See Contracts XXVI, XXVII, XXVIII, XXIX, XXX, XXXI, XXXII.
ARMED SERVICES LEAVE ACT.
See Pay and Allowances VIII, IX, X, XI, XII, XIII, XIV, XV. ARMY POSTAL SERVICE.
I. In a suit brought by plaintiff for damages caused by loss of and damage to shipments of fourth class, unprotected mail, it is held that under the facts and circumstances of the instant case, the Govern- ment is not liable to plaintiff for the loss of or damage to the fourth class, unprotected mail for which claim is made. Plaintiff having failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, defendant's motion to dismiss is granted and the petition is dismissed. Twentier, 244.
II. Plaintiff, a partnership, in June, 1945, delivered shipments of pins and rings to the United States Post Office at Bisbee, Arizona, addressed to a Special Service Officer overseas and the shipments were transmitted to the Army Postal System in New York City, but they never reached the ad- dressee. A part of the shipments was later re- turned to plaintiff in a damaged condition and it was found that some of the rings were missing. Having been paid in advance for the shipment, plaintiff alleges it was obligated to send another shipment of rings to those who had ordered them and in so doing incurred additional expense, which plaintiff seeks to recover in addition to the value of the goods lost. Id.
III. Under the statute the Army Postal System is an ex- tension of the United States Post Office Depart- ment. If, in the instant case, any contract of bailment arises, by implication or otherwise, it must be between plaintiff and the United States Post Office Department, not plaintiff and the Army. Id.
ARMY POSTAL SERVICE-Continued
IV. The United States, in the carriage and delivery of mail for the public benefit, is engaged in the dis- charge of a governmental function. The liability of the Government for the loss or damage of mail is limited by the applicable statutes and the Postal Regulations issued thereunder. In order to se- cure protection against loss or damage, it is neces- sary, under the Postal Regulations, to use regis- tered, insured or c. o. d. mail. No liability exists
for the loss or damage of shipments by fourth class, unprotected mail, which is the type of mail involved in the instant case.
V. Provision for the Army Postal System is made by the Act of August 21, 1941, as amended, 39 U. S. C. 138 (1946 Ed.). Under the provisions of this Act, and the Postal Regulations in effect thereunder, at the time the shipments in question were made, the use of registered, insured or c. o. d. services for mail addressed to Army Post Office addresses was forbidden. It is held that the fact that under the Postal Laws and Regulations the plaintiff, in this instance, could use only fourth class, unprotected mail indicates that defendant, in the performance of a sovereign function, was unwilling to provide any remedy of indemnifica- tion for losses of the kind which plaintiff has suffered, due to the risks inherent in wartime transportation of mails overseas. Id. 23.
See Pay and Allowances VIII, IX, X, XI, XII, XIII, XIV, XV. BAIL BOND FORFEITED.
I. Where the plaintiff became surety on a bail bond in the United States District Court in the amount of $1,000, and the bond was forfeited when the defendant in the criminal action failed to appear before the court; and where the plaintiff located the defendant and had him produced in court; and where the District Court thereupon ordered a remission of $750 to the plaintiff on the forfeited bond which has not been paid; it is held that plaintiff is entitled to recover. granted. Judgement for $750. Bail 79 (1).
Plaintiff's motion
Weinstein, 559,
BAIL BOND FORFEITED-Continued
II. At the time the plaintiff's bond was forfeited and he paid the money into court, there was no statutory provision whereby the District Court could refund the money pursuant to the order of refund entered on December 8, 1950. The Act of October 27, 1951, 65 Stat. 658, permitting refund in such cases, was not retroactive and hence not applicable to the instant case but is an expression of Congress as to what is right in such cases. Id. Bail 79 (1).
III. Following the judgment in Peerless Casulaty Co. v. United States, 118 C. Cls. 624, entered upon a stipulation of the parties in a similar case, the Government does not oppose the plaintiff's motion in the instant case.
See Taxes I, II, III, IV, V, VI, VII, VIII.
CADET, SERVICE AS.
See Pay and Allowances XVI, XVII, XVIII, XIX.
CAREER COMPENSATION ACT.
See Pay and Allowances XXVI.
"CARRY-BACK."
