of the recipients were the measures of the right which was subjected to assessment, and the imposed tax could be enforced personally against the successor charged. The act of 1892 was a revision of the whole law upon the subject. It was passed with knowledge of our decisions, and in view of our construction, and was obviously intended, in some respects, to compel on our part different conclusions. I do not think there was any such purpose so far as our general doctrine as to the nature of the tax is concerned. There are some changes of phraseology in the more important sections, but I think it remains true that the tax is one upon the right of succession, levied upon successors in respect to the shares to which they succeed, and not upon the decedent's estate as such." The court conceded, however, that while the general rule regarding the nature of the tax had not been modified, the definition of the word "property" contained in 29 the act had the effect of limiting the exemption declared 30 in favor of lineal successors to estates where the aggregate property of the decedent transferred amounts to less than $10,000; and where several lineals succeed to personal property amounting in the aggregate to more than $10,000, their interests are taxable, though each beneficiary may succeed to less than that amount. The tax is under this act declared to be upon the aggregate estate or property of the decedent, passing to taxable persons or interests, and not upon the separate share of the devisee or legatee; and where the estate passes to collaterals and strangers to the blood, and is worth $500 or more, it is taxable, notwithstanding the legatees take less than that sum. Where it passes to lineal heirs, and the aggregate estate is personalty worth $10,000 or more, it is also taxable, although the separate shares are 19 Section 22, c. 399, Laws 1892. less.31 This is the rule adopted under the statute of Pennsylvania. 32 And in New York it overrules the earlier cases under the statutes in existence prior to the act of 1892.33 § 10. A Tax upon a "Commodity" in Massachusetts. 34 In Massachusetts the constitution provides that the state may levy duties and excises "upon any produce, goods, wares, merchandise, and commodities whatsoever, brought into, produced, manufactured, or being within the commonwealth." Under this provision it has been held that the privilege of transmitting and receiving, by will or descent, property on the death of the owner, is a "commodity" within the meaning of the constitution, and that an excise in the nature of an inheritance tax may be laid upon it.35 § 11. Under the Constitution of Minnesota. In Minnesota, by recent amendment to the constitution,30 it is provided that there may be, by law, levied and collected a tax upon all inheritances, devises, bequests, legacies, and gifts of every kind and description, above a fixed and specified sum, of any and all natural persons and corporations. 31 In re Hoffman, 143 N. Y. 327, 38 N. E. 311; In re Hall's Estate (Sup.) 34 N. Y. Supp. 616. 32 Chapter 3, § 41. 33 See In re Hoffman's Estate, supra; also In re Cager's Will, 111 N. Y. 345, 18 N. E. 866; In re Howe, 112 N. Y. 100, 19 N. E. 513. 34 Part 2, c. 1, § 1, art. 4. 35 Minot v. Winthrop (1894) 162 Mass. 113, 38 N. E. 512. 36 Adopted November 6, 1894. See 1 St. Minn. 1894, Const. art. 9, § 1. See note on proposed tax, 2 Minn. Law J. (May, 1894) 123. This provision was evidently inserted to meet the ruling in State v. Gorman, 40 Minn. 232, 41 N. W. 948. Such a tax, above such exempted sum, may be uniform, or it may be graded or progressive, but shall not exceed a maximum tax of 5 per cent. § 12. Under the Federal "Income Tax" of 1894. Under the act of congress passed August 28, 1894, a tax of 2 per cent. was imposed upon all gains, profits, and incomes received from "money and the value of all personal property acquired by gift or inheritance." While this provision of the act would have given rise to much litigation on account of its obscure and ambiguous language, it was not a proper tax to associate with the income tax system. the whole act has, however, been declared unconstitutional, no practical purpose is accomplished by the discussion of that part of the act relating to the inheritance tax.38 § 13. Not a Property Tax. As In accordance with the views given above, it has been uniformly held that the tax is not a property tax within the meaning of the various provisions of the federal and state constitutions.39 87 Section 28. 