176. Proposed Intervention in Cuba (1875)

BY SECRETARY HAMILTON FISH

Fish was United States senator for one term before the Civil War; he was secretary of state during both of Grant's administrations, playing an important part in negotiating the Treaty of Washington and in discussing with Spain the questions arising from the insurrection then in progress in Cuba. Diplomatic negotiations with Spain concerning Cuba began soon after the United States had acknowledged the independence of the South and Central American States; and these questions were repeatedly revived until they finally culminated, in 1898, in war between the two nations. This extract is from an official letter to Caleb Cushing, minister to Spain. - Bibliography: A. P. C. Griffin, List of Books relating to Cuba (Senate Document, 55 Cong., 2 sess., No. 161). For other articles on American interests in Cuba, see Contemporaries, III, No. 149; below, ch. xxx and No. 189.

T the time of your departure for Madrid, apart from the general question of the unsatisfactory condition of affairs in Cuba and the failure to suppress the revolution, several prominent questions remained unadjusted, the settlement of which was deemed necessary before any satisfactory relations with Spain could be established or maintained. Upon all of these you were instructed.

The most prominent among them were the questions arising from the embargo and confiscation of estates of American citizens in Cuba; those relating to the trial of American citizens in that island, in violation of treaty obligations, and the claims arising out of the capture of the Virginius, including the trial and punishment of General Burriel.

After the expiration of more than eighteen months, it seems advisable to examine what progress has been made and to consider our present relations with Spain. . . .

. . . the promises made and repeated, the assurances given from time to time that something should be done, the admission of the justice of the demands of this country, at least to the extent of expressing regret for these wrongs and promising redress, followed as they have been by absolutely no performance and no practical steps whatever towards performance, need no extended comment.

In the cases of embargo and confiscation, not only have wrongs been long since done, but continuing and repeated wrongs are daily inflicted.

Turning to the questions which arose from the capture of the Virginius, and the executions which followed, no extended reference is required.

The particulars of the delivery of the vessel to this Government, and the payment to both Great Britain and the United States of considerable sums as compensation for the acts of the authorities in ordering the execution of fifty-three of the passengers and crew under circumstances of peculiar brutality, have passed into history.

So far as a payment of money can atone for the execution of these unprotected prisoners, that has been accomplished.

The higher and more imperative duty which the government of Spain assumed by the protocol of November 29, 1873, namely, to bring to justice General Burriel and the other principal offenders in this tragedy, has been evaded and entirely neglected.

Having touched on these particular questions which have lately been prominent as disturbing causes with Spain, it is necessary to also refer to the general condition of affairs in Cuba as affecting our relations with the mother country.

In my No. 2, of February 6, 1874, (the first instruction addressed to you on general matters pertaining to your mission,) I referred at length to the views entertained by the President and to the position of this Government.

It was then more than five years since an organized insurrection had broken out which the government of Spain had been entirely unable to suppress. . ..

Almost two years have passed since those instructions were issued.. and it would appear that the situation has in no respect improved.

The horrors of war have in no perceptible measure abated; the inconveniences and injuries which we then suffered have remained, and others have been added; the ravages of war have touched new parts of the island, and well-nigh ruined its financial and agricultural system and its relations to the commerce of the world. No effective steps have been taken to establish reforms or remedy abuses, and the effort to suppress the insurrection, by force alone, has been a complete failure.

The United States purchases more largely than any other people of the productions of the island of Cuba, and therefore, more than any other for this reason, and still more by reason of its immediate neighborhood, is interested in the arrest of a system of wanton destruction which disgraces the age and affects every commercial people on the face of the globe.

Under these circumstances, and in view of the fact that Spain has rejected all suggestions of reform or offers of mediation made by this

Government, and has refused all measures looking to a reconciliation, except on terms which make reconciliation an impossibility, the difficulty of the situation becomes increased.

When, however, in addition to these general causes of difficulty, we find the Spanish government neglectful also of the obligations of treaties. and solemn compacts, and unwilling to afford any redress for long-continued and well-founded wrongs suffered by our citizens, it becomes a serious question how long such a condition of things can or should be allowed to exist, and compels us to inquire whether the point has not been reached where longer endurance ceases to be possible.

During all this time, and under these aggravated circumstances, this Government has not failed to perform her obligations to Spain as scrupulously as toward other nations. . .

It will be apparent that such a state of things cannot continue. It is absolutely necessary to the maintenance of our relations with Spain, even on their present footing, that our just demands for the return to citizens of the United States of their estates in Cuba, unincumbered, and for securing to them a trial for offenses according to treaty provisions and all other rights guaranteed by treaty and by public law, should be complied with.

...

