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124 C. Cls.


See Statute of Limitations XII.

See Statute of Limitations XIII, XIV, XV.

See Army Postal Service, I, II, III, IV, V.



I. Under the provisions of a Resolution of the House

of Representatives referring a pending bill to the
United States Court of Claims for a report, under
Sections 1492, 2501 and 2509, Title 28 U. S. Code,
the Court is not required to determine the ques-
tion of possible bars to the jurisdiction of the
Court to render final judgment on the claim in-

volved. Zadeh, 650.
Courts for 468.
II. The defendant's contention is not sustained that

the limiting effect of Section 2501 should be ap-
plied to a Congressional reference resolution
requiring only a report to one House of Congress
as is applicable to claims before the Court for
final determination and the rendering of judgment.


Courts Come 461.
III. Following the suggestion made in 1882 by Chief

Justice Richardson (see 17 C. Cls. Pre. Pp. 3, 10)
which led to the enactment of the Bowman Act
(22 Stat. 485) there has never been an instance
where the Court of Claims has demurred at ren-
dering reports to Congress and it is inconceivable

that it should do so in the future. Id.

Courts fon 468.
IV. Under Section 2502 of Title 28, the necessity of

showing reciprocity as a prerequisite for the
maintenance of a suit in the Court of Claims by
an alien, where final determination and judgment
are sought, has been repeatedly held (see Aktie-
bolaget Irmo-Industri v. United States, 101 C. Cls.
483) but such cases are not applicable to the

instant case. Id.
Aliens Row 16.

124 C. Cls.


V. The primary purpose of Section 2509, Title 28, is to

provide to the Congress, or either House, judicially
determined facts for its use in determining whether
or not certain private claims warrant legislative
relief, including the waiver of certain defenses

otherwise available to the United States. Id.

Courts from 451.
VI. A mere dismissal of the instant case, on defendant's

plea to the jurisdiction, would not accomplish the
purpose of the House Resolution in the instant
case, and the matter is accordingly referred to a

commissioner for a hearing. Id.

Courts Cars 466.
VII. Under House Resolution 734, 81st Congress, 2nd

Session, referring to the United States Court of
Claims, the bill (H. R. 5243) for the relief of
Otho F. Hipkins, et al., for a report to Congress as
to the nature and character of the demand, as a
claim, legal or equitable, against the United
States, and the amount, if any, legally or equitably
due from the United States to the claimants; on the
evidence adduced the Court concludes there is no
legal claim against the United States but on the
consideration of all the facts and circumstances it
is recommended to Congress that the plaintiff
Otho F. Hipkins be paid the sum of $5,000. This
suggestion is addressed entirely to the discretion

of Congress. Hipkins, 708.
Courts Own 468.

United States Cm 97.
VIII. The referred bill is in two parts. The first part

relates to services performed and expenses incurred
by Otho F. Hipkins and the Hipkins Traction
Device Company. The second part deals with the
alleged unauthorized use by the Government of
traction devices invented by Otho F. Hipkins and
the infringement of Letters Patent Nos. 1,600,588,
1,600,589 and 2,008,210, all three patents involving
a traction device which would operate on trucks
and similar vehicles. On motion of plaintiffs,
during the hearing of the case, the petition was
dismissed as to the unauthorized use of patents

Nos. 1,600,588 and 1,600,589. Id.
United States can 97.

124 C. Cls.


IX. The alleged infringing structure was manufactured

by Alliance Engineering Inc. pursuant to contracts
entered into by that company with the defendant.
A comparison of the description and illustrations
of the Alliance structure with the phraseology of
the claims of the Hipkins patent No. 2,008,210 as
actually granted demonstrates that there is little
similarity in the shoes or locking devices of the two
structures which was part of the traction device
that was covered by the last Hipkins patent and
consequently there is no infringement of the

patent by the accused device. Id.
Patents Co 328.
X. With the exception of Claim 3 of the Hipkins patent

No. 2,008,210, which is quite limited in scope, and
is not infringed, the claims of the Hipkins patent

are anticipated by the prior art. Id.
Patents Com 328.
XI. On the evidence, there is no proper basis for holding

that the Government through the Alliance con-
tracts utilized the subject matter of the Hipkins
patent No. 2,008,210 as covered by the patent

actually issued. Id.

