$ 18 does not exceed the sum of $50,000, the tax shall be one per cent.; when it exceeds $50,000, and does not exceed $100,000, one and one-half per cent.'; and then it proceeds to fix higher rates of taxes on higher grades. There is no exemption to all persons of taxes on property of the value of $20,000, but if the amount or value of the property which so passes is less than $20,000 no tax is imposed thereon. But if the amount or value of the estate be over $20,000, say $20,001, then the tax must be paid on the whole sum, and not simply on the amount over $20,000. And thus in the first case the person taking the estate would receive the whole amount thereof, while in the other case he would receive but $19,800, which seems manifestly unequal and unjust. If the statute exempted $20,000 (or any other sum) of every estate from taxation, it would, in our judgment, be equal and valid, even in imposing a graded tax, as it does. But, as it stands, we are of the opinion that it violates the principle of uniformity and equality which must be found in all laws imposing taxes of every kind.” 70 But such act was held not in conflict with the constitution," providing that "all laws of a general nature shall have a uniform operation throughout the state." 2 Upon appeal to the supreme court,* Burke, J., held that the act, by its exemption from taxation of the right to receive or succeed to estates not exceeding $20,000 in value, and taxing the whole right of receiving or succeeding to estates which exceed that sum in value, and in taxing at a higher rate per centum the right to receive or succeed to estates of larger value than to estates of smaller value, was in conflict with section 2 of the bill of rights of the constitution of Ohio, declaring that "all political power is inherent in the people. Government is instituted for their equal protection and benefit"; and the whole act was 70 State v. Ferris, supra. 71 Const. Ohio, art. 11, § 26. 72 State v. Ferris, supra. therefore declared unconstitutional and void. It was also held that the first section of the fourteenth amendment to the federal constitution, providing that no state shall "deny to any person the equal protection of the laws," was not broader than the second section of the state bill of rights. A statute somewhat similar to that of Ohio is now in force in Illinois, having gone into effect July 1, 1895.73 * 19. Double Taxation. There is nothing in the federal constitution that forbids double or unequal taxation by a state. Hence, the privilege under these laws may be taxed, although the property is also taxed; 75 and it makes no difference that the same tax is imposed upon the succession in another state.76 The result of double taxation, however, is one which the courts are inclined to avoid, whenever it is possible, within reason, to do so.77 73 See statute, Appendix, X. 74 Davidson v. New Orleans, 96 U. S. 97-106; In re Enston's Will, 113 N. Y. 182, 21 N. E. 87; Bemis v. Boston, 14 Allen, 368; People v. Coleman, 119 N. Y. 137, 23 N. E. 488. As to dotible taxation, se 5 Political Science Quarterly (Dec., 1890) 637. 75 Eyre v. Jacob, 14 Grat. 427. Contra, Curry v. Spencer, 61 N. H. 630. 76 Com. v. Sharpless, 2 Chest. Co. Rep. (Pa.) 246; Com. v. Schumacher, 9 Lancaster Bar (Pa.) 199. But see In re Enston's Will, supra; Bonaparte v. Tax Court, 104 U. S. 595; In re Strong, 17 N. J. Law J. 234. 77 In re James (1894) 144 N. Y. 6, 38 N. E. 961, affirming 77 Hun, 213, 28 N. Y. Supp. 351, and 6 Misc. Rep. 206, 27 N. Y. Supp. 288. See In re Coleman's Estate (1893) 159 Pa. St. 231, 28 Atl. 137. (50) § 20. Not a Taking of Private Property, etc. Nor is it a taking of private property without compensation.78 80 The statute of Maine 79 does not conflict with the state constitution prohibiting the taking of private property for public uses without just compensation. The latter provision is limited to the exercise of the right of eminent domain, and does not extend to the subject of taxation.81 82 Nor does this statute conflict with the constitution of the state, that no person shall be deprived of his property or privileges but by judgment of his peers, or by the law of the land.83 The provisions of the New York constitution, that no person shall be deprived of property without due process of law, nor property taken for public use without just compensation, have no application to the exercise of the taxing power. 