Even more must we do this when the administration of justice is in the hands of a profession with a long tradition of principles, an ideal of justice and a systematic science. In other words, we must regard "the spiritual initiative, which is superior to mechanical causation." 105 The insistence of the Neo-Kantians and of the new school of jurists in France upon the psychological side is parallel with the rise of social psychology among the sociologists. What is valid in the economic interpretation is better expressed by Kohler. Roscoe Pound.

HARVARD LAW SCHOOL.

[To be continued.]

105 Small, General Sociology, 639.

HARVARD LAW REVIEW.

Published monthly, during the Academic Year, by Harvard Law Students.

THE LAW SCHOOL. The registration in the School on November 15 for the last twelve years is shown in the following table:

The following tables show the sources from which the twelve successive classes have been drawn, both as to previous college training and as to geographical districts:

As the twenty-one Harvard seniors in the first year class have in
each instance completed the work required for the A.B. degree, all mem-
bers of the class are virtually college graduates. The same is true of
practically the entire school. Of the seventy-six unclassified students
thirty-four have entered this year, and of these, twenty-six are graduates
of a college or university, and eight are graduates of law schools.

One hundred and forty-five colleges and universities have representa-
tives now in the school, as compared with one hundred and thirty-eight
last year and one hundred and twenty-four the previous year. In the
first-year class eighty-three colleges and universities are represented as
follows:

Harvard
74; Yale 33; Princeton 22; Dartmouth 15; Brown II; Bow-
doin 8; University of California, Clark College, Oberlin, Williams 4;
Amherst, Bates, University of Chicago, Cornell University, University
of Illinois, University of Iowa, University of Minnesota, New York Uni-
versity, University of Pennsylvania, 3; Alabama Polytechnic Institute,
University of Arkansas, Beloit, Boston College, Buchtel, Carleton, Col-
orado College, University of Georgia, Holy Cross, University of Kansas,
University of Michigan, University of Texas, Trinity (Conn.), Tufts,
Union University, University of Virginia, Wabash, Washington and Jeffer-
son, Wesleyan, 2; Allegheny, Bellevue, Bethel, Central University (Ky.),
Columbia University, Cotner University, Delaware, De Pauw, Earlham,
Elon, Emory, Fisk University, Greenville, Grinnell, Hamilton, Juniata,
University of Kentucky, Kenyon, Knox, Lafayette, Loyola, University of
Maine, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Middlebury, University
of Mississippi, University of North Dakota, Northwestern University,

Ohio Wesleyan University, Oxford University, Parsons, Pennsylvania College, University of Rochester, Rutgers, Santa Clara, University of Tennessee, Tulane University, Ursinus, University of Utah, Washburn, Washington and Lee University, West Virginia University, Western Reserve University, University of Wisconsin, Wittenberg, Wofford, 1.

4

5

LIABILITY OF FUTURE INTERESTS IN PERSONALTY FOR OWNER'S DEBTS. — Although the ancient common law did not recognize the existence of future estates in personalty, the law became more liberal at an early period, and there has resulted an approximate assimilation of the rules governing the limitation of future interests in realty and personalty.1 Remainders, vested 2 and contingent, legal and equitable, may without question be carved out of the absolute ownership of chattels. However, the power to deal with these interests when once created, has, in most jurisdictions, been confined to narrower limits. This is manifested most frequently in the restrictions placed on two closely allied incidents of ownership, alienability and liability to the demands of creditors.

8

In these two particulars, the law as to personalty and realty has followed much the same trend. The assignment of a vested remainder in either land or chattels was allowed at common law; the estate passed by deed as a present property right. But contingent remainders in land could be assigned only in equity or by estoppel,' as they were not regarded as present interests, and, moreover, such an assignment was repugnant to the law of champerty and maintenance. Though the doctrines of champerty and maintenance never applied to personal property, the rule was the same.10 In several jurisdictions, this doctrine has been modified by statute and decision, so that a contingent interest may be assigned at law."

9

Although alienability and liability to the claims of creditors are two very similar attributes of property and other rights, they have often been disassociated in dealing with future estates. It is everywhere settled that a vested remainder in land may be sold on execution at law, title passing by sheriff's deed.12 But a vested remainder in chattels is not subject to sale by common-law execution, as the writ of fieri facias 1 See 2 BL. COMM. 398; 2 KENT COMM. 352. Cf. N. Y. CONSOL. LAWS, 1909, c. 41, § 11; N. Y. LAWS OF 1909, C. 45.

2 Hyde v. Parrat, 1 P. Wms. 1; Langworthy v. Chadwick, 13 Conn. 42.

3 Logan v. Executor of Ladson, 1 Desaus. (S. C.) 271.

* Dargan & Bradford v. Richardson, Dud. (Ga.) 62.

