Taxation and Finance 367 the multitudinous detailed expenditures for which they must provide.' But, of course, it is impossible for the several committees, in the time at their disposal, to give even minor matters the amount of attention demanded by sound public economy. "The machinery provided by Congress," said Mr. Littauer 2 in 1906, "for the examination of accounts and expenditures, of economy, justness, correctness of expenditures, of conformity with appropriation law, of retrenchment, abolishment of useless offices, of the reduction and increase of pay of officers is evidently not in working order; at any rate some gear is out of place which needs looking after by the engineers in charge. Without some aid from those who have made examinations of the actual conduct of expenditures in the bureaus, your committee on appropriations probes away, in ascertaining these facts, largely in the dark. We follow up leads which come to us through rumors or through our own experience and casual observation. Our efforts in forming such an appropriation bill as this toward getting at necessary facts can amount to nothing but a scratch on the surface, astounding though such revelations scratched up actually are.' Recognizing the uncertain character of the estimates for appropriations Congress, by a law passed in 1909, has attempted to throw upon the President the burden of suggesting ways and means for balancing accounts which will compel him to look more sharply into the cost of national administration. Indeed the first signs of this result were manifested in Mr. Taft's message of December 7, 1909. He called the attention of Congress to the fact that the estimates submitted had been cut to the quick and that, in order to bring down expenditures, he had instituted a searching investigation into public business methods with a view to a reorganization of the service in the interests of economy and efficiency. Not only do the respect ve committees on appropriations have great difficulty in securing proper estimates for public expenditures; they are under constant pressure from every hand to increase the amounts which they recommend to the House for adoption. Every government interest is represented in this pressure for larger appropriations. A new bureau is created and it inevitably wishes to widen the range of its work and to increase 1 Readings, p. 338, for an interesting example of methods. 3 بع メ こ the salaries of its employees. Army and naval officers, loyal to their branch of the service, are always demanding larger and larger appropriations. Then there is the interminable list of appropriations forced upon Congress through log-rolling-appropriations for post-offices, river and harbor improvements, naval stations, docks, and other public works which redound to the advantage of specific localities.1 More than once members have protested against this system. "This practice," exclaimed Mr. Cannon in the House in 1902, "of going from committee to committee that, under the rules of the House, has jurisdiction, and then before the matter has been investigated, by the aid of a willing Senate, failing in one place, rushing to another that has not jurisdiction, and sticking in amendments here, there, and yonder ought to be done away with. Appropriation for the next year, appropriation for this year, legislation here, legislation there. If action is continued along these lines it will demoralize the matter of appropriation and bring scandal and criticism-deserved criticismfrom the people of the country."2 Nevertheless, the system continues, and the interests that are constantly seeking large appropriations fight against every attempt at reform. As a result, the committees are subject to a thousand demands for increased expenditures to every one that comes on behalf of economy. Moreover, each committee, jealous of its own prerogatives, is anxious to carry its own bills through the House. Consequently the Treasury of the United States is under constant and relentless attack; its defenders are few in number and the implements of defence are wholly inadequate to the task. When an interest seeking a new or increased appropriation fails in one committee of the House it goes to another; failing in the House, it repeats the same process in the Senate; and, under the system of divided responsibility which exists, it is generally successful. "There is no selfish interest on the side of economy," declared Mr. Gillett in the House, in 1905, "while every member has pressure from home for increased expenditure, and naturally the government suffers. Experience on the appropriations committee, when one sees how defenceless the Treasury is against the constant assaults upon it, is bound to make a man an economist unless he reaches that hopeless stage where he concludes that resistance is 2 Reinsch, Readings, p. 203. 1 See above, p. 269. vain, and that he might as well join the scramble, take what he can, and wait for the deluge." 