84 § 21. Need not State Object of Tax. It is not necessary that the act should state the object of the tax, or to what purpose it is to be applied, under the New York constitution, as that provision was only intended to apply to the annually recurring taxes known at the time of the constitution's adoption.85 In Michigan, however, a 78 Strode v. Com. (1866) 52 Pa. St. 186; People v. Mayor, etc., of Brooklyn, 4 N. Y. 419. 79 Appendix, V. 80 Article 1, § 21. 81 State v. Hamlin (1894) 86 Me. 501, 30 Atl. 76. 82 Article 1, § 6. 83 State v. Hamlin, supra. 84 People v. Mayor, etc., of Brooklyn, supra. 85 In re McPherson, 104 N. Y. 306, 10 N. E. 685; s. p., Eyre v. Jacob, 14 Grat. 427. statute was held void for failure to distinctly state the tax and the object to which it was to be applied.86 And in New Jersey the statutes 87 have been declared unconstitutional and void so far as they attempt to tax devises of land, for the reason that the titles of the acts do not express a purpose to include real estate.88 The defect indicated is, however, avoided by the act of 1894, but this statute does not apply to property passing by will before the act was approved.‡ § 22. As to Notice and Hearing. But parties against whom it is sought to assess the tax have a constitutional right to notice, and to an opportunity for a hearing upon the assessment. It would seem that all the statutes upon this subject sufficiently provide for such notice and hearing, so as to obviate any constitutional objection, either under the state constitutions or under the fourteenth amendment to the federal constitution.S9 The statute of Maine 9o does not conflict with the latter provision. 91 "The act 1 provides for an appraisal of the estate subject So Const. Mich. art. 14, § 14; Chambe v. Durfee (1894) 100 Mich. 112, 58 N. W. 661. 87 See Appendix, II. 88 Van Riper v. Happenheimer, 17 N. J. Law J. (Feb., 1894) 49; In re Dobermiller, Id. (Dec., 1894) 378. Appendix, II. State v. Hancock (N. J.; 1895) 32 Atl. 689. 89 Cooley, Tax'n (2d Ed.) 362, 363; In re McPherson, 104 N. Y. 306, 10 N. E. 685; Wallace v. Myers, 38 Fed. 184, citing Railroad Co. v. Richmond, 96 U. S. 521; Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U. S. 27, 5 Sup. Ct. 357; Wurts v. Hoagland, 114 U. S. 606, 5 Sup. Ct. 1086; Kentucky Railroad Tax Cases, 115 U. S. 321, 6 Sup. Ct. 57; State v. Hamlin (1894) 86 Me. 507, 30 Atl. 76. 90 See Appendix, V. 91 Section 12, Appendix, V to the excise, upon application to the probate court, by the state assessors, or any person interested in the estate; and 92 the probate court having jurisdiction of the settlement of the estate is authorized to hear and determine all questions in relation to said tax that may arise,' etc., 'subject to appeal as in other cases.' These provisions fully secure the rights of all parties interested, and satisfy the requirements of due process of law.'" 93 § 23. Due Process of Law not Violated. Nor do these statutes violate the provisions of the fourteenth amendment to the constitution, prohibiting any state from depriving any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law.** The provisions of the New York constitution that no person shall be deprived of property without due process of law, nor property taken for public use without just compensation, have no application to the exercise of the taxing power.95 97 The statute of Maine 96 does not conflict with the state constitution, providing that no person shall be deprived of his property or privileges but by judgment of his peers, or by the law of the land.98 Nor does this statute conflict with the provision of the fourteenth amendment to the constitution of the United States, providing that "no state shall make or enforce any 92 Section 13. 93 State v. Hamlin (1894) 86 Me. 507, 30 Atl. 76. 94 In re McPherson, 104 N. Y. 306, 10 N. E. 685; State v. Hamlin, supra. 95 People v. Mayor of Brooklyn, 4 N. Y. 419. 96 Appendix, V. 97 Article 1, § 6. 98 State v. Hamlin, supra |