1825. INSTRUCTIONS TO OUR MINISTER TO SPAIN. 437 pation of the slaves, and that the existence of a republic full of free negroes just off the coast of our slave States would be a source of constant danger to the South, seemed almost certain. Such a change in the condition of these islands must therefore be prevented at all hazards, and this Clay now undertook to do. Mr. Everett, our Minister at Madrid, was instructed to bring the subject of the war to the attention of the Spanish Government.* He was to remind it that the struggle on this continent was at an end, that not one foot of land from the southern and western limits of the United States to Cape Horn owned the sway of Spain, that not one bayonet in all that vast domain remained to support her cause, nor was the peninsula able to replace the armies vanquished and annihilated by the victorious forces of the republics. The troops of these new states, flushed with victory, no longer had employment on the continent, and yet while the war continued they could not be disbanded. To what object, then, would the republics direct their conquering arms? To Cuba and Porto Rico. It was not, then, in the interest of the republics that the President wished to see the war ended. They would be the gainers by a continuance. It was for Spain herself, for humanity, for the general repose of the world, that Mr. Everett was to urge Spain to end the strife. As to the United States, he was to say that we were "satisfied with the present condition of the islands in the hands of Spain "; that we “desired no political change in that condition." Mr. Middleton, at St. Petersburg, was next instructed to ask the Russian Government to use its best efforts to persuade Spain to end the war with her old colonies. The contest had gone on for seventeen years, had been marked in its early stages by shocking excesses on both sides, and during its continuance whole generations had passed away and others had grown to majority without knowing the blessings of peace. In this war the people of the United States had taken no part. They had been strictly neutral, but it could not be said they were indifferent spectators. Mr. Middleton was to urge on the Russian Government the hopelessness of the attempt to conquer South America, and impress the Emperor with the fact that only by a speedy peace could Cuba and Porto Rico be saved to Spain, in whose hands the United States was quite content to have them remain.* Russia would do nothing. Neither justice, nor the law of nations, nor the respect due to the authority of a mother country over her colonies would, the Emperor replied, permit him to offer mediation till the sentiments of Spain and of the Allies she had long been in the habit of consulting had first been ascertained.† Stripped of its diplomatic garb, the answer was understood to mean that the Emperor would consult the Allies and act accordingly; and, with the hope of aiding the negotiations yet further, Clay turned to the Ministers from Colombia and Mexico. They were informed of the request made to the Emperor, of his reply, of the conviction that Spain would soon yield, and were asked to urge their governments, in the interests of peace, to suspend the sailing of an expedition, then fitting out at Cartagena, against Cuba and Porto Rico. Such a suspension was due to the Emperor, to the United States, and would render it unnecessary for other powers to consider what they would do if the islands were invaded. Just what this meant Clay now explained in a letter to Mr. Middleton. "On this matter," said he, "it is necessary that we should be clearly understood by Russia. For ourselves, we desire no change in the possession of Cuba. We cannot allow a transfer of the island to any European power. But if Spain should refuse to conclude a peace and obstinately go on with the war, although we do not desire to see Cuba in the possession of either Mexico or Colombia, the President cannot see any ground on which we can interfere. If the war against the island should be conducted by the republics in a desolating manner; if they should put arms into the hands of one race of the inhabitants to destroy the lives of * Clay to Middleton, May 10, 1825. Nesselrode to Middleton, August 20, 1825. 1825. INSTRUCTIONS TO THE MEXICAN MINISTER. 439 another; if, in fine, they should set examples which, from our neighborhood, would be dangerous to our quiet and safety, the Government of the United States might feel called on to interpose its power."