1820.

THE SOUTH AMERICAN REPUBLICS.

41

that henceforth all "useful or necessary changes in the legislation and administration of states must emanate alone from the free will, the reflecting and enlightened impulse of those whom God has rendered responsible for power!"

Tidings of the collapse of absolute government in Spain reached the United States in March, 1820, and were welcomed with unconcealed delight. The cause of the republics of South America became more than ever the cause of liberty and constitutional government, and found no warmer champion in all the land than Henry Clay. The time to be neutral had, in his opinion, long passed, and determined to force the administration from its position of neutrality, he demanded a speedy recognition of the independence of the young republics. Toward this end the House, over which he presided as Speaker, could do little, but that little he easily persuaded it to do, and in May secured the passage of a resolution that it was expedient to provide a suitable outfit and salary for such Ministers as the President might send to any of the governments of South America which had established and were maintaining their independence of Spain.*

Monroe saw fit to send none. He was anxiously awaiting the ratification of the treaty of 1819 by Spain, and was determined to do nothing likely to give Ferdinand an excuse for withholding his signature. He was sure, he told Congress, that the powers of Europe would take no part in the struggle; he was confident that an adjustment of the dispute would soon be reached; and he was ready by friendly counsels with Spain or other powers to promote that result in every way. But Clay was not to be turned from his purpose, and with the words of the President still ringing in his ears moved an appropriation for sending a Minister or Ministers to South America. When this was lost by a small majority, he promptly brought in a resolution that the House of Representatives shared with the people of the United

* Resolved, That it is expedient to provide by law a suitable outfit and salary for such Minister or Ministers as the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, may send to any of the governments of South America which have established and are maintaining their independence of Spain. Moved April 3, 1820; carried May 9; yeas 80, nays 75.

States in the deep interest they felt for the Spanish provinces of South America struggling for liberty and independence, and that whenever the President deemed it proper to recognize the sovereignty and independence of any of them the House would give him its constitutional support. The longdeferred Spanish treaty had now been ratified, and, as the passage of the resolution, which was a mere expression of a wish, could do no harm, the House passed it by fine majorities,* and sent Clay at the head of a committee to deliver it to the President. But Monroe was not to be driven by Clay. He took his own time, and allowed a year to go by before, on the eighth of March, 1822, he recommended recognition. Late in January the House, weary with the dilatoriness of the President, undertook to spur him on to action by a call for information concerning the political condition of the South American provinces of Spain and the state of the war between them and the mother country. In transmitting the report of Adams, the President reviewed at great length the history of the revolts and declarations of independence by Mexico, Chili, Peru, Buenos Ayres, and Colombia, and gave it as his opinion that, as Spain after so many years of trial had failed to reduce them to obedience, they were actually in a state of independence which ought to be recognized. The message ended with a suggestion that an appropriation should be made to enable him to send ministers. In this the House gladly concurred with but one dissenting vote, and then unanimously appropriated one hundred thousand dollars. The Senate agreed to the bill some weeks later, and on May fourth, 1822, Monroe signed it.

No act of that session was so popular. Members of the House who were absent when the first vote was taken hastened to have their names entered among the yeas. Clay

The resolution was divided. On the first part, expression of sympathy, the yeas were 134, the nays 12. On the second part, tendering constitutional support, the yeas were 87, the nays 68.

Resolved, That the House of Representatives concurs in the opinion expressed by the President in his message of March 8, 1822, that the American provinces of Spain which have declared their independence and are in the enjoyment of it ought to be recognized by the United States as independent States.

1822.

GREAT BRITAIN AND THE REPUBLICS.

43

was the hero of the hour. The people everywhere sanctioned the recognition, and began to believe that necessity might drive the republics of the New World into an alliance for the preservation in America of the liberal ideas and democratic institutions the Holy Allies were so successfully stamping out in Europe.

When the Congress at Laybach adjourned in 1821, it did so with the understanding that it should meet again in 1822. That the question of intervention in the affairs of Spain would then come up, and that when it did, Great Britain would have much to say, was well known to the powers. What they would do might be doubtful, but the course she should pursue was to her certain. She would leave the revolution in Spain to run its course; she would urge the European powers to do the same, and, following her own interests, would acknowledge the independence of the Spanish South American colonies. A trade so great had sprung up with them that it was impossible to put off the day when she must have in each, if not a minister, at least a diplomatic agent. Such a policy ran so directly counter to the wishes of the Holy Alliance that it was felt to be necessary that her position should be upheld by her foremost diplomat. The Prime Minister, Lord Castlereagh, was accordingly chosen to represent her. In the instructions which he drew up for himself, and which the Cabinet and the King approved, he was commanded to inform the Congress that it was the intention of England to send accredited agents to some of the South American republics, which meant a steady opposition on England's part to any intervention by the Holy Alliance. Unhappily, when the Congress met at Vienna, in September, Castlereagh was dead, Canning was Prime Minister, and the Duke of Wellington was England's representative.

