We will add, on this point, one or two extracts from the "Crisis:" "The Supreme Court, in contending for its extended construction of the Constitution, would draw a distinction between that instrument and the old confederation, which certainly cannot be maintained on the grounds it assumes. It would impress upon us, that the exclusion of the word "expressly," in the one compact, and the insertion of it in the other, included or excluded in either, the idea of implied powers. The words of the 10th amendment to the Constitution are, "the powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people." In the confederation it is thus expressed: "each State retains every power, jurisdiction and right, not expressly delegated to the United States." "Let me here premise the distinction, which must forever exist between the case of a people emerging from a state of revolution, without any government, and assembled to form one; and a case, where the people already are associated, in so many independent political communities, each having its own regular Government. In the one case, it is intended, ex necessitate rei, that all powers should be vested in their new rulers with certain limitations. What is not here reserved as a bill of rights to the people, is clearly designed to be given. But, in the other case, where the people are governed in so many distinct sovereignties, and are willing to divide the sovereignty, with a common head to direct the whole, it becomes necessary to state, not what powers are withheld, but what powers are given. In the first case, the powers given are general, with certain exceptions-in the second case, the powers are altogether special. In the one case, every thing that is not retained is actually surrendered-in the other, nothing can be claimed that is not clearly given. The 10th amendment, therefore, to the present Constitution, and the second article in the confederation, already quoted, were only declaratory clauses. To the States, or to the people, were reserved, as a matter of course, all powers which were not surrendered. There is no need to distinguish here between express and implied powers. Where any power is surrendered to a legislative body, the power to make the laws necessary to execute that power, is also surrendered. To these positions all men must give their unqualified assent."—Crisis, p. 33. Again." I have said that the word is insignificant. It is a word, in my view, so harmless, that whether it be inserted or excluded from the 10th amendment, no possible alteration can be produced in the rights of either party. For A. to say to B. "the power I do not give you is retained by me," is certainly as strong and as expressive for all purposes, as if he had said, what I do not expressly give you, I retain.-The first phrase is the better of the two-it is more simple and expresses as much." Crisis, p. 36. In reviewing these questions, we have thought it our duty to revert constantly to the origin and apparent object of every power. It may be the business of a technical lawyer to consider the words as the words merely of a written instrument; a statesman must take wider views, and consider carefully the intention of the instrument as well as its expressions. In explaining doubtful passages or phrases in a deed, the preamble is often permitted to manifest the intention of the framer, to explain and control the powers and trusts. In examining the Constitution, we have not only the preamble to the instrument itself, but still stronger evidence of the purport of every clause, of the intended effect of almost every expression. We have the testimony of the framers of the Constitution; the declarations of those most prominent in its establishment; the journal of the body by whom it was created, disclosing their express objects, shewing not only the history and origin of those powers which it was deemed expedient to grant, but also the claims of jurisdiction which were intentionally omitted, and those which were expressly rejected. Surely evidence like this might be admitted, and should be maturely considered by all who are called upon to construe the doubtful or conflicting clauses of such an instrument. Who can examine the mass of testimony on this subject, and hesitate to acknowledge, either, that the framers of the Constitution did not understand their own work, did not comprehend the instrument they were fashioning, the language in which they were clothing their intentions? or that no power is delegated by this charter which is not enumerated. There is one argument which has been so often advanced, urged with so much earnestness and apparent sincerity, that we cannot avoid offering a brief reply. The assumption of these powers, it is said, has been found absolutely necessary to accomplish the great objects of the Government, to secure the benefits of the Union, to render perfect the system which has been ordained for our guidance. To suppose them denied by the Constitution, would be to suppose that instrument imperfect, its authors unwise, and the means they devised, insufficient to secure and perpetuate the prosperity of the country. To these remarks we have heretofore occasionally alluded-we will now more distinctly respond. That the powers actually and indisputably contained in the Constitution are neither few, nor unimportant; that our Government is no loose and uncompacted system, no feeble embryo, we may ask almost in the very words we have already quoted from the "Crisis," what power is there which can be required for the management of our foreign relations, either in peace or in war, for the regulation of our commerce or for the preservation of harmony, and the distribution of justice among the States, which has been denied? What has been withheld, except the privilege of intermeddling with the domestic arrangements and police of the respective States, and it is this barrier, greatly important to them, insignificant to the general Government, which the restless spirit of our politicians, and of party, now wishes to break down. We will not admit, even if these powers which are claimed by construction, should be withheld, that any imputation would lay against the wisdom of those who arranged the Constitution. Their sagacity, their foresight has received from an admiring country unqualified praise, and no praise, which they have received, is beyond their merits. Yet, no where, perhaps, has their wisdom been more manifest than on this very point on which they have been indirectly subjected to censure and reproach. They never imagined that they could construct a Government calculated to answer all times, all events, all changes of manners or of society; that they could look through the revolutions of ages, and adapt the structure