in the prestige of victory, and aiming at the boldest quarry-the conquest of peace on the soil of the loyal States. . It was an error in its inception, for it was an enterprise that overstepped the limits of that fitting theory of military policy that generally governed the Confederate war-councils, and committed Lee to all the perils and losses of an invasion without any adequate recompense, and even without any well determined military object.' The idea of Mr. Everett is not far different, and he makes the additional mistake of throwing the responsibility of this campaign, on the Confederate Government, and not on Gen. Lee. Contrast with these, the clear and simple statement of Gen. Lee himself, in his report: The position occupied by the enemy,' says he, ' opposite Fredericksburg, being one in which he could not be attacked to advantage, it was determined to draw him from it. The execution of this purpose embraced the relief of the Shenandoah Valley from the troops that had occupied the lower part of it during the winter and spring, and, if practicable, the transfer of the scene of hostilities north of the Potomac. It was thought that the corresponding movements, on the part of the enemy, to which those contemplated by us would probably give rise, might offer a fair opportunity to strike a blow at the army commanded by General Hooker, and that, in any event, that army would be compelled to leave Virginia, and possibly to draw to its support, troops designed to operate against other parts of the country. In this way, it was supposed, that the enemy's plan of campaign for the summer, would be broken up, and part of the season of active operations be consumed in the formation of new combinations, and the preparations that they would require. In addition to these advantages, it was hoped that valuable results might be attained by military success.' The position of affairs in Virginia, in May, 1863, was as follows:-Gen. Hooker had opened the Spring Campaign with nearly 130,000 men, well armed and equipped. At the head of this splendid force, he attempted to turn the position of Gen. Lee, who held the line of the south bank of the Rappahannock with between 50,000 and 60,000 men, and either throw him back toward Richmond, or defeat him in the open field, if he ventured to give battle. This plan was not only baffled, but at Chancellorsville the Federal army was defeated, and forced to recross the Rappahannock, with the loss of more than 17,000 men, besides the disabling of three-fourths of its cavalry. The Confederate loss was about 12,000. Each army returned to its old lines, and rested for several weeks after this fierce conflict. The Federal army had met with a severe reverse, but was still formidable. Gen. Hooker had still 100,000 effective men, and of these, 30,000 were in fine condition; for Gen. Hooker had so managed as not to bring them into battle. His strength was diminished somewhat, during the month of May, by the expiration of the term of service of a number of regiments. On the other hand, Gen. Lee brought up Longstreet from Suffolk with two divisions, and, by calling in the conscripts and furloughed men, found himself, about the last of May, at the head of 55,000 infantry, and from 5,000 to 6,000 cavalry,—in all about 61,000 men.' The Confederate army occupied the 1 The total effective force Historical Magazine, August, War Department, at 68,352. under Gen. Lee in May, 1863, is reported in the 1867, as taken from the captured rapers of the C. S. This (if correct) included all the troops within the |