After a short session at Vienna, the Congress adjourned to Verona, where, in October, 1822, the affairs of Spain were carefully considered. No declaration was made in the name of the Alliance, but an agreement was entered into that certain changes should be demanded in the Spanish Constitution, and, if not granted, the French army, supported, if

necessary, by Russia, Austria, and Prussia, should invade Spain.

The demand was made and was refused; the ambassadors of the members of the Holy Alliance left Madrid, and on April seventh, 1823, a French army, led by the Duke of Angoulême, crossed the frontier and entered Spain.*

That moment Canning began to act. He knew, as everybody knew, that when the allies had once settled the affairs of Spain they would go on and settle those of her former colonies, now recognized as republics by the United States. Turning to Richard Rush, who represented our country at London, he proposed that the United States should join with England in a declaration that, while neither power desired the colonies of Spain for herself, it was impossible to look with indifference on European intervention in their affairs, or to see them acquired by a third power. Hardly had the request been made when Canning received a formal notice that later in the year a Congress would be called to consider the affairs of Spanish America, and again pressed Rush for an answer. Rush had no instructions, but with a courage that did him honor, he replied that "we should regard as highly unjust and as fruitful of disastrous consequences any attempt on the part of any European power to take possession of them by conquest, by cession, or on any other ground or pretext whatsoever," and promised to join in the declaration if England would first acknowledge the independence of the little republics. This she would not do, and the joint declaration was never made.

* While this army was on its march, Albert Gallatin, our Minister at Paris, made this remarkable announcement to Chateaubriand: "The United States would undoubtedly preserve their neutrality, provided it was respected, and avoid every interference with the politics of Europe. Even in the questions connected with South America they had not interfered, and, although their wishes were not doubtful, they had neither excited nor assisted the Spanish colonies. But I had every reason to believe that, on the other hand, they would not suffer others to interfere against the emancipation of America. If France was successful in her attack on Spain, and afterward attempted either to take possession of some of her colonies or to assist her in reducing them under their former yoke, I was of opinion that the United States would oppose every undertaking of this kind.”—Albert Gallatin, Writings, vol. ii, p. 271, May 13, 1823.

1823.

JEFFERSON'S ADVICE.

45

When Monroe received the letters of Rush relating the details of the proposition for a joint declaration, he seems to have been greatly puzzled how to act. The suggestion of England that the time had come to make a declaration of some sort admitted of no dispute. But how was it to be made? If he joined with Great Britain would he not be forming one of the "political connections" Washington had denounced in his "Farewell Address "; one of the "entangling alliances" of which Jefferson had given warning in his first inaugural speech? Should he make it alone, would he not be violating that policy of non-interference in the affairs of the colonies which he had himself advised in six messages and two inaugural speeches? Uncertain what to do, he turned to Jefferson for advice, sent the letters of Rush to Monticello, and late in October received a reply.

"The question presented by the letters you have sent me is the most momentous which has ever been offered to my contemplation since that of Independence. That made us a nation; this sets our compass and points the course which we are to steer through the ocean of time opening on us. And never could we embark upon it under circumstances more auspicious. Our first and fundamental maxim should be, never to entangle ourselves in the broils of Europe; our second, never to suffer Europe to intermeddle with cisatlantic affairs. America, North and South, has a set of interests distinct from those of Europe, and peculiarly her own. She should therefore have a system of her own, separate and apart from that of Europe. While the last is laboring to become the domicile of despotism, our endeavor should surely be to make our hemisphere that of freedom."

As soon as Jefferson had written his answer, he forwarded the letters of Rush to Madison at Montpelier, and from him Monroe received assurance that "there ought not to be any backwardness in meeting her in the way she has proposed."

Thus encouraged, not simply to meet an emergency, but to "point the course which we are to steer through the ocean of time opening on us," Monroe consulted his Secretaries. During the month of November not a week went by but a Cabinet discussion was held on the matter, and it was at one