Moreover, apart from these particular questions, in the opinion of the President, the time has arrived when the interests of this country, the preservation of its commerce, and the instincts of humanity alike demand that some speedy and satisfactory ending be made of the strife that is devastating Cuba. . . .

The contest and disorder in Cuba affect the United States directly and injuriously by the presence in this country of partisans of the revolt who have fled hither (in consequence of the proximity of territory) as to a political asylum, and who, by their plottings, are disturbers of the public peace.

The United States has exerted itself to the utmost, for seven years, to repress unlawful acts on the part of these self-exiled subjects of Spain, relying on the promise of Spain to pacify the island. Seven years of strain on the powers of this Government to fulfill all that the most exacting demands of one government can make, under any doctrine or claim of international obligation, upon another, have not witnessed the much hoped for pacification. The United States feels itself entitled to be relieved of this strain.

The severe measures, injurious to the United States and often in con

flict with public law, which the colonial officers have taken to subdue the insurrection; the indifference, and ofttimes the offensive assaults upon the just susceptibilities of the people of the United States and their Government, which have characterized that portion of the peninsular population of Havana which has sustained and upheld, if it has not controlled, successive governors-general, and which have led to the disregard of orders and decrees which the more enlarged wisdom and the more friendly councils of the home government had enacted; the cruelty and inhumanity which have characterized the contest, both on the part of the colonial government and of the revolt, for seven years, and the destruction of valuable properties and industries by arson and pillage, which Spain appears unable, however desirous, to prevent and stop, in an island three thousand miles distant from her shores, but lying within sight of our coast, with which trade and constant intercourse are unavoidable, are causes of annoyance and of injury to the United States, which a people cannot be expected to tolerate without the assured prospect of their termination.

The United States has more than once been solicited by the insurgents to extend to them its aid, but has for years hitherto resisted such solicitation, and has endeavored by the tender of its good offices, in the way of mediation, advice, and remonstrance, to bring to an end a great evil, which has pressed sorely upon the interests both of the Government and of the people of the United States, as also upon the commercial interests of other nations.

The President hopes that Spain may spontaneously adopt measures looking to a reconciliation, and to the speedy restoration of peace, and the organization of a stable and satisfactory system of government in the island of Cuba.

In the absence of any prospect of a termination of the war, or of any change in the manner in which it has been conducted on either side, he feels that the time is at hand when it may be the duty of other governments to intervene, solely with the view of bringing to an end a disastrous and destructive conflict, and of restoring peace in the island of Cuba. No government is more deeply interested in the order and peaceful administration of this island than is that of the United States, and none has suffered as has the United States from the condition which has obtained there during the past six or seven years. He will, therefore, feel it his duty at an early day to submit the subject in this light, and accompanied by an expression of the views above presented, for the consideration of Congress.

It is believed to be a just and friendly act to frankly communicate this conclusion to the Spanish government.

You will, therefore, take an early occasion thus to inform that govern

ment.

House Executive Documents, 44 Cong., I sess. (Washington, 1876), XII, No. 90, pp. 3-11 passim.

177. Relations to Latin-America (1881)

BY SECRETARY JAMES GILLESPIE BLAINE

Blaine was secretary of state in Garfield's cabinet, and for a few months in Arthur's also. His foreign policy was much criticised, especially for its tendency to dictate to the South American nations. His policy of intervention in the Chileno-Peruvian War was reversed by his successor in office. This extract is from an official letter to H. J. Kilpatrick, minister to Chili. — For Blaine, see No. 160 above. — Bibliography as in No. 179 below.

THE

HE unfortunate condition of the relations between Chili and Peru makes the mission upon the duties of which you are now entering one of grave responsibility and great delicacy. Difficult as would be any intervention of the United States under ordinary circumstances, our position is further embarrassed by the failure of the conference at Arica, undertaken at our suggestion. It is evident from the protocols of that conference that Chili was prepared to dictate and not to discuss terms of peace, and that the arbitration of the United States upon any questions of difference with the allied powers of Peru and Bolivia was not acceptable and would not be accepted by the Chilian Government. Since that time the war has closed in the complete success of Chili, and in what can scarcely be considered less than the conquest of Peru and Bolivia.

This government cannot therefore anticipate that the offer of friendly intervention in the settlement of the very serious questions now pending would be agreeable to the Government of Chili. It would scarcely comport with self-respect that such an offer should be refused, and it would be of no benefit to Peru and Bolivia that it should be offered and declined. But I am sure the Chilian Government will appreciate the natural and deep interest which the United States feels in the termination of a condition so calamitous in its consequences to the best interests of all the South American republics. It should also know that if at any time the interposition of the good offices of this government can con