ENGLISH AND FRENCH INTERVENTION IN THE RIO DE LA PLATA. We do not propose to discuss, at present, the broad question of the right of one government to interfere, by force, in the affairs of another; nor even the more limited question of European intervention in the concerns of America. For our immediate object, it will suffice to assume, that, if any one government have the right, upon general principles of public law and of justice, to intervene aggressively in the affairs of another, any third government must, on the same premises, have equal right to interpose defensively, for the purpose of preventing, obstructing, or defeating such intervention. If England, for example, as a member merely of the great family of nations, or as a potential member of that more closely connected family of nations belonging to Christendom, be so affected by the disturbed condition of the countries of the Rio de la Plata, as to have cause to intervene for their pacification, then the United States, affected injuriously by that very intervention, have not less cause of interest, nor less right of intervention, in the proceedings of England. These are self-evident consequences of the assumed principle. While, therefore, we cordially approve and second the views of the general question proclaimed by the President of the United States in his late annual Message to Congress, we purposely confine ourselves, however, in the subsequent remarks on the events of the Rio de la Plata, to narrower considerations, for the reason that we desire to measure and to judge those events by the very standard of right assumed by France and England as the justification of the indirect and covert war, which they are now prosecuting against the Argentine Con federation. Let us premise a brief view of the state of things in the countries of the Rio de la Plata at the moment when the English and French governments appear on the stage. The British colonies in America, on separating from the mother-country, passed naturally, and almost spontaneously, into the form of a single confederation. But the Spanish colonies, scattered over a much larger extent of the continent,-sundered, some of them by seas, and others by lofty mountains or wide deserts,-dissociated politically as well as geographically,-entering on the career of independence without concert of operations, or even of time, forming, in the course of events, occasional or partial associations of government or of alliance, but never any general confederation,-these colonies ended by settling down into a number of distinct, and sometimes of hostile republics. To prevent this result, to combine all the colonies of Spanish America in one Federal Republic, in close alliance with the United States, was that high conception and grand ambition of the life of Simon Bolivar, incidental to which was the idea of the American Congress of Panamá. In the course of the progress of these events, it was the constant aim of each one of the old colonial subdivisions of the Spanish empire to continue to constitute one government. Thus the Mexican Republic assumed to be the successor of the colonial administration of New Spain; and the Argentine Confederation, of that of Buenos Ayres. But the same circumstances of local interest, or of personal ambition, which had prevented all the colonies from forming one confederation, also prevented, in some cases, the several parts of a colonial administration from combin ing cordially into one republic. In this way, Paraguay, on the upper waters of the Rio de la Plata, and Uruguay at the mouth of that river, (sometimes called the Banda Oriental from its position between the Rio de la Plata, its branch the Uruguay, and the ocean,) though formerly dependent on the colonial administration of Buenos Ayres, came to be distinct republics, and each separate from the Argentine Confederation. The peculiar geographical position of Paraguay, and the policy of isolation and of reserve infused into its administration by the late Dictator Francia, who so long conducted the government, have preserved that republic from foreign conflicts, as well as from internal disorders, while it has remained unrecognized either by the Argentine Confederation, or by the other states of Europe and America. But the situation of Uruguay, on the other hand, lying on the sea-coast, interposed between Buenos Ayres and Brazil, has rendered it the theatre of almost incessant war, the possession of it having been continually disputed between the Brazilian Empire, the Argentine Confederation, and chiefs of its own, until, at length, in 1828, its independence was acknowledged by these two powers, in a treaty alleged to have been mediated by Great Britain, and confirmed in 1840, in a treaty concluded by Buenos Ayres with France. Peace, however, in Uruguay, did not follow the acquisition of independence; for it continued to be distracted by domestic factions; and, at the beginning of the present train of events, its principal city, Montevideo, was held by one chief, Rivera, (or his successor in the same interest,) supported mostly by French and other foreign residents, whilst Oribe, another chief, and the regularly elected President of the Republic, held all the rest of it, aided by an auxiliary force under his orders from Buenos Ayres, the city of Montevideo itself being closely invested by sea and land, and on the