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bear on behalf of certain institutions, such as the tenement, health, and school departments, to have an adequate opportunity to be heard by the public authorities in charge of making up the budget. In New York City, the law provides for hearings by the board of estimate and apportionment and it is a common practice for the various departments, taxpayers' associations, and other interests in the city to present their claims. Advocates of improvement in our educational methods, those who wish to see more searching tenement-house and sanitary inspection, those who want new systems of transportation, and all other groups desiring the city to undertake or extend or curtail any particular functions, may present their respective demands before this board. Unfortunately, however, the public does not realize the importance of budget-making, and we are sadly in need of general education with regard to the proper expenditure of municipal


The second aspect of budget-making is largely concerned with technical matters the effective execution of the public will in the disbursement of funds; but even here the influence of the public should be brought to bear in order to secure scrutiny and publicity. The charter-makers of New York City attempt to provide for this side of financial administration by creating commissioners of accounts,' but their purpose has not been realized in practice. Boston has attempted publicity through the commission appointed by the governor with full power to investigate the expenditure of money in the city.

On this technical side certain positive demands are being made in the name of efficiency. A uniform system of bookkeeping should be established in all departments, and when the budgetmaking authority desires to secure specific information from them it ought to send out uniform questions and secure uniform answers, "so that the salary changes and costs of supplies and repairs, etc., will mean the same thing in all estimates, for each department, and for each main division of work." The estimates for pay-rolls and general maintenance for each department should be made on an annual, not a monthly, basis. When increases in pay-rolls are demanded, it should be specifically stated whether

1 See Readings, p. 520.

2 See How Should Public Budgets Be Made? Bureau of Municipal Research, New York City.

the increases are for additional employees or for higher salaries. The tentative estimates of each department containing great specific detail should be prepared in advance and made available to the public a considerable period before the actual making of the budget.

To enable the public to play its part in the framing of the budget, it is necessary for civic bodies to be active in laying before the people in various ways, especially through the press, the salient features of general interest in the proposed budget. While the estimates are still in tentative form, public hearings should be granted, and after the whole budget is ready for its final adoption its principal features should be made public again, and further hearings granted. It is also suggested that, in connection with the publication of the leading items of the tentative budget, statements should be made with regard to those demands of the citizens which had been rejected.

Public control should extend beyond the making of the budget to the disbursement of funds, because it is a common practice for public officers to use funds for other purposes than those indicated in the actual appropriation. It is suggested, therefore, that "a resolution should accompany every budget to the effect that moneys therein appropriated may not be used for other purposes without authority from the appropriating body and without due notice to the public." To prevent the head of any department from spending his allowances early in the fiscal year and becoming bankrupt later, the amounts voted for each payroll should be so divided that the disbursements for any one month do not exceed one-twelfth of the total annual appropriation. Finally, "to make possible these steps and to make certain their execution, it is necessary to have from the first day of the year in all of the departments modern business methods of describing work done when done, and money spent when spent, plus methods of inspection and of audit to see that the rules are complied with and the truth told." 2

1 The city comptroller of New York is now instructed to supervise the monthly pay-rolls and to see that the sums of money voted are expended for the purposes for which they were designed.

2 On taxation, see below, chap. xxxi.

Police Administration

A primary function of a municipality, of course, is the exercise of the police power in its narrowest sense; that is, the enforcement of the law against thieves, burglars, murderers, incendiaries, and criminals of every type, high and low. This work is intrusted to the police force; and in America the police is regarded as a branch of local government, although in a few states a somewhat strict control is placed in the hands of the central administration. The New York legislature, for example, in 1857, combined New York City, Brooklyn, and some contiguous areas into a single metropolitan police district under the supervision of a state commission, but thirteen years later the scheme was abolished. There is to-day, however, a special division of police charged with enforcing the election law in the metropolis and placed under the control of a state commissioner appointed by the governor. In Baltimore, St. Louis, and Boston the police boards are branches of the state administration. In Pennsylvania and some other commonwealths there is a special state police force.

It is pointed out in defence of the state system of control that in the present condition of American politics the police department too often falls under the control of the vicious elements of the population against which it is supposed to enforce the law. The governor of Massachusetts said in 1868, "It is apparent that public decency and order and public justice require the maintenance of an executive body which shall not be controlled by the public sentiment of any locality, and which shall be competent in its spirit, its discipline, and its members to a reasonable and judicious but just and impartial enforcement of the statutes of the commonwealth.”1

1 Quoted in Goodnow, Municipal Government, 260. Professor A. R. Hatton, in a paper read before the National Municipal League in 1909, made the following suggestions for a plan of coördinating state and local police control:

1. Police commissioner in each city to be appointed by the mayor; term, during good behavior; removable by mayor after a public statement of charges.

