in the words of the memorialists, "if the Legislature shall decline to propose such amendment of the Constitution, then we ask that a Convention of the people of this state be by law called to revise and amend the Constitution." This memorial was headed-we believe it was also written-by Mr. Hoffman, and was subscribed by several of the soundest and wisest Democrats in the state. At the rising of the Legislature, in the spring of 1843, it had become apparent to the reformers, that they could place no reliance whatever upon the Legislature, and that the alternative of a Convention, presented by the Herkimer memorialists, was now the only process of relief worth laboring for. To this end, therefore, every energy was bent during the summer and fall following. Immense meetings were held at Albany, and in the city of NewYork, and county meetings were held at different points throughout the state, the common sentiment of which was, the absolute necessity of a Convention for Constitutional Reform. The public press took up and propagated the enthusiasm. Associations for Constitutional Reform were organized, and the doctrines of the reformers were made welcome wherever they were announced. It was during this summer that the cause of reform received a new accession of strength from the friends to the cheap and prompt administration of justice. For several years the delays and expense of litigating a suit in our state courts had been quite intolerable. The Supreme Court, the Court of Errors, and the Court of Chancery, were completely choked up with the accumulated business of from three to five years, and a suit commenced in one of the County Courts might be protracted by either of the litigants without difficulty, from seven to ten years, before it could be forced to a final decree in the Court of last resort. It may naturally be supposed that the people and the lawyers, who are alike the victims of these unnatural abuses, were aroused by the prospect of a Convention, in which, among other things, the judicial organization of the state might be repaired and adapted to the uses of a civilized community. The same prospect likewise invited various other reforms which, however, were subordinate to those we have designated, but which we shall have occasion presently to notice more in detail. When the Legislature again assembled in the winter of 1843-44, it was found that this Convention movement was no longer the vagary of a few impracticable abstractionists, and those whose judgments, interests, or timidity advised against the measure, felt that the sentiment which gave it impulse must be propitiated before it could be resisted. A series of amendments to the Constitution was accordingly introduced by the enemies of the Convention, which passed both Houses of the Legislature, embodying substantially the guaranties of the people's resolution, and having an apparent tendency to relieve the judiciary. The first amendment, proposed to adopt the policy enacted in the law of 1842, providing for the payment of the debts and preserving the credit of the state. The second adopted the spirit of the people's resolution. The third provided for the appointment of three additional Chancellors. The fourth provided for two additional Supreme Court Judges. The fifth, that no officer should be removeable by the joint resolution of the two houses, without having an opportunity of being heard upon the charges made against him. The sixth, that no property qualification should be required to render a person eligible to any office or public trust. During the same session a resolution was introduced into the upper house by Senator Porter, instructing the Judiciary Committee to report a bill to submit the question of Convention or no Convention to the people at the next general election. It was not adopted for various reasons. The first was, that several of the delegates betrayed their constituents, and the second and most controlling reason was, the indisposition of the members of the dominant party to embarrass the then approaching Presidential canvass with a measure which might have perilled a result towards which the Democracy of the state were then looking with legitimate feelings of hope and pride. It was therefore-as we think wisely-determined to postpone the revision of the Constitution until after the fever of this election had subsided, that the people might address themselves to the solemn work of reconstructing their fundamental law with becoming deliberation and singleness of purpose. It is well known that the elections of November, 1844, resulted in the elevation, to the governor's chair, of one who, within a short six months previous, had declined the nomination to three of the highest political distinctions in the gift of the American people, and who had sacrificed his personal comfort and his political interests to those of the party of which he was the acknowledged leader. It was now fairly to have been expected that the claims of the reformers would have been respected, and a Convention called. But lo! new difficulties had presented themselves. In the first place, a new party had obtained the ascendency in N. Y. City, called Nativists, and composed chiefly of Whigs, who clamoured for a restriction of the political privileges enjoyed by adopted citizens. But this was only part of the trouble. In some of the interior counties the tenants of certain estates, with long leases, had determined that they would no longer pay the rents exacted by their landlords. They organized themselves in bands to resist the officers of the law commissioned to collect these rents, and during this year, 1844, consummated the foulest personal indignities upon those officers by deliberate murder. Demagogues were not wanting to propitiate the favor of these misguided outlaws, by smiling upon their outrages, and consequently a party of anti-renters sprang into existence, sufficiently numerous to hold the balance of power between the two great parties in the state. They demanded a change in the Constitution, which would protect them from or vary their liabilities under their leases, and of course a representation in the Convention. Then the right of the negroes to vote would have to be contested again, and with doubtful success. If the opposition were to prove unsuccessful, it would probably throw