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bama was distributed as an electioneering fund; some of it at points like Opelika, which had not been under water since the days of Noah's flood. This open prostitution of public funds, became a most effective weapon in the hands of the Democrats. To crown the misadventure, the Republican Governor, Lewis, probably to stamp with the seal of his condemnation the folly of the superserviceable politicians, who had secured this hapless appropriation, in his message to the Legislature, just after the election, took occasion to say, pointedly, that the state had during the year been "free from floods."

The Republicans renominated Governor Lewis and the Democrats selected as their candidate George S. Houston. And now began the great struggle which was to redeem Alabama from Republican rule. The state was bankrupt - its credit gone.

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Governor Lewis had reported to the Legislature, November 17th, 1873, that he was unable to sell for money any of the state bonds." The debt, which had been at the beginning of Republican administration in the state $8,356,083.51, was now, as appears by the official report, September 30th, 1874, including straight and endorsed railroad bonds, $25,503,593.30.

City and county indebtedness had in many cases increased in like proportion, with no betterments to show for expenditures.

The administration of public affairs in the state for many years preceding the Civil War had been notably simple and economical. had been low, honestly collected and faithfully applied.

Taxes

To a people trained in such a school of government the extravagance and corruption now everywhere apparent, coupled with the higher rates of taxation and bankrupt condition of the treasury, were appalling.

More intolerable still were the turmoil and strife between whites and blacks, created and kept alive by those who, as the Republican Governor Smith had said, “would like to have a few colored men killed every week to furnish a semblance of truth to Spencer's libels upon the people of the state generally," as well as to make them more "certain of the vote of the negroes." Not only was immigration repelled by these causes, but good citizens were driven out of the state. It is absolutely safe to say that Alabama during the six years of Republican rule gained practically nothing by immigration, and at the same time lost more inhabitants by emigration than by that terrible war, which destroyed fully one-fifth of her people able to bear arms. Thousands more were now resolved to leave the state if, after another and supreme effort, they should fail to

rid themselves of a domination that was blighting all hope of the future. Few things are more difficult than to overcome political prejudices as bitter as those which had formerly divided the white people of Alabama, but six years of Republican misrule had been, in most cases, sufficient for the purpose. In 1874 the people seemed to forget that they had ever been Whigs and Democrats, Secessionists and Union men; and when this came about the days of the black man's party in Alabama were numbered. Although the whites had lost over twenty thousand men in the war who would now have been voting, they had in the state, by the census of 1870, a majority of 7,651 of those within the voting age. In 1880 this majority, as the census showed, was 23,038, and by the coming of age of boys too young to have been in the war, the white voters certainly outnumbered the blacks in 1874 by over ten thousand.

The Republicans had forced the color line upon an unwilling people. The first resolution of the Democratic platform of July, 1874, was that "the radical and dominant faction of the Republican party in this state persistently and by false and fraudulent representations have inflamed. the passions and prejudices of the negroes, as a race, against the white people, and have thereby made it necessary for white people to unite and act together in self-defense and for the preservation of white civilization." That the people of the state accepted this issue in this manner is the rock of offense against which partisan clamor in distant states has so often since that day lashed itself into fury.

The campaign of 1874 was not unattended by the usual efforts to inflame the public mind of the North and to intimidate Democratic voters at home by the display of Federal power, both civil and military. Troops were, of course, loudly called for. . .

There were, during the year 1874, conflicts between whites and blacks, in which both parties received injuries and losses. These were incited, Democrats claimed, by Republican leaders to invoke the aid of Federal authorities, civil and military, in the pending election. . . . The Republican press, however, claimed that the acts which were to bring United States troops into the state to superintend the elections always resulted from the folly of the Democrats, who did not desire the presence of troops, and that the troubles were never instigated by the Republicans, who were anxious to have the troops. The political training of the colored man had been such that it was perfectly natural for him to look upon United States soldiers, when he saw them come into the state, as sent to see that he voted the Republican ticket. . . .

The presence of troops . . . while it encouraged the negroes, served greatly to intensify the zeal of Democrats. Thousands of whites were inspired during that campaign with the feeling that their future homes depended upon the result of the election. The aliens among the Republican leaders also felt that their future habitations depended on the election, for they had no business in Alabama, except office-holding.

The Democrats were successful. They carried by over ten thousand majority all the state offices and they elected large majorities in both branches of the Legislature.

The clutch of the carpet-bagger was broken; most of them left the State; and there was at once peace between whites and blacks. A new Constitution was adopted. Superfluous offices were abolished. Salaries were cut down and fixed by the Constitution, some of them, perhaps, at too low a figure; and it is believed that, in many respects, the limitations upon the power of the Legislature were made too stringent. It was the necessary reaction, the swing of the pendulum from corruption and extravagance to the severest simplicity and economy in government. The consequences have been most happy. . .

