Opinion of the Court, per FOLGER, J. tion which would allow more than that sum, so far as an excess over that sum is concerned. But it is claimed, that it relates only to the compensation which may be retained from the State treasury, and not to that which any county may, under any law, elect to give a county treasurer. This, however, depends upon this notion: Is it not the purpose of the statutes and the practice of the government that, whatever compensation the county treasurer may receive for receiving and paying over the State tax, is to be paid in effect by the State, by the county treasurer retaining the same, from the payment made by him, on account of the State tax, to the State treasurer. We think that such is the law and the practice. Then the effect of those laws, which give to boards of supervisors the power to fix the compensation of county treasurers, is this: That they may fix it at so much to be paid by the State, and so much by the county. This being so, a general act, which limits the amount of compensation from the State treasury, is hostile and repugnant to an act which allows a local authority, to give a rate of compensation which will yield more to the officer for the receipt and payment of the State tax; and being so, the local act must fall pro tanto. We are, therefore, of the opinion that the board of supervisors of Westchester county may name a rate of compensation for the treasurer of that county as high as one per centum; but, if that will give him more than $2,000on the moneys paid by him to the State treasurer, it is inoperative above that amount as to those moneys, though, on all other moneys, it is operative in full, whatever may be the sum which the compensation reaches. It follows from this that the county treasurer in the case before us had no right to retain, as his fees, on receiving and paying over the State tax, more than $2,000; and that the board of supervisors erred in auditing his account made upon a different theory; and that the writ of mandamus was properly sent to them, unless some of the minor objections made by them are valid. It is said, (as one of these), that the writ will not remedy SICKELS.-VOL. XXVIII. 23 Opinion of the Court, per FOLGER, J the difficulty or afford the relief sought. It will remove the adjudication upon the accounts of the treasurer made by the board. This was made in a matter, and as to the accounts of an officer, where it had jurisdiction. It was not void; it was erroneous, as it proceeded on a wrong notion of the law. Thus, if the writ goes, the treasurer is left without the protection of that audit, and must answer to any authoritative tribunal upon the facts and the law of his case as they will appear. We do not think that the doctrine of Sup. of Chenango v. Birdsall (4 Wend., 453) applies in this case. That was a raking over, by action on the bond of a county treasurer, of his accounts for a series of years, after they had been passed upon and settled by the predecessors in office of the plaintiffs in that case. It was put upon the ground of a final settlement having been made, with knowledge of all the facts, and after the calming of differences of opinion as to the propriety of the charges made by him. The judgment was, that a subsequent board could not ignore that settlement and open the accounts again and sue. The case is different here. This is the same board which passed the resolution. A taxpayer intervenes, and asks the command of the court to that board to rectify a legal error into which it had fallen. Upon the whole then we are of the opinion that a writ of mandamus was authorized. It has been noticed that the amounts alleged, and admitted to have been retained by the treasurer, are not the same in the two affidavits. If the writ absolutely affected the amount, it would need to be amended; but it is in the alternative. It names the sum of $1,370.02; but it adds, “or any other sum which is in excess of the sum of $2,000.” The writ can be obeyed under our decision, by demanding of the treasurer, or by not auditing to him, the sum named in the defendants' affidavit. As the appellants have obtained something by their appeal, to wit, a reduction of the sums practically adjudged, they should pay no costs in this court; as they have not obtained all that they claimed, they should not recover costs here. Statement of case. And the order should be modified in accordance with these views, without costs to either party as against the other. All concur. Ordered accordingly. IN THE MATTER OF THE APPLICATION OF THE COMMON Proceedings were instituted by the common council of the city of Brooklyn under the act of 1871 (chapter 833, Laws of 1871), which authorized them to open and continue North Thirteenth street, from First street "to the East river, and to the permanent bulk-head line." While the proceedings were pending the act of 1873 (chapter 334, Laws of 1873) was passed, which it was claimed established a new bulk-head line over 200 feet beyond the line as it was at the time of the passage of the act of 1871. Held, that the intent of said act of 1871 was to open the street as a public highway to the waters of the East river, and the artificial shore as established by the bulk-head line; that it did not give an absolute and fixed boundary at the shore of the river as it then existed, but a shifting terminus at the shore as it might exist either by change in the natural banks or in the artificial shore; that conceding that the act of 1873 changed the bulk-head line, the