the state into the embrace of our political opponents for a few years, and prove fatal also to the prospects of those of our public men whose day-star of hope might be rising over the meridian of Washington. The horrors of negro suffrage, of anti-rentism, and of nativism, were therefore successively invoked by the opponents of the Convention, as conclusive evidence of the danger of trusting our Constitution again in the people's hands; and lest these reasons might not prove efficacious, the right of the people to amend or meddle with their Constitution, except in such particulars and to such extent as the Legislature should first prescribe, was boldly asserted in quarters where there was not even the excuse of ignorance to palliate the absurdity. The opposition, however, all proved unavailing, and a bill passed both houses of the Legislature, on the 12th of May, 1845, providing for the submission of the Convention question to the people on the 4th day of November, following. At that election, the call was sustained by a majority of about 180,000.* This tremendous vote, and over *STATE OF NEW-YORK, SS.-Statement of the whole number of votes given at the General Election held in the said State, on the 4th day of November, 1845, under and pursuant to the act entitled "An Act recommending a Convention to the people of this State," passed May 13, 1845. whelming majority, made it sufficiently apparent that the whole people, without respect to party distinctions, were intent upon a thorough reform in our fundamental law, and were looking to far more comprehensive changes than had been contemplated, when the clarion of the Conventionists first broke forth among the hills of Old Herki mer. We should here add, that those amendments to the Constitution which had been proposed by the Legislature, for the relief of the judiciary, and to sustain the credit of the state, Onondaga.... Ontario.. were rejected by that body the following year, session of 1844; first, because they were insufficient for the ends they were designed to accomplish; second, if they had been sufficient, they would not have superseded the necessity for a Convention; and thirdly, their passage would au mesure, have weakened the claim of the reformers for that Convention, in which and where alone, far more important reforms than those proposed were expected to originate. From the character of the delegates which have been elected,* and of the resolutions and instructions which have * The following is a list of the Delegates from the several counties, which, for convenience of reference to our readers, we have thought proper to give in this connexion. Tilden, Campbell P. White, John A. Kennedy, William S. Conelly, Lorenzo B. Shepherd, Robert H. Morris, George S. Mann, Alexander F. Vache, David R. F. Jones. Niagara-Hiram Gardner, John W. McNitt. Oneida-Charles P. Kirkland, Julius Candee, Edward Huntington, Harvey Brayton. Onondaga-David Munro, Wm. Taylor, Cyrus H. Kingsley, Elijah Rhoades. Ontario-Alvah Worden, Robert C. Nicholas. Orange-John W. Brown, George W. Tuthill, Lewis Chuddeback. Orleans.-Wm. Penniman. Oswego-Orris Hart, Sereno Clark. Otsego-Samuel Nelson, Levi S. Chatfield, Harvey Strong. Putnam-Governeur Kemble. Queens-John L. Riker. Rensselaer-Abm. Witbeck, Jr., Wm. H. Van Schoonhoven, Perry Warren. Richmond-John T. Harrison Rockland-John J. Wood. Saratoga-John K. Porter, Jas. M. Cook. Schoharie-Wm. C. Bouck, John Gebhard, Jr. St. Lawrence-Bishop Perkins, John L. Russell. Jonah Sanford. Steuben--Robert Campbell, Jr., Wm. Kerman, B. S. Brundage. Suffolk-C. C. Cambreleng, Abel Huntington. Tompkins-Thomas B. Sears, John Young. Tioga-John J. Taylor. Ulster-James E. Forsyth, Geo. G. Graham. Warren-Wm. Hotchkiss. Washington-Edward Dodd, Albert L. Baker, Westchester-John Hunter, Aaron Ward. Wayne-Horatio N. Tafft, Ornon Archer. Wyoming-Andrew W. Young. Yates-Elijah Spencer. been addressed to them from the various quarters of the state, it is sufficiently obvious that the people are anticipating a new Constitution, and that they do not expect their representatives to re-enact the folly of the Peliades, by attempting to cut up and boil down to the freshness and vigor of youth, the decrepit carcass, in awe of which they have been compelled to live for the last quarter of a century. We propose to enumerate some of the most conspicuous and desirable of the changes which are likely to be made, with a side-long glance at corresponding tendencies-if they have appeared in such of our sister states as have recently submitted their Constitutions to a review by the people. In this enumeration, we shall not attempt to discriminate those reforms for which there has been a general call, from such as have received, as yet, little or no public discussion. We shall specify all such as are entitled, in our judgment, to the patient consideration of the Convention. I. OF LEGISLATIVE POWER. 1. The delegates to both branches of the Legislature should be elected from separate districts-each constituency being represented by a single delegate. That this measure is in accordance with the strict principles of democratic government does not admit of a doubt. The nearer the representative may be brought to his constituents, the greater will be his accountability, the more likely is he to be competent and disposed to represent them adequately and honestly, and the less chances are there for corrupt or perverse influences to operate upon the primary assemblies, in which the qualifications and character of their representatives are determined. The uniform approbation given to this measure by the several counties in the state at their several nominating Conventions, render its adoption almost a matter of course. 2. The sessions of the Legislature should be biennial only. There is no doubt that if this body be restricted, as we earnestly hope and pray it may be, to the passage of general laws, forty or fifty days every two years will suffice for all the legislation which will be required at its hands. By a very cursory examination of the New-York session laws for the last ten years, it will appear that the great mass of them concern private and local interests, with which government, properly restricted, would have nothing whatever to do. We esteem it substantial evidence that a wiser view of the proper sphere and function of government is beginning to prevail in our republic; that the last four Constitutions which have been formed within its borders,those of New-Jersey, Louisiana, Texas and Missouri, have all provided for the assembling of their Legislatures once in two years. The system of biennial sessions is also sanctioned by the Constitutions of Arkansas, Illinois, Mississippi, Tennessee and Delaware. 