See Taxes XXII, XXIII, XXIV, XXV, XXVI.
CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEE.
See Suit For Salary XVI, XVII, XVIII, XIX, XX, XXI, XXII. CONTRACT SETTLEMENT ACT.
I. Where the plaintiffs in cases Nos. 50272 and 50273 were subcontractors under a contract between the Government and the Batavia Metal Products, Inc., which has not filed a petition in the Court of Claims, plaintiffs are not entitled to recover from the defendant unless they are entitled to recover under the provisions of the Contract Settlement Act. The plaintiff in No. 50272 was also a sub- contractor of Erie Basin Metal Products, Inc., which has a petition in the Court of Claims but does not sue on behalf of its subcontractor, and it is likewise not entitled to recover from the defend- ant unless it is entitled to recover under the Contract Settlement Act. Erie Basin, 95. United States
CONTRACT SETTLEMENT ACT-Continued
II. Under the provisions of Section 7 of the Contract Settlement Act the Government can become liable on the claim of a subcontractor whose con- tract has been terminated only upon written notice by the Government to the subcontractor and to the prime contractor that it assumes responsibility for settling the claim of the subcontractor, upon the conditions set out in the notice, and upon consent thereto by the subcontractor. See Kal Machine Works, Inc. v. United States, 107 C. Cls. 202. The petitions of National Machine Works and Interstate Machinery Co. in the instant cases do not allege the existence of any such notices from the United States. Id.
III. The Joint Termination Regulations (10 F. R. 7985) in providing that the United States shall assume liability for the claims of subcontractors where the prime contractor is financially irresponsible do not undertake to eliminate, if they could, the statutory requirement that the United States make a written acceptance of this responsibility. The United States may refuse to pay the sub- contractor because it denies liability to the prime contractor for an amount sufficient to discharge the subcontractor's claim, or for other reasons. The United States does not become liable to pay the subcontractor until it gives the required notice assuming liability. Id.
IV. Under Section 7 (b) of the Contract Settlement Act, it is obligatory on the contracting agency, rather than permissive, for the agency to exercise super- vision and control over payments to the war contractor when the contractor is unable to meet his obligations. It is obligatory on the contracting agency to see to it that any payment to the war contractor on account of the termination claim of a subcontractor should get into the hands of the subcontractor. The legislative history of the Act sustains the court's interpretation of Section 7 (b). Id.
V. Under Section 7 (b) the defendant is not obliged to pay the claim of a subcontractor whenever the prime contractor goes into bankruptcy. A con-
CONTRACT SETTLEMENT ACT-Continued
dition precedent to the obligation to pay the sub- contractor is the acknowledgement of an obligation to the prime contractor by the Government in an amount sufficient to pay the subcontractor. Id. United States
VI. In the claim of the National Machine Works, as a subcontractor under Erie Basin Metal Products, Inc., the defendant did not assume direct liability to the subcontractor, but the settlement was made between the prime contractor and the sub- contractor, and it was contemplated that the subcontractor would be paid by the prime con- contractor. There was no assumption of liability by the Government to the subcontractor. No notice was issued agreeing to make direct settle- ment and defendant is not liable on this cause of action. Id.
VII. It is held that defendant's motions for summary judgments as to plaintiffs National Machine Works, Inc., and Interstate Machinery Co. Inc., must be granted and the petitions dismissed. Summary judgment in the case of Erie Basin Metal Products, Inc., is denied.
VIII. Under the provisions of Section 13 of the Contract Settlement Act (58 Stat. 649), providing for administrative consideration of claims and for appeal to the Maritime Commission from de- cision of its Settlement Board, the period of limitation of one year begins to run from the date of a demand for findings. In the instant case, plaintiff's demand for findings was made on July 20, 1949. Plaintiff's petition filed in the Court of Claims on June 14, 1950, was within time. Defendant's motion is denied. Arlington Trust
IX. The events which cause the limitation periods to run are specified in the statute; either the issuance of findings or the failure to issue findings after a demand. In the instant case the former event did not occur and the latter event did not occur until July 20, 1949. Plaintiff's petition, June 14, 1950, was filed in time. Id.
Limitation of Actions 105 (2).
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