PHILIPPINE CASES.
See Statute of Limitations XII.
PHILIPPINE CLAIMS.
See Statute of Limitations XIII, XIV, XV.
POSTAL REGULATIONS.
See Army Postal Service, I, II, III, IV, V.
RELEASES, EFFECT OF.
See Contracts XXXIV, XXXV, XXXVI, XXXVII, XXXVIII, XL, XLI, XLII, XLIII.
I. Under the provisions of a Resolution of the House of Representatives referring a pending bill to the United States Court of Claims for a report, under Sections 1492, 2501 and 2509, Title 28 U. S. Code, the Court is not required to determine the ques- tion of possible bars to the jurisdiction of the Court to render final judgment on the claim in- volved. Zadeh, 650.
II. The defendant's contention is not sustained that the limiting effect of Section 2501 should be ap- plied to a Congressional reference resolution requiring only a report to one House of Congress as is applicable to claims before the Court for final determination and the rendering of judgment. Id. Courts
III. Following the suggestion made in 1882 by Chief Justice Richardson (see 17 C. Cls. Pre. Pp. 3, 10) which led to the enactment of the Bowman Act (22 Stat. 485) there has never been an instance where the Court of Claims has demurred at ren- dering reports to Congress and it is inconceivable that it should do so in the future. Id. Courts
IV. Under Section 2502 of Title 28, the necessity of showing reciprocity as a prerequisite for the maintenance of a suit in the Court of Claims by an alien, where final determination and judgment are sought, has been repeatedly held (see Aktie- bolaget Irmo-Industri v. United States, 101 C. Cls. 483) but such cases are not applicable to the instant case. Id.
REPORT TO CONGRESS-Continued
V. The primary purpose of Section 2509, Title 28, is to provide to the Congress, or either House, judicially determined facts for its use in determining whether or not certain private claims warrant legislative relief, including the waiver of certain defenses otherwise available to the United States. Id. Courts
VI. A mere dismissal of the instant case, on defendant's plea to the jurisdiction, would not accomplish the purpose of the House Resolution in the instant case, and the matter is accordingly referred to a commissioner for a hearing. Id.
VII. Under House Resolution 734, 81st Congress, 2nd Session, referring to the United States Court of Claims, the bill (H. R. 5243) for the relief of Otho F. Hipkins, et al., for a report to Congress as to the nature and character of the demand, as a claim, legal or equitable, against the United States, and the amount, if any, legally or equitably due from the United States to the claimants; on the evidence adduced the Court concludes there is no legal claim against the United States but on the consideration of all the facts and circumstances it is recommended to Congress that the plaintiff Otho F. Hipkins be paid the sum of $5,000. This suggestion is addressed entirely to the discretion of Congress. Hipkins, 708.
VIII. The referred bill is in two parts. The first part relates to services performed and expenses incurred by Otho F. Hipkins and the Hipkins Traction Device Company. The second part deals with the alleged unauthorized use by the Government of traction devices invented by Otho F. Hipkins and the infringement of Letters Patent Nos. 1,600,588, 1,600,589 and 2,008,210, all three patents involving a traction device which would operate on trucks and similar vehicles. On motion of plaintiffs, during the hearing of the case, the petition was dismissed as to the unauthorized use of patents Nos. 1,600,588 and 1,600,589. Id. United States
REPORT OF CONGRESS-Continued
IX. The alleged infringing structure was manufactured by Alliance Engineering Inc. pursuant to contracts entered into by that company with the defendant. A comparison of the description and illustrations of the Alliance structure with the phraseology of the claims of the Hipkins patent No. 2,008,210 as actually granted demonstrates that there is little similarity in the shoes or locking devices of the two structures which was part of the traction device that was covered by the last Hipkins patent and consequently there is no infringement of the patent by the accused device. Id. Patents
X. With the exception of Claim 3 of the Hipkins patent No. 2,008,210, which is quite limited in scope, and is not infringed, the claims of the Hipkins patent are anticipated by the prior art.
XI. On the evidence, there is no proper basis for holding that the Government through the Alliance con- tracts utilized the subject matter of the Hipkins patent No. 2,008,210 as covered by the patent actually issued. Id. 97.