3. The members of the Legislature should have their compensation fixed and paid them by the County which sends them. This mode of compensating delegates has all the advantages of direct taxation without any of its inconveniences. The people will be led to feel a more immediate interest in the services rendered, when they are made to realize that they have to pay for them. There will be a corresponding desire to procure the most efficient representation, and a disposition to hold them to a stringent accountability-the two cardinal tendencies in civil government to be encouraged. Another plan, which would be a great improvement upon the per diem system at present in operation, would be to fix the salary upon each member for the whole period for which he should be elected-say $500 for the two years, to be paid quarterly in advance, and notwithstanding absence, resignation or death of the incumbent. This would be a more adequate compensation to the member for the time he would be required to spend in the state service, and would also be much less expensive to the state than the present per diem allowance and annual sessions. The sum being fixed and certain, with or The average per diem now to each member for an ordinary four months session is $360-making $720 for two years, and at the same rate for extra sessions. $500 for the term of two years would save $220 for each legislative term on every delegate, and also secure their services at extra sessions without additional cost. without service, leaves no inducement to protract the legislative sessions except for the public advantage; and in case a delegate were strenuously called upon by his constituency to resign his seat, he would not have to overcome a hostile pecuniary interest in order to discharge his duty. The principles of both propositions are reconcileable with each other, and both practicable. We believe great good would be realized from the operation of either, but most from their wise combination. 4. The state should derive no revenue directly or indirectly from property taken from private individuals for public use. There is no propriety in the state attempting to compete with private enterprise in trade, manufactures, internal improvements, or in any other department of industry. The public judgment of the State, and we believe of the Union, has substantially so determined. If, therefore, the state requires private property for its legitimate and sovereign purposes, the advantages of such an appropriation should be common and equal to all. There can be no harm therefore, nor injustice in making it, if an easement, free to all. To draw a revenue from it, even to the treasury of the state, is as idle, as for an individual to fill one of his pockets by emptying another. If the advantages should operate unequally, then government ought not to be interested in the work, nor would it be of such a public character as would justify a violation of private and vested rights, to carry it forward. Of course, in thus limiting the influence of the Legislature over the industry of the state, the Convention should be careful to provide some general mode of self-incorporation for associations which, under proper restrictions, would be competent to undertake and execute those industrial enterprises of a quasi public character, which are not strictly among the proper functions of govern ment. 5. The expropriation of private property, however, by the government, whether done directly or indirectly, should only be permitted upon payment FIRST made to the owners, of its fair value, to be assessed by a jury to be selected from the vicinage. 6. The state should have no power to contract debts, or loan its credit, except in case of war, invasion or insurrection. This is broader than the " People's Resolution," which authorized the creation of a debt, provided, among other things, the people approve of it at the general election next after the Legislature have so advised them. But if the state receive no revenue from her public works, she can never pay her debts so contracted except by direct taxation. But it is much more provident to raise the money in advance or as it is required to be disbursed, than to leave the debt with its accumulation of interest to a succeeding generation for payment, while, if the generation that contracts the debt has to pay it, all they pay in interest is utter loss. Again, the money would then come directly from the people; and they would be sure, before they made the appropriation, that the advantages to be derived from it were clear and well secured. Again. It seems unnecessary to provide in the Constitution for raising money upon the credit of the state, by submitting the question to the people, inasmuch as the people are always competent to assemble and impose a tax or create a loan, by virtue of the same power which enables them to amend or alter their Constitution. It seems unnecessary to authorize them to do what we cannot prevent them from doing. But we do not imagine that there is any occasion to provide with very great care, for an emergency which can hardly happen. At least we can conceive of no case other than those excepted in our original proposition, when it could be necessary for the State of New-York to borrow money, after she shall have freed herself from her present liabilities. If the policy embodied in the last three propositions be correct, then the one which follows is inevitable. 7. That those public works and internal improvements belonging to the state which she could not construct under the above restrictions, should be sold at once, and the proceeds applied to the payment of the public debt.* 8. That the Common School fund *The financial bearing of this proposition may be partially inferred from the following statement of th public works at present owned by the state, the time when commenced, their cost for construction and repairs, their debts, tolls and interest : |