1 The English House of Commons solved this problem, early in the eighteenth century, by standing orders providing that the House would not consider any motion involving a charge upon the public revenue unless recommended by the crown - which means to-day, unless recommended by the Cabinet of responsible ministers representing the majority and definitely responsible to the country and to a party for its policies and achievements. This system has been adopted by the self-governing colonies of the British empire.2 A slight step in the direction of concentrated financial responsibility in the federal government was made in 1909 by the act of Congress, mentioned above, which seems to have attracted slight public interest, but which may prove a turning-point in the history of federal finances. Under this act the Secretary of the Treasury is required to collect from all the executive departments their 'Reinsch, Readings, p. 357. The tendency to increase is illustrated by this official statement of appropriations, fiscal years 1907, 1908, and 1909. и estimates of the expenditures necessary for the ensuing fiscal year and then to estimate the probable revenues of the government for the same period. The act provides that it shall then be the duty of the President of the United States, in case a probable deficit is shown by the Treasurer's estimates, to recommend the methods by which the deficit may be met. Obviously the rush on the Treasury must be checked, and as Congress is apparently unable to meet the problem, it seems to be calling in executive help, which also implies executive responsibility in a large measure. Congress is, therefore, not unaware of the chaotic condition of national finances, and within the last few months the whole problem has been somewhat thoroughly discussed in both houses. Mr. Tawney, of the appropriations committee, has declared that $50,000,000 a year is being wasted by present methods, and Mr. Aldrich, of the finance committee in the Senate, puts the amount at $300,000,000 a year. During the special session of 1909, the Senate created a public expenditures committee with more important and extensive duties than any such committee has enjoyed since the beginning of our history. This committee, in February, 1910, reported to the Senate a bill creating a Business Methods Commission to consist of three Senators, three Representatives, and three members appointed by the President, and authorized to go into the whole matter of national finance with searching scrutiny and prepare plans for putting our budgetmaking on a sound basis. The actual work of preparing an appropriation bill is undertaken by the committee having that specific matter in charge. The general committee on appropriations is divided into several sub-committees, each one of which prepares one or more measures. Usually, the sub-committees hold hearings, at which the heads of the various departments and chiefs of bureaus may explain their needs. The measures prepared by these sub-committees are then brought together in one group and considered by the whole committee. The chairman of the committee on appropriations, in order to have at least some supervision over the other committees in charge of appropriations, appoints a few members of his group to watch all of the appropriation measures, but this control is only slight it does not in any way work an effective coördination of the spending groups in the House of Representatives. When an appropriation bill is reported by a committee, it is placed on the union calendar. On the proper occasion the bill is called up by the member having it in charge, and the House, in going into the committee of the whole for its consideration, agrees that a certain time shall be allowed for debate. This time is equally divided between the two parties in the House, and it is devoted to a general discussion, during which speeches are usually made on almost any subject. After the general discussion, there is a debate under the five-minute rule; the bill is considered section by section, and any member is allowed to introduce an amendment and speak on it five minutes. When these general and detailed discussions are finished, the committee of the whole rises and reports the bill to the House, with the amendments made in the committee; and it is then passed in the House as a rule under the previous question; that is, without debate. Appropriation bills, when passed by the House, are transmitted to the Senate, and with some exceptions are referred to the committee on appropriations in that body. Bureau chiefs1 and other persons, who were unsuccessful in obtaining increased or new appropriations in the House, immediately begin to besiege the Senate committees. Appropriation bills are debated in the Senate with more freedom than obtains in the House, and this freedom enables any Senator who desires some particular appropriation for his state to threaten to "talk the bill to death" unless his terms are conceded. It is, accordingly, a general practice for the Senate to increase very materially the appropriations adopted by the House. For example, it added to the House bills for the year 1907-08 sums amounting to more than $70,000,000. As in the case of tariff bills, differences between the Senate and the House are adjusted by a conference committee representing the two bodies. The result is always a compromise which is accepted, as a rule, without reopening the discussion. We find here the same lack of responsibility and coördination which occurs in the case of revenue measures, and a total failure of anything like a proper adjustment of revenues and expenditures. In Great Britain, the budget, embracing the estimated expenditures and the revenue measures to meet them, is prepared under This is forbidden by recent executive order (except with the consent of the head of the department); but it remains to be seen how effective this order will be. Above, p. 213. |