38 Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 157 U. S. 429, 15 Sup. Ct. 673. 39 See cases, section 2, supra; also, In re Sherwell's Estate (1891) 125 N. Y. 379, 26 N. E. 464; In re Knoedler's Estate (1893) 110 N. Y. 379, 35 N. E. 601; In re Merriam's Estate (1894) 141 N. Y. 484, 36 N. E. 505; In re Cullum's Estate, 5 Misc. Rep. 173, 25 N. Y. Supp. 700, affirmed 76 Hun, 610, 27 N. Y. Supp. 1105, and 145 N. Y. 593, 40 N. E. 163; State v. Hamlin (1894) 86 Me. 495, 30 Atl. 76; In re Tuigg's Estate (Surr.) 15 N. Y. Supp. 548; In re Carver's Estate (1893) 25 N. Y. Supp. 991, 5 Misc. Rep. 173; In re Swift (1893) 137 N. Y. 77, 88, 32 N. E. 1096, Gray, J., dissenting; In re Small's Estate, 151 Pa. St. 1, 25 Atl. 23, 28; State v. Ferris (April, 1895) 9 Ohio Cir. Ct. R. It was said by Lee, J.: 40 "The property tax which the framers of the constitution were contemplating was the ordinary annually recurring tax for the support of government, laid upon all property whatsoever. They had no reference to casual subjects of taxation occurring irreg ularly and occasionally, which, though connected with property, were yet readily to be distinguished in their essential character and features." 41 And in a recent case in New York, where the constitutionality of the act was in question, the same views were announced, and a majority of the court went so far as to hold that it was not important to determine whether the act was to be regarded as imposing a tax on property or upon the succession or devolution of property by will or intestacy; whether one or the other, it was held constitutional in all respects.12 Whether the object of taxation be regarded as the property which passes or the person who takes it is a wholly immaterial question. The legislature is not restricted in the selection of its subjects for the raising of revenue for 299, affirmed as State of Ohio ex rel. v. Ferris, 23 Wkly. Law Bul (Ohio) July 1, 1895, 349, 352. The opinion will be published in the N. E. Rep. as soon as handed down. See note to 32 Am. Law Reg. (N. S.) 364, where the author says: "In view of the federal decisions fixing the status of this form of taxation, it seems absurd to regard succession charges as property taxes. It is upon the idea that the tax is the price paid for the privilege of succession that its constitutionality has been upheld when applied to the transmission of United States securities." 40 Eyre v. Jacob, supra. And see In re McPherson, 104 N. Y. 306, 10 N. E. 685; Com. v. Maury, 82 Va. 883, 1 S. E. 185. 41 See, also, State v. Hamlin, 86 Me. 502, 30 Atl. 76. 42 In re McPherson, 104 N. Y. 306, 10 N. E. 685; In re Swift, 137 N. Y. 77, 32 N. E. 1096; Wallace v. Myers, 38 Fed. 184. See In re Hoffman, 143 N. Y. 327, 38 N. E. 311; In re Howard, 5 Dem. Sur. 483; In re Sherwell's Estate (1891) 125 N. Y. 379, 26 N. E. 464, affirming (Sup.) 12 N. Y. Supp. 200. state uses. In such respects it is sovereign, and is without other control than the restrictions found in the fundamental law of the state.13 In another case in North Carolina the court seem to have reached the conclusion that the tax was not a property tax, but one upon the succession to property, without being aware of any previous authority upon the question.** So a tax upon a legacy to the United States government is not a tax upon federal property within the prohibitions of the federal constitution.*5 Nor is this a tax upon real or personal property, under the constitution of Maine." § 14. Not a Direct Tax. Nor is it a direct tax upon land, taken by descent, within the meaning of the federal constitution, but it is more in the nature of an impost or excise upon the devolution of the estate, or the right to become beneficially entitled thereto, or to the income thereof.47 § 15. Taxing Foreign Real Estate-When Void as Direct Tax. But as real estate is not drawn to the person or domicile of the owner for taxation, it cannot be taxed directly by these laws, outside the jurisdiction where it is situ 43 In re Sherwell's Estate, supra. 44 Pullen v. Commissioners of Wake Co. (1872) 66 N. C. 363. 45 In re Merriam's Estate (1894) 141 N. Y. 484, 36 N. E. 505; In re Cullum's Estate, 5 Misc. Rep. 173, 25 N. Y. Supp. 700, affirmed 76 Hun, 610, 27 N. Y. Supp. 1105, and 145 N. Y. 593, 40 N. E. 163, mem. See 32 Am. Law Reg. (N S.) 364, 366. 46 Const. Me. art. 9, § 8; State v. Hamlin (1894) 86 Me. 495, 30 Atl. 76. 47 Scholey v. Rew (1874) 23 Wall. 331. See, also, Strode v. Com., supra; Com. v. Herman, 16 Wkly. Notes Cas. 211, 212; Minot v. Win |