United States for 97.
XII. Plaintiffs' claim for alleged authorized use of the

invention covered by the three Hipkins patents,
under an implied contract, is based on alleged
verbal agreements with representatives of the
defendant, now deceased. There is no evidence
that the representatives in question were author-

ized to bind the defendant. Id.

United States Cow 74.
XIII. Where plaintiffs claim that Otho Hipkins and the

Hipkins Traction Device Company, at various
times, gave time and expended money in demon-
strating the Hipkins traction device and in train-
ing Army personnel in its practical use and appli-
cation; it is held that any claim for personal
services rendered and expenses incurred by Hip-
kins as an individual accrued to him by April 14,
1932, when he became president of the Hipkins
company, and was barred by April 14, 1938, by
the six-year statute of limitations. A report to
Congress under 28 U. S. C. 2509 would have to
124 C. Ols.


suggest that any amount to be given to Hipkins
individually would be a gratuity or the recogni-

tion of a moral obligation. Id.

Courts for 461.
XIV. Where it is shown that the demonstrations and tests

in behalf of the Hipkins company ceased in Octo-
ber 1934, when Hipkins became employed by an-
other concern, any claim by the Hipkins company
was barred in October 1940 by the six-year statute

of limitations. Id.

Courts C 461.
XV. There was no legal obligation on the part of the

Government to pay for the services rendered by
Otho F. Hipkins nor to reimburse him for ex-
penses incurred, and it is conceded he was in the
employ of the Government when the first two
patents were applied for and granted. It is ap-
parent from the record that the Hipkins patents
were not infringed by the Government's contracts.
However, upon consideration of the entire record,
the court concludes that the Government received
substantial benefits from the work and efforts of
Hipkins, and it is recommended to Congress that,
in its discretion, the sum of $5,000 be paid to

Otho F. Hipkins. Id.

Courts Om 468.

See Suit for Salary XX.

See Pay and Allowances VIII, IX, X, XI, XII, XIII, XIV, XV.

See Pay and Allowances XXIV, XXV, XXVI.

See Contracts VII, VIII, IX, X, XI, XII, XIII.

See Taxes I, II, III, IV, VI, VII, VIII.

See Contracts LVII, LVIII, LIX.

I. Following the opinion in Marcos v. United States, 122

C. Cls. 641, it is held that the statute of limitations
against the claim in the instant case began to run
124 C. Cls.


on September 2, 1945, and plaintiff, therefore,
had until September 2, 1951, to file his petition in
the Court of Claims. The petition filed on August
3, 1951, was within the statutory period. De-

fendant's motion denied. Bermejo, 80.
Limitation of Actions Com 113.
II. Following the opinion in Marcos v. United Stales,

122 C. Cls. 641, it is held that the statute of limi-
tations against the claim in the instant case began
to run on September 2, 1945, and plaintiffs, there-
fore, had until September 2, 1951, to file their
petition in the Court of Claims. The petition
filed on July 5, 1951, was within the statutory
period. Defendant's motion denied. Quintos et

al., 104.

Limitation of Actions Saw 113.
III. Where plaintiff, an employee of the Railroad Retire-

ment Board, upon his honorable discharge from
the service was reemployed by the Board on
February 25, 1946, but was restored to a position
of lower grade and pay; and where his claim for
restoration to his former grade was rejected by the
Railroad Retirement Board on June 27, 1951,
and by the Civil Service Commission on April 4,
1952; and where plaintiff's petition was filed July
15, 1952, in his suit for the difference between the
salary received upon reemployment and the salary
of his former position; it is held that the six-year
statute of limitations bars recovery for any period
prior to July 15, 1946, and to that extend defend-
ant's motion to dismiss is allowed. McCormick,


Courts fm 461.
IV. The statute of limitations is not tolled during the

period a claim is under administrative considera-
tion. See Love v. United States, 122 C. Cls. 144;
Tan v. United States, 122 C. Cls. 662; certiorari
denied, 344 U. S. 895. Id.
Limitation of Actions w 105 (2).
V. Plaintiff's claim is not barred by the statute of limi-

tations from recovery for the period July 15, 1946,
to February 25, 1947, if the allegations of his
petition are otherwise correct. Under the provi-
sions of the Selective Service and Training Act
plaintiff was entitled to the restoration to his

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