* In plain language, if the Republi"In cans of South America invaded Cuba, stirred up a slave insurrection, and armed the negroes, the United States would interfere. One thing was settled. Slavery must not be abolished in Cuba and Porto Rico, and to keep the islands slave soil they must remain in the possession of Spain. But it was not to Russia alone that this policy was announced. Like declarations had already been made to Great Britain, France, and Mexico. During the summer of 1825 a great French fleet suddenly appeared off the coast of Cuba, and gave color to the belief that it was the intention of France to seize the island and hold it for herself, or perhaps for Spain. Rumor went so far as to assert that, once in the hands of France, Cuba was to be made the base of action for an attack on Mexico and subjection of her to the Crown of Spain. Greatly alarmed at the prospect, Mexico instantly turned to the United States and asked for an application of the Monroe Doctrine in her behalf. Clay had been but a few weeks in office when it became his duty to instruct Joel R. Poinsett, the first Minister ever sent by our country to Mexico. The novelty of the situation appealed strongly to Clay, and in his instructions he dwelt at length on this fact, bade Poinsett remind Mexico of the warm feeling always entertained toward her by the people of the United States, of the promptness with which we recognized her independence, and of the step on our part which did so much to stop interference in her affairs by the Holy Allies. Mr. Poinsett was especially to bring to the attention of Mexico the message of Monroe of December, 1823, in which were asserted certain important principles of "inter-continental law in the relations of Europe and America," and urge on her the utility and expediency of asserting two of them on all proper occasions. These were that the American continents are not henceforth to be considered subject to coloni * Clay to Middleton, December 26, 1825. zation by any European power, and that we should regard as dangerous to our peace and safety any attempt on the part of the allied powers to extend their system to any portion of this hemisphere.* Obedient to instructions, Poinsett opened negotiations for a treaty of commerce, presented what Clay called the two principles of inter-continental law, and had scarcely done so when news reached Mexico that a French squadron was off the coast of Cuba, and her Secretary of State requested the United States to demand an explanation from the King of France.t That Clay was influenced by Mexico's appeal may well be doubted; nevertheless, he acted and bade our Minister at Paris protest against the appearance of so large a fleet off our coast without any previous statement of its purpose, and to add to the assurances already given that we did not want Cuba and Porto Rico for ourselves, that we were satisfied with their present political condition, and could not, with indifference, see them pass from Spain to any other European power, the further avowal that we could not consent to the occupation of them by any other European power than Spain under any contingency whatever.‡ Nor was this an idle threat. A few days later, when writing to Poinsett, the Secretary returned to his statement, sent him a copy, and told him to read it to the Mexican representatives as an indication of what the United States would have done had the contingency happened.* It was now the month of November, by which time the Ministers of Mexico, Colombia, and Guatemala, having heard from their respective governments, returned to Clay with a formal invitation to the United States to be represented at Panama, and with statements of the matters to be discussed before the Congress. Mexico suggested the kind of opposition to be made to colonization in America by European powers, and the sort of resistance to be offered to the * Clay to Poinsett, March 25, 1825. 1825. CONGRESS AT PANAMA. 441 interference of any neutral in the war between the young republics and Spain. Colombia approved these and added two more the independence of the negro republic of Hayti and a consideration of the means to be used for the abolition of the slave-trade. Guatemala urged that, as the powers of the Old World had formed a continental system and held congresses to consider their interests, the republics of the New World should meet, form an American system, and discuss American interests. Though the answers were far from satisfactory, Adams accepted the invitation, and in his annual message aroused his enemies with the statement that "Ministers will be commissioned to attend." The purposes for which the Congress at Panama had been called were well known to him. He had the answers of the Ministers, and he had, besides, seen, in a copy of the official Gazette of Colombia, a plain statement of what the Congress was expected to do. It was "to form a solemn compact or league by which the states whose representatives are present will be bound" to wage war against Spain or any other power that attempts to assist her; to consider the expediency of uniting to free Cuba and Porto Rico; to discuss the wisdom of joining in a war at sea and on the coast of Spain; to consider what should be done to give effect to the declaration of Monroe that the American continents are closed to European colonization; and to decide what should be done to resist foreign interference in the domestic affairs of American governments. But Adams ignored these matters, and, in a special message to the Senate, suggested very different objects for discussion and named two envoys extraordinary and a secretary to attend the Congress.* Of his constitutional right to accept the invitation he had, he said, no doubt. Yet it seemed wise, before taking so important a step, to be sure that the Senate, by confirming his nominations, and the House, by voting an appropriation, concurred in the expediency of the The United States neither intended nor were ex measure. * Richard C. Anderson, John Sergeant, William B. Rochester, secretary. |