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SOUTHERN REVIEW.

NO. II.

MAY, 1828.

ART. I.-1. Articles of the Constitution as agreed upon by the
Federal Convention, September 17, 1787.

2. The Federalist, a collection of Essays written in favour of the
New Constitution. 2 vols. 12mo. New-York. 1788.

3. The Crisis: or Essays on the Usurpations of the Federal Government. Charleston. Miller. 1827.

//IN government as in science, it is useful often to review its

progress, and to revert even to its simplest elements. It will be salutary frequently to ascertain how far society and laws, in their present condition, accord with those which we have been accustomed to consider as their first and purest principles, how far in the lapse of time, they may have deviated from their original form and structure. Even when we recur to inquiries merely speculative, to imaginary "social contracts," to abstract rights, we may often gather instruction, and detect some concealed or neglected truth, applicable to our own times and to our own immediate condition. But when a Government is derived not from fictitious assumptions, not from ancient or obscure sources - or traditions, but from actual and specific agreement; when many and various interests have been combined and compromised, and a written covenant has assured to many parties, rights and powers and privileges, it becomes a duty to revise this compact frequently and strictly, that no one entitled to its protection, may be deprived, through inadvertence on the one part, or encroachment on the other, of his vested rights; and, that no changes may be introduced into the compact, but by the actual assent of those who are parties to the covenant.

VOL. I.-No. 2.

35

And when in the very compact itself, provision has been made to correct and ameliorate the system, whenever it shall be found imperfect or incompetent to the discharge of its functions, or shall fall behind the spirit of the age, or the progressive improvements of society, it becomes a measure of wisdom as well as justice, to take care that no fundamental changes shall be introduced, but in the manner and under the conditions prescribed and understood by every associated member.

The Constitution of the United States was arranged with the most deliberate care, was drawn up with the most scrupulous caution, was examined even with jealous vigilance. Its provisions were supposed to be so clear and explicit, its duties and its powers so well defined and accurately limited, and its language so perspicuous, that no controversy could arise respecting its real meaning, no latent or invisible danger lurk under its simple and guarded phraseology.

But in the progress of time, as the provisions of the Constitution have been gradually unfolded, investigated and applied, and their practical operation displayed, many difficulties have occurred. So imperfect, after all, is the most laboured production of man, so inadequate the language he is obliged to employ, that his best efforts often end in disappointment. The most simple expressions are frequently found to convey, when critically analyzed, doubtful meanings; and phrases, which in the common usages of life are obvious and familiar, can be rendered by ingenious glosses and interpretations, ambiguous and obscure. Hence, in the construction of the Constitution, great diversities of opinion have arisen; they occurred at an early period of the administration of the government, they have increased in the importance of their views, and in their possible results, and now threatening to become intermingled with sectional feelings and sectional interests, they may finally endanger, if not terminated by some new compromise in the spirit of our ancient friendship, the peace or permanence of the Union.

It is not only on particular facts or questions that these controversies now rest, but on the general doctrines of construction. Disputes have arisen as to the manner in which we should read and interpret the articles of the Constitution itself; on the spirit in which, under the guidance of a sound logic, of philosophic deduction, we should assign to each clause, to each phrase of that important instrument, its real power and value, its extent when collated with analogous expressions, its limits when contrasted with conflicting rights and principles.

On the one hand it is contended, that, in expounding a charter ́so important and extensive as the Constitution of the United

States, embracing so many interests, and involving so many duties, a liberal construction inust be given to its provisions, even some latitude to its expressions-that in so complicated a system, framed to protect not only national and individual rights and privileges, but the intermediate and modified sovereignty of the several States, a construction, strict and literal, would frequently defeat the very object of the compact, and reflect even on the wisdom of its framers-that in giving general powers to carry all of the specified trusts into effect, it was intended, surely, not to confine the Government to the most simple and obvious means of executing these trusts, not to limit it to one single or solitary resource, but to allow it to pursue varied and even indirect measures to accomplish more effectually the purposes of its creation-that, though "limited in its powers, it is supreme within its sphere of action-that sound construction must allow to the national legislature that discretion with respect to the means by which the powers it confers are to be carried into execution, which will enable that body to perform the high duties assigned to it, in the manner most beneficial to the people that if the end be legitimate, if it be within the scope of the constitution, then all means which are appropriate, which are plainly adapted to that end, which are not prohibited, but consist with the letter and spirit of the Constitution, are constitutional”*—and, that to provide for the general welfare, many arrangements and modifications of the powers which are granted, many incident provisions which could not be foreseen, or which it may have been considered superfluous to specify, must be understood.

On the other hand, it is maintained that the articles of the Constitution should receive a strict and guarded constructionthat the Constitution itself is a grant of special powers to accomplish certain objects, a trust to special agents appointed in a specified manner, and authorised to execute the great duties committed to their care-that every power entrusted is distinctly enumerated, and nothing left to discretion but the subordinate means necessary to carry these powers into effect-that while we view with a candid and liberal spirit, the conduct of those agents, it yet becomes our duty to guard carefully the limits which have been prescribed to their powers, to ascertain the real extent of the trusts placed under their control, and in all cases of doubt and hesitation, it would be the part of wise and prudent statesmen to limit, rather than extend authority, as history teaches that free governments have always been des

Wheaton's Reports, vol. iv. pp. 405-421.

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