5 Patterson v. Devlin, McMul. Eq. (S. C.) 459.

• Dargan & Bradford v. Richardson, supra.

7 Den d. Hopper v. Demarest, 21 N. J. L. 525; Watson v. Smith, 110 N. C. 6, 14 S. E. 640. See 4 KENT COMM. 260.

8 See WILLIAMS, REAL PROPERTY, 21 ed., 369.

See BUTLER AND HARGRAVE, NOTES ON CO. LITT., 265 a, note 212.

10 Ridgeway . Underwood, 67 Ill. 419. It does not appear that a contingent remainder in chattels ever passed by estoppel.

11 Lawrence v. Bayard, 7 Paige (N. Y.) 70; Ham v. Van Orden, 84 N. Y. 257. 1 Rev. STAT. OF 1836, 725, § 35 was in force when these cases were decided. Putnam v. Story, 132 Mass. 205.

12 Atkins v. Bean, 14 Mass. 404; Deadman . Yantis, 230 Ill. 243, 82 N. E. 592; Sheridan v. House, 4 Keyes (N. Y.) 569.

requires an actual custody and delivery of the goods, and it can be reached only by a creditor's bill in chancery.13 In both realty and personalty contingent interests are beyond the reach of creditors in most jurisdictions. A contingent remainder in land, not being assignable, may not be sold on execution at law 14 and a fortiori the same is true of a contingent remainder in chattels. The right to realize on them by a creditors' bill in equity seems to depend upon whether they may be accorded the dignity of an existent estate. In most jurisdictions this is denied.15 Assignments of contingent remainders in equity are sustained as specific performance of contracts to assign after the estate vests, and it is said that a court of equity cannot compel a debtor to make such a contract.16 However, in a few jurisdictions the courts have been willing to raise contingent estates above the rank of mere possibilities,17 and in others the same result has been produced by statute, so that a contingent interest in lands or chattels may be reached by a creditors' bill.18 The question was raised for the first time in New York by a recent case which decided 19 that an equitable contingent remainder is "property" within section 1871 of the Code of Civil Procedure. National Park Bank v. Billings, 144 N. Y. App. Div. 536, 129 N. Y. Supp. 846. The court appears to have been influenced by section 59 of the Real Property Law,20 which declares that all interests in land or chattels shall be alienable like estates in possession. However, it is possible that the same result might have been reached independently of the statute. It requires no straining of logic to say that a contingent remainder dependent only on surviving the life tenant and attaining a certain age, is more than a mere possibility. Such estates were always transmissible," and the fact that the interest is equitable rather than legal offers no ground for a valid distinction.22 Under the New York statute defining contingent remainders,23 estates that in other jurisdictions would be treated as contingent are called vested, and accorded, without question, the dignity and attributes of a present property. It is difficult to see why an estate limited with an added contingency sufficient to withdraw it from the terminology of this statute should be so different in its essence, as to be beyond the reach

24

13 Dargan & Bradford v. Richardson, supra; Allen v. Scurry, 1 Yerg. (Tenn.) 36; Lockwood & Co. v. Nye, 2 Swan (Tenn.) 515.

14 Haward v. Peavey, 128 Ill. 430, 21 N. E. 503; Roundtree v. Roundtree, 26 S. C. 450, 2 S. E. 474.

15 Howbert v. Cauthorn, 100 Va. 649, 42 S. E. 683; Watson v. Dodd, 68 N. C. 528. 16 Watson v. Dodd, supra.

17 Jacob, Jr. v. Howard, 15 Ky. L. Rep. 133, 22 S. W. 332.

18 MASS. REV. LAWS, c. 159, § 3, cl. 7, provides for a "suit by creditors to reach and apply in payment of a debt, any property, right, title or interest, legal or equitable, of a debtor, which cannot be reached at law, if the value can be ascertained by sale, appraisal or by any means within the ordinary procedure of the court." Alexander v. McPeck, 189 Mass. 34, 75 N. E. 88. The Missouri statute provides for execution sale of any interest in real estate. Mo. GEN. STAT. OF 1865, 642, § 18; White v. McPheeters, 75 Mo. 286.

19 Scott and McLaughlin, JJ., dissented with opinions.

20 N. Y. CONSOL. LAWS, 1909, c. 50; N. Y. LAWS OF 1909, c. 52. Cf. Cohalan v. Parker, 138 N. Y. App. Div. 849, 123 N. Y. Supp. 343.

21 Pinbury v. Elkins, 1 P. Wms. 563; Crawford v. Clark, 110 Ga. 729, 36 S. E. 404. 22 Ricketson v. Merrill, 148 Mass. 76, 19 N. E. 11.

23 N. Y. REAL PROPERTY LAW [CONSOL. LAWS, 1909, c. 50; LAWS OF 1909, c. 52], § 40. "Bergmann v. Lord, 194 N. Y. 70, 86 N. E. 828.