point of surrender, which would have concluded the war and restored peace to all the countries of the Rio de la Plata. This was the moment selected by the British and French governments to interfere for the purpose, professedly, of the pacification of the Banda Oriental. In this act of intervention, France and England assume the style of " Mediating Powers." They profess to act in perfect concert, and both to occupy the same relation of right, under treaty or otherwise, to the Argentine Confefederation, and to the whole question of the war in Uruguay. They pretend, also, to be actuated alike by disinterested motives, and pacific ones; namely, the putting an end to war in the Rio de la Plata. Finally, they make ostentatious pretensions of regard of humanity, observance of the law of nations, and respect for the independent sovereignty of the Argentine Confederation. Alleging such pretensions, they have proceeded to command the government of Buenos Ayres to recall its auxiliary forces from the Banda Oriental, and, in default of the submission of that government to their peremptory summons, to seize the Buenos Ayrean ships of war, raise the siege of Montevideo, attack and garrison sundry points on the coast of the Banda Oriental, take possession of the Buenos Ayrean island of Martin Garcia, place under blockade the ports and coast of the state of Buenos Ayres, and force their way up the river Paraná, which is the main stream of the Rio de la Plata, running through the Argentine states of Buenos Ayres, Entre Rios and Corrientes, and separated from the territory of Uruguay by the state of Entre Rios. In a word, to the pre-existing war in Uruguay, whose duration they have protracted, they have added a war of aggression of their own in the heart of the Argentine Confederation. These professions, pretences and acts, we propose to strip of all diplomatic disguise, and bring to the touchstone of justice and public law, as understood and practised in Europe, and especially by France and England themselves. In the first place, the name under which they act, that of " Mediating Powers," is obviously a misnomer, not to say a falsehood; for mediation between two conflicting powers, on the part of a third, implies counsel, peaceful intermediation, interposition accepted by the belligerents; whereas, the least fact here is one of hostile intervention, forced upon independent governments at the cannon's mouth. We begin, therefore, with encountering a disingenuous and simulated character assumed by the intervening powers. In the second place, Great Britain pretends, falsely, to stand in the same political relation to the question of the Rio de la Plata that France does. This pretence appears in the "Declaration of Blockade," issued by the Baron Deffaudis and Mr. Ouseley, the respective plenipotentiaries of France and England, which document, in regard of its relation to the United States and other neutral nations, as well as its general tenor, might, with greater reason, be termed a "Declaration of War against Buenos Ayres, by France and Eng Land." For, after reciting the ground of original right under which the two allies commenced their intervention, it proceeds to give reasons for the subsequent acts of hostility against the Argentine Confederation. To these reasons for changing mediation into war, we shall refer by and by: our present object is with the alleged motives of mediation, which are stated as follows: "The undersigned plenipotentiaries were charged by their governments to effect the pacification of the Republics of the River Plate, and to secure the entire and real independence of the State of the Uruguay. Such are the positive terms of the treaties of 1828 and 1840, signed by the government of Buenos Ayres, and in the conclusion of which the governments of the undersigned took part more or less directly. But the war carried on by the government of Buenos Ayres against the State of Uruguay, is manifestly opposed to the independence of that state, inasmuch as its declared object is to force a change in its government. On the other hand, this desolating warfare, continued with no national or legitimate object, but for the ruin and annihilation of the State of the Uruguay, is scarcely less disastrous to the other states of the River Plate in its effects on their commercial prosperity; thus causing most serious injury to the commercial na tions of Europe and America; and more especially to those which the undersigned have the honor to represent. "The imperative duty, therefore, as well as the legitimate interests of the governments of the plenipotentiaries could no longer allow the continuance of this war, which has already lasted much too long. "The undersigned were further instructed to obtain, if possible, by amicable negotiations, the pacification of the River Plate; during the greater part of their stay at Buenos Ayres, they accordingly made every effort, and separately and conjointly omployed every means of conciliation that friendly and confidential communications could offer, in the hope of meeting a corresponding spirit on the part of the government of Buenos Ayres. Both powers, be it observed, assume to act in the execution of treaties, signed by the government of Buenos Ayres, in the conclusion of which they took part more or less directly, as if both treaties communicated an identity of right and a