2. Mayors, police commissioners, and sheriffs to be removed by the Governor after public statement, for delinquency or corruption.

3. A system of state inspection of local police.

4. A small but efficient state detective force under the supervision of the governor to assist him in keeping informed of local conditions.

5. Centralization of state inspection and detective work in a state bureau. Cincinnati Conference for Good City Government, 1909, pp. 157 ff.

It is the general practice in the United States, however, to vest the control of the police force in some local authority, but the greatest divergences have arisen in the construction of that authority. In the middle period of our municipal development the supervision of the police was generally intrusted to a board, which was, in some cities, made elective. The board system was popular for a time, largely because it secured representation for both political parties, which were supposed to watch and check each other. It was soon found by experience that instead of watching each other they frequently combined to divide the spoils. The board system, moreover, did not fix responsibility in any single person, and when charges of corruption and inefficiency were preferred, each member would plead not guilty, and very probably attempt to shift the burden to some other member. The difficulty of placing the responsibility at length led in most large cities to the abandonment of the board system and the concentration of supervision in the hands of a single officer appointed by the mayor.

In the city of New York, for example, the police commissioner is appointed by the mayor for a term of five years and he may be removed by the mayor at any time.' He is charged with the administration of the police department and the supervision of the police force; and in order to place full authority and responsibility on him, he is given power to appoint four deputy commissioners to assist him in his administrative duties and in the execution of his policy. This is undoubtedly a highly centralized

1 He may also be removed by the governor of the state.

2 This extract from an article by General Theodore A. Bingham, expolice commissioner of New York City, indicates one of the problems connected with the question of the tenure of office, which is commonly overlooked: "I found immediately that among the officers of the force there were very few I could trust to carry out my orders in good faith. The reason was very simple. I was head of the department for an indeterminate period, which might end at any time. Back of me was the mayor, who chose me, and whose office would also end at an early date. Back of him was the permanent political machine, which elected him. As the policeman is in office for life, he very logically looked past both the mayor and me and made his alliances and took his orders from the only permanent influence concerned -- the politician. I could not at that time even choose the leading officers of the department whom I wanted to carry out my orders. I was in command of a body of men who, by the logic of their position, were forced to take their final orders from some one else. That condition of affairs exists to-day, and

system, but if the police force is corrupt and the enforcement of the law is lax, the citizens know how to find a remedy they bring pressure to bear at once upon the mayor. On the whole, it has worked better than the board system.

The uniformed police force organized on a military basis is a somewhat recent development in the cities of western Europe. In the Middle Ages and well into the eighteenth century, the cities of England relied upon unpaid justices and constables; toward the end of the eighteenth century the practice of employing paid night watchmen was adopted; and at length in 1828 a constabulary force under commissioners appointed by the crown was established for London, in the face of bitter opposition to what was regarded as an inroad upon the liberties of the British citizens.1 As late as 1840, the city of New York had no regular patrol during daytime and relied largely at night upon watchmen who were otherwise employed during the day; and it was not until 1844 that a completely organized police force was adopted for that city. In the beginning, however, there was great opposition to wearing uniforms; but at length the requirement was made universal. Within a short time organized and uniformed police forces were created for Philadelphia, Boston, Baltimore, and other large cities, and distrust of the military feature disappeared entirely.

For the purpose of police administration, each city of any size is divided into precincts, or districts, in each of which there is a police station and a squad of men. The police force itself is organized on the military principle of graded authorities rising upward from the patrolman to the chief. In New York, for example, there is assigned to each precinct a group of patrolmen; above them there is a sergeant or roundsman who makes periodical tours of the district to see that the men in the rank are doing their duty; over this local force is placed a captain; and the whole city is under the supervision of the chief and his four deputies. For the purpose of facilitating central control, the city is laid out into large inspection districts in charge of special officers, known as inspectors, who are supposed to keep close watch on the conduct of the subordinates. And there is, in

will exist so long as the police commissioner of New York has no permanence in office." McClure's Magazine for November, 1909.

1 Reference: Fairlie, Municipal Administration, p. 131.

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