law carried the street to the new river line; also that the act of 1871 was not repealed by implication by the act of 1873. It seems, that had the line been changed after the street had been opened and improved, the public would have had a right of way over the new made land to the river, and the charge of it as a public highway. Nominal damages only were allowed to P. & K., claimants for compensation. The deed under which P. claimed bounded the land conveyed by several streets, one of which was North Thirteenth street. A separate clause conveyed the interests of the grantees to the center line of the streets lying in front of and adjacent to the land conveyed, adding "of which streets North Thirteenth street has not been opened or ceded to the public." In the deed to K. one of the boundary lines is given as "the center line of a parcel of land called North Thirteenth street," although not opened as a street. It appeared that in 1871 the owners inclosed the land covered by the street, but whether before or after the passage of the act of that year above mentioned did not appear; nor did it appear by what authority the strip of land was designated and set aside as a street, or when dedicated. Held, that the deeds contained clear recognitions by grantors and grantees of the rights of the public in the land as a street; that if it was not in fact a public highway the onus 73 179 135 346 73 179 141 301 Statement of case. was upon the claimant for compensation to show that fact; that in the absence of evidence to the contrary, a dedication of the land was prop-erly found by the commissioners; that it could not be assumed that the inclosing the land was before the public acted upon and accepted the dedication by directing the opening of the street; and that the allowance of nominal damages only was proper. (Argued March 19, 1878; decided March 26, 1878.) APPEAL from order of the General Term of the Supreme Court, in the second judicial department, affirming an order of Special Term which confirmed the report of commissioners appointed to assess damages in proceedings instituted by the common council of the city of Brooklyn under chapter 833, Laws of 1871, for the opening of North Thirteenth street in said city. The appellants who were The Charles Pratt Manufacturing Company, Charles Pratt & Caroline Kloss, objected to the report on the ground that the act (chapter 334, Laws of 1873), by extending the bulk-head line rendered the opening as provided for by the act of 1871 impossible; that the two acts were inconsistent, and in consequence that the former act was repealed by the later. The appellants also objected to the confirmation of the report, on the ground that the compensation allowed was inadequate. The commissioners found as to one piece of land claimed by Charles Pratt and as to the piece claimed by Caroline Kloss in substance, that their title was subject to a dedication to the public use, and allowed only nominal damages; as to another parcel they awarded to Pratt, or the Pratt Manufacturing Company $30,000. The further facts appear sufficiently in the opinion. Everett P. Wheeler, for appellants. The bulk-head line mentioned in the statute was that established when it was passed. (Halsey v. McCormick, 18 N. Y., 147; White's Bank v. Nichols, 24 id., 65; Banks v. Ogden, 2 Wal., 57.) The act of 1871 (chap. 853) was repealed by the act of 1873 (chap. 334). (Sedgw. on Stat. Law [2 ed.], 104; Ex. Pet. Statement of case. Co. v. Lacy, 63 N. Y., 422; Pierce v. Delamater, 1 id., 16; People v. Mayor, 32 Barb., 102, 121.) The acceptance by the public of a street is not to be presumed but must be affirmatively proved. (Niagara Bridge Co. v. Bachman, 66 N. Y., 261; Fonda v. Borst, 2 Abb. Ct. App. Dec., 155; 2 Keyes 48; Holdane v. Cold Spring, 21 N. Y., 474; Cook v. Harris, 61 id., 448, 454; Badeau v. Holmes, 14 Barb., -328; 2 Washb. on R. E. [2d ed.], 580, 607; Maynard v. Maynard, 10 Mass., 456; Elsey v. Metcalf, 1 Den., 326.) The right of revocation may be exercised by the grantee of the land dedicated. (4 Kent's Com., 467, 468.) A change by the Legislature in the line of a dedicated street is a formal refusal by the public to accept the dedication, provided access to the land by some highway is preserved. (Underwood v. Stuyvesant, 19 J. R., 181; Sedgw. Const. Stat. [2d ed.], 554; People v. Green, 58 N. Y., 295; Bank of Hamil ton v. Dudley, 2 Pet., 526; People v. Lawrence, 36 Barb., 177, 191; Archer v. Whalen, 1 Wend., 179.) A dedication for one purpose is not a dedication for another. It is to be limited to the precise terms of the gift. (Heard v. City of Brooklyn, 60 N. Y., 242; In re Brooklyn Heights, 48 Barb., 288.) The commissioners were bound to state the principles on which they proceeded in making their award. (In re Flatbush Ave., 1 Barb., 286, 292; In re N. Y. C. R. R. Co., 6 Hun, 149.) Not only the value of the land used must be paid, but full compensation must be made for injury to the adjoining land. (Gerard on Titles [2d ed.], 41; In re Furman St., 17 Wend., 649, 671; 6 Hun, 149; In re Utica R. R. Co., 56 Barb., 456; A. and S. R. R. Co. v. Dayton, 10 Abb. Pr. [N. S.], 182; W. and R. R. R. Co. v. Stauffer, 60 Penn., 374; Carpenter v. Landiff, 42 N. H., 218; Hatch v. Vt. C. R. R. Co., 25 Vt., 49.) The bulk-head should be paid for. (In re Wall St., 17 Barb., 617.) William C. De Witt, for respondent. When a right of way is once established to a river it continues there over any projection of the land, interposed either naturally or artifi |