community of interest to England as well as to France. And yet, whilst one of these treaties gave to France a full and perfect right to intervene on the casus fœderis arising, neither of them imparted the slightest right of intervention to England. To prove this position we must recur to the text. France and Buenos Ayres are sole parties to the treaty, concluded in 1840, the seventh article of which is in the following words: "The government of Buenos Ayres will continue to consider the Oriental Republic of Uruguay in a state of perfect and absolute independence, in the manner stipulated in the preliminary convention of peace, concluded the 27th of August, 1828, with the Empire of Brazil, without prejudice to its natural rights, whenever justice; the honor and security of the Argentine Confederation shall demand it." We translate the article literally, preserving the obscurity of the last words, -whenever justice, &c. shall demand IT, -for the same obscurity, or rather inartificial expression, is found in the Spanish and French: "sin perjuicio de sus derechos naturales, toda vez que lo demanden la justicia, la honra y la seguridad de la Confederacion Argentina " in the one, and "sans préjudice de ses droit naturels, toutes les sois que le demanderont la justice, l' honneur et la sécurité de la Confederation Argentine' in the other; the honest meaning of which is apparent enough, namely, that the continued recognition of the independence of the Oriental Republic is not to prejudice any natural right of the Argentine Confederation in the premises, in regard to which, the case arising, the Buenos Ayrean government is free to do whatever justice or its honor and security may require. France, of course, has apparent right, on general principles, to demand of Buenos Ayres the punctus execution of this treaty in which event, the true questions would be, first, whether the casus fæderis existed, and (that being established,) secondly, whether the proceedings of France, in the demand of execution, were conformable to general justice, and to the rights of other powers. Buenos Ayres, moreover, in the treaty with France, agrees that its new engagement shall be deemed co-extensive with the stipulation in pari materia contained in the treaty of 1828, between Buenos Ayres and Brazil, of which the material part is in these words: "It being a duty of the two contracting governments to aid and protect the Province of Montevideo, until it shall be completely constituted, the said governments agree, that if before the constitution of the said Province shall have been sworn to, and for five years afterwards, tranquillity and security shall be disturbed within it by civil war,they will furnish to i slawful government the necessary aid to maintain and support it. Which term being elapsed, all protection furnished by this article to the lawful government of the province of Montevideo shall cease, and the same shall remain considered in a state of perfect and absolute independence." Of the true construction of the concluding clause of the article we shall speak hereafter. Suffice it to say, in this connection (at least for the argument's sake) that the terms of the treaty of 1840, both in itself and its reference to that of 1828, would seem as between European powers, (that is, without considering the question of European interposition in the concerns of America.) to give to France the right to demand of Buenos Ayres to respect the independence of Uruguay. But what has Great Britain to do with these treaties? She is not a party to either of them. That appears on the face of each. Nor has the Argentine Confederation, at any time, entered into covenants with England regarding the independence of Uruguay. What, then, do the plenipotentiaries mean by saying that England "took part more or less directly" in the conclusion of these treaties? To answer this question, we have to recur to the more explicit statements in certain separate but concurrent communications addressed to the Buenos Ayrean government by the Baron Deffaudis and by Mr. Ouseley, in the nature of a summons to surrender, before the commencement of hostilities: which communications have been published in Buenos Ayres. There, Mr. Ouseley, (in common with the Baron Deffaudis,) after citing the treaty of 1828 as "concluded under the mediation of England, between Brazil and the Argentine Confederation," and that of 1840, as concluded "between France and the Argentine government," assumes the "right of France as principal in one treaty, and that of England as mediatrix in the other," to demand a cessation of the belligerent acts of Buenos Ayres in Uruguay. We hardly know how to speak in terms of respect or forbearance of such a pretension as this, which would be ridiculous if it were not monstrous. It is absurd, in the first place, to pretend that a mediatory power becomes thereby the perpetual guarantor of a treaty between other powers, but to which itself is no party. In the second place, if England were, (which is she not, either expressly or impliedly,) the guantor of the treaty of 1828, she could act us such, lawfully, only as the second and at the request of one of the parties, which in this case would be Brazil. But Brazil, though she contemplated, originally, taking a part in this intervention, yet, long since, desisted from that purpose, and has carefully held herself |