XII. Plaintiffs' claim for alleged authorized use of the invention covered by the three Hipkins patents, under an implied contract, is based on alleged verbal agreements with representatives of the defendant, now deceased. There is no evidence
that the representatives in question were author- ized to bind the defendant. Id.
XIII. Where plaintiffs claim that Otho Hipkins and the Hipkins Traction Device Company, at various times, gave time and expended money in demon- strating the Hipkins traction device and in train- ing Army personnel in its practical use and appli- cation; it is held that any claim for personal services rendered and expenses incurred by Hip- kins as an individual accrued to him by April 14, 1932, when he became president of the Hipkins company, and was barred by April 14, 1938, by the six-year statute of limitations. A report to Congress under 28 U. S. C. 2509 would have to
REPORT OF CONGRESS-Continued
suggest that any amount to be given to Hipkins individually would be a gratuity or the recogni- tion of a moral obligation. Id.
XIV. Where it is shown that the demonstrations and tests in behalf of the Hipkins company ceased in Octo- ber 1934, when Hipkins became employed by an- other concern, any claim by the Hipkins company was barred in October 1940 by the six-year statute of limitations. Id.
XV. There was no legal obligation on the part of the Government to pay for the services rendered by Otho F. Hipkins nor to reimburse him for ex- penses incurred, and it is conceded he was in the employ of the Government when the first two patents were applied for and granted. It is ap- parent from the record that the Hipkins patents were not infringed by the Government's contracts. However, upon consideration of the entire record, the court concludes that the Government received substantial benefits from the work and efforts of Hipkins, and it is recommended to Congress that, in its discretion, the sum of $5,000 be paid to Otho F. Hipkins. Id.
RES ADJUDICATA.
See Suit for Salary XX.
RETIRED PAY.
See Pay and Allowances VIII, IX, X, XI, XII, XIII, XIV, XV. RETIREMENT, EFFECTIVE DATE.
See Pay and Allowances XXIV, XXV, XXVI.
REVOCATION OF BID.
See Contracts VII, VIII, IX, X, XI, XII, XIII.
ROYALTY PAYMENTS.
See Taxes I, II, III, IV, VI, VII, VIII.
SPECIFICATIONS, FAULTY.
See Contracts LVII, LVIII, LIX.
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS.
I. Following the opinion in Marcos v. United States, 122 C. Cls. 641, it is held that the statute of limitations against the claim in the instant case began to run
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS-Continued
on September 2, 1945, and plaintiff, therefore, had until September 2, 1951, to file his petition in the Court of Claims. The petition filed on August 3, 1951, was within the statutory period. De- fendant's motion denied. Bermejo, 80.
II. Following the opinion in Marcos v. United States, 122 C. Cls. 641, it is held that the statute of limi- tations against the claim in the instant case began to run on September 2, 1945, and plaintiffs, there- fore, had until September 2, 1951, to file their petition in the Court of Claims. The petition filed on July 5, 1951, was within the statutory period. Defendant's motion denied. Quintos et al., 104.
III. Where plaintiff, an employee of the Railroad Retire- ment Board, upon his honorable discharge from the service was reemployed by the Board on February 25, 1946, but was restored to a position of lower grade and pay; and where his claim for restoration to his former grade was rejected by the Railroad Retirement Board on June 27, 1951, and by the Civil Service Commission on April 4, 1952; and where plaintiff's petition was filed July 15, 1952, in his suit for the difference between the salary received upon reemployment and the salary of his former position; it is held that the six-year statute of limitations bars recovery for any period prior to July 15, 1946, and to that extend defend- ant's motion to dismiss is allowed. McCormick, 111.
IV. The statute of limitations is not tolled during the period a claim is under administrative considera- tion. See Love v. United States, 122 C. Cls. 144; Tan v. United States, 122 C. Cls. 662; certiorari denied, 344 U. S. 895. Id.
V. Plaintiff's claim is not barred by the statute of limi- tations from recovery for the period July 15, 1946, to February 25, 1947, if the allegations of his petition are otherwise correct. Under the provi- and Training Act
sions of the Selective Service plaintiff was entitled to the restoration to his
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