The facts of history are that the people of Alabama, prostrated by an unsuccessful war, and divided by the bitter memories of the past, were very loth to oppose what seemed to be the behests of the strongest government man had ever seen. They were utterly unable to unite and agree on any policy whatever. For six long years they suffered degradation, poverty and detraction, before they made up their minds to come together to assert, as they finally did, their supremacy in numbers, wealth, education and moral power. They have now in successful operation a government that, for the protection it affords to the lives, liberties and property of all its people, white and black, may safely challenge comparison with that of any state in the Union. Education and the liberalizing influences of the age . . will gradually . . . solve every problem that can arise within her borders if she herself is left to deal with them. . . . Hilary A. Herbert and others, Why the Solid South? or Reconstruction and its Results (Baltimore, R. H. Woodward Co., 1890), 61–69 passim.

159. Electoral Crisis of 1877

BY MAJOR-GENERAL WINFIELD SCOTT HANCOCK

Hancock was the most prominent of the Federal officers during the Civil War who exercised no independent command. He was a Democrat by birth and breeding, and

was opposed to the congressional policy of reconstruction. His name was before the Democratic national convention in 1868, and in 1880 he was the candidate of that party for president. During the excitement over the contested election of 1876-77, when he was in command of the Division of the Atlantic, the false report was circulated that he had been selected to lead an armed force to Washington to compel the inauguration of Tilden, and that to prevent this the government had ordered him to the Pacific coast, but that he had refused to go. During the prevalence of that rumor the letter from which this extract is taken was written to General Sherman, then commanding the army; it shows the perplexities of the situation and the attitude of a prominent Union general. For Hancock, see [Almira R. Hancock], Reminiscences of Winfield Scott Hancock. — Bibliography: W. E. Foster, Presidential Administrations, 51.

WHE

THEN I heard the rumor that I was ordered to the Pacific coast, I thought it probably true, considering the past discussion on the subject. . . . I was not exactly prepared to go to the Pacific, however, and I therefore felt relieved when I received your note informing me that there was no truth in the rumors. Then I did not wish to appear to be escaping from responsibilities and possible danger which may cluster around military commanders in the East, especially in the critical period fast approaching.

"All's well that ends well." The whole matter of the Presidency seems to me to be simple and to admit of a peaceful solution. The machinery for such a contingency as threatens to present itself has been all carefully prepared. It only requires lubricating, owing to disuse. The army should have nothing to do with the selection or inauguration of Presidents. The people elect the Presidents. Congress declares, in a joint session, who he is. We of the Army have only to obey his mandates, and are protected in so doing only so far as they may be lawful. Our commissions express that.

I like Jefferson's way of inauguration; it suits our system. . . . He inaugurated himself simply by taking the oath of office. There is no other legal inauguration in our system. . . . Our system does not provide that one President should inaugurate another. There might be danger in that, and it was studiously left out of the Charter. But you are placed in an exceptionally important position in connection with coming events. The Capitol is in my jurisdiction, also, but I am a subordinate, and not on the spot, and if I were, so also would my superior in authority, for there is the station of the General-in-Chief. On the principle that a regularly elected President's term of office expires with the 3d of March (of which I have not the slightest doubt, and which the laws bearing on the subject uniformly recognize), and in consideration of the possibility that the lawfully elected President may not appear until

the 5th of March, a great deal of responsibility may necessarily fall upon you. You hold over. You will have power and prestige to support you. The Secretary of War, too, probably holds over; but, if no President appears, he may not be able to exercise functions in the name of a President, for his proper acts are of a known superior, a lawful President. You act on your own responsibility, and by virtue of a Commission only restricted by the law. The Secretary of War is only the mouth-piece of a President. You are not. If neither candidate has a Constitutional majority of the Electoral College, or the Senate and House on the occasion of the count do not unite in declaring some person legally elected by the people, there is a lawful machinery already provided to meet that contingency, and to decide the question peacefully. It has not been recently used, no occasion presenting itself; but our forefathers provided it. It has been exercised, and has been recognized and submitted to as lawful on every hand. That machinery would probably elect Mr. Tilden President and Mr. Wheeler Vice-President. That would be right enough, for the law provides that in failure to elect duly by the people, the House shall immediately elect the President, and the Senate the Vice-President. Some tribunal must decide whether the people have duly elected a President.

I presume, of course, that it is in the joint affirmative action of the Senate and House; why are they present to witness the count, if not to see that it is fair and just? If a failure to agree arises between the two bodies, there can be no lawful affirmative decision that the people have elected a President, and the House must then proceed to act, not the Senate. The Senate elects Vice-Presidents, not Presidents. Doubtless, in case of a failure by the House to elect a President by the 4th of March, the President of the Senate (if there be one) would be the legitimate person to exercise Presidential authority for the time being, or until the appearance of a lawful President, or for the time laid down in the Constitution. Such a course would be a peaceful and, I have a firm belief, a lawful one.

I have no doubt Governor Hayes would make an excellent President. I have met him, and know of him. For a brief period he served under my command; but as the matter stands I can't see any likelihood of his being duly declared elected by the people, unless the Senate and House come to be in accord as to that fact, and the House would of course, not otherwise elect him.

What the people want is a peaceful determination of this matter, as

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