of to-day to the fluctuations and vicissitudes of a long futurity. They did all that wise men could do. They suited the Government to the present generation, to the age and the circumstances which they had studied and understood-they delegated, and expressly delegated to it all power that was necessary for its present and prosperous existence; and to guard against all unforeseen contingencies, to prepare it for the dangers and difficulties that might, in other times, arise, they incorporated in the system the principle of perpetual amelioration. So that every alteration, which new circumstances might require, could be effected, not by irregular assumptions, not by forced constructions, but by amendments made under the express stipulations, according to the legitimate provisions of the Constitution itself. Hence, the great impropriety, we may say danger, in assuming, without the express warrant of the Constitution, new jurisdiction. Who will believe that any power, which, in the course of time, should be found essential to the successful administration of the Government, would be refused by a happy and enlightened people? Who will believe that a people, regulating its own affairs, should deny to its own Government any authority necessary to secure to the country safety or prosperity? If any such incident should hereafter occur, it may justly be ascribed to that grasping cupidity which has sought for power in the most unexpected sources-which has awakened the apprehensions of the prudent, and may lead the people to imagine that no amendment of the Constitution, hereafter, can be safely adventured, lest every word added or employed in amending, may be tortured into new forms, may be found pregnant with unexpected consequences, may prove a word of power, a mystery, an en chantment, a consuming fire absorbing and drying up the very source from whence it was derived. It should also be remembered that the benefits we have derived from this Constitution, the blessings we have enjoyed under its benign and successful administration, have all flowed from the exercise of those powers which it unquestionably possesses. The constructive claims of the Government have only partially, and in a very few unimportant instances been yet exerted. They exist, at present, rather in theory than in practice. We therefore raise, while it is yet time, a warning voice against their extension, because we feel persuaded that whenever these doctrines shall be fully developed, whenever they shall be made to press in their undefined extent on the different portions of this country, instead of connecting them more closely together, instead of cementing the Union of our great confederacy, they will prove only sources of dissatisfaction and of discord, and, like the cords wound around the sleeping Sampson, will be broken as a thread, and become like flax that is burnt with fire, before the energy of an awakened and irritated people. The union of the States has been from the first assemblage of delegates in 1774, to the present hour, the wish, the hope, the ardent aspiration of every patriot of America. It has grown with our growth, it has strengthened with our strength. It has become a feeling rather than a principle. It is mingled with every calculation of our future greatness or felicity, with every anticipation of permanent prosperity or of national glory. It has been cherished in no portion of our country with more devotion than in the South; it has been supported no where with more unanimity and disinterestedness. In all the questions which have agitated our country, one only excepted, this section of the union has been, if not passive, at least defensive in its position. The only measure engendering acrimonious feelings, which has ever been brought forward by the people of the Southern States, was our late war with Great-Britain; and that war, if we except those sentiments of national honor, which we know are common to every portion of our country, was undertaken altogether for Northern interests, for the protection of commerce and navigation, not of agriculture. The South suffered by it most severely, but it has never repented of its sacrifices; and our citizens are still prepared to make great concessions to friendship and to peace. In every event that may occur, they will have the proud boast of having done nothing to disturb the harmony of the Union. No discordant note will originate with them. If ever a separation of the States shall take place, it will only occur when some portion of the confederation shall find the Government no longer one of equal rights or equal benefits; when it shall discover that the Constitution will no longer afford to all, protection for their property, nor security for their lives. If ever that evil day should arrive, when the Constitution of our country shall offer no barrier to the projects of designing or ambitious men, no limits to the speculations of any one who shall proclaim the general welfare to be his sole end and aim, his guide and his exclusive principle, the rights of confiding members of this confederacy may indeed be violated-but not with impunity-and from the errors of misguided, even if honest statesmen, posterity may have to mourn over the fragments of that mighty Republic, which, in its dawn, offered to the world so bright an example, and promised to itself so proud a destiny. ART. II.-1. Roemische Geschichte Von B. G. Niebuhr, 1ste und 2te Theile. Berlin, 1811, 1812. 2. Roman History, by B. G. Niebuhr, translated from the German, by F. A. Walter, Esq. F. R. S. L. One of the Librarians of the British Museum. 2 Vols. London, 1827. HISTORY is to morals and politics precisely what experiment and observation are to physics. In either case, without well ascertained facts, it is vain to marshal our inductions and to make a parade of propositions; our systems, conceived only in the brain, will never admit of application to any thing out of it. It is because past authentic history furnishes the only means by which we may predict the future, that it becomes indispensable for regulating the conduct of mankind upon important occa sions. These observations may serve as an apology for the labours of those authors whose chief delight appears to be derived from the detection of error, and whose excursions on the sea of history appear to be designed rather for sport than for use. Mr. Niebuhr, the author of the work on "Roman History" now before us, is certainly not at all behind others in a wary scepticism, though this fault, (if it is one) is, in a great degree, redeemed by the masterly manner in which he endeavours, upon all occasions, to divine and explain the true nature of ancient institutions. His doubts are not all new, for many of them had |