over offenses

ceded districts.

30.

When any offense is committed in any place, jurisdiction Jurisdiction over which has been retained by the United States or ceded committed in to it by a State, or which has been purchased with the con- July 7, 1898, v sent of a State for the erection of a fort, magazine, arsenal, dockyard, or other needful building or structure, the punishment for which offense is not provided for by any law of the United States, the person committing such offense shall, upon conviction in a circuit or district court of the United States for the district in which the offense was committed, be liable to and receive the same punishment as the laws of the State in which such place is situated now provide for the like offense when committed within the jurisdiction of such State, and the said courts are hereby vested with jurisdiction for such purpose; and no subsequent repeal of any such State law shall affect any such prosecution. Act of July 7, 1898.

SALE OF ABANDONED AND USELESS MILITARY RESER

VATIONS.

1211. That whenever, in the opinion of the President of the United States, the lands, or any portion of them, included within the limits of any military reservation heretofore or hereafter declared, have become or shall become useless for military purposes, he shall cause the same, or so much thereof as he may designate, to be placed under the control of the Secretary of the Interior for disposition as hereinafter provided, and shall cause to be filed with the Secretary of the Interior a notice thereof. Act of July 5, 1884 (23 Stat. L., 103).

instrumentalities, the legislative power of the State will be as full and complete as over any other places within her limits. Fort Leavenworth R. R. Co. v. Lowe, 114 U. S.. 525, 559. Where the absolute title to property remains in the United States, no matter for what purpose it is acquired or held, it is not subject to State or municipal taxation. Am. and Engl. Eney, of Law, vol. 25, p. 110, and cases cited.

The purchase of lands in a State by the General Government, with legislative consent, does not, ipso facto, confer upon the General Government exclusive juris diction, unless the purchase is for a fort or for some other purpose distinctly named in Article 1, § 8, of the Constitution; and in order that exclusive jurisdiction may be acquired over land taken for any other purpose, the act providing therefor and calling for the consent must unequivocally declare that exclusive jurisdiction is intended and necessary, or such necessity must be manifest from the purpose of the act. Accordingly, held, that the acts of Congress establishing the National Home for Disabled Volunteer Soldiers and creating a corporation authorized to take and hold lands for the purpose of such Homes, containing no declaration of the necessity of exclusive jurisdiction in the General Government over such lands, do not vest such exclusive jurisdiction in the United States, upon the consent of the State being given to the acquisition of such lands. In re Kelly, 71 Fed. Rep., 545.

A cession to the General Government, in the act giving the consent of the State to the purchase of such land, of "jurisdiction," does not confer exclusive jurisdiction, the purpose of the act not requiring it, but such jurisdiction only, concurrent with that of the State, as Congress may find necessary for the objects of the cession. Ibid.

Upon lands so ceded for the purpose of a home for disabled volunteers the crimi. nal laws of the United States, which apply only to places within their exclusive jurisdiction, are not operative. Ibid.

A State may cede to the United States exclusive jurisdiction over a tract within its limits in a manner not provided for in the Constitution of the United States; and may prescribe conditions to the cession, if they are not inconsistent with the effective use of the property for the purpose intended. The reservation which has usually accompanied the consent of the States, that civil and criminal process of the State

Sale, etc., of useless military

abandoned and

reservations.

July 5, 1884, v. 23, p. 103-104.

Survey and subdivision of

lands.

Sec. 2, ibid.

Appraised.

SEC. 2. That the Secretary of the Interior may, if in his opinion the public interests so require, cause the said lands, or any part thereof, in such reservations, to be regularly surveyed, or to be subdivided into tracts of less than forty acres each, and into town lots, or either, or both. He shall cause the said lands so surveyed and subdivided, and each tract thereof, to be appraised by three competent and disinterested men to be appointed by him, and who shall, after having each been first duly sworn to impartially and faithfully execute the trust reposed in them, appraise the

courts may be served in the places purchased, is not considered as interfering in any respect with the supremacy of the United States over them, but is admitted to prevent them from becoming an asylum for fugitives from justice. Fort Leavenworth R. R. Co. v. Lowe, 114 U. S., 525, 533. Such reservations provide only "that civil and crimi inal process, issued under the authority of the State, which must, of course, be for acts done and cognizable by the State, may be executed within the ceded lands, notwithstanding the cession." Not a word is said from which we can infer that it was intended that the State should have a right to punish for acts done within the ceded lands. Ibid., 534: United States v. Cornell. 2 Mason, 60; Commonwealth v. Clary, 8 Mass., 72; Mitchell v. Tibbetts, 17 Pick., 298; People v. Godfrey, 17 Johns (N. Y.), 225. Residents within such ceded districts have none of the duties and obligations and none of the rights and privileges of citizens of the States within which such lands are situated. They are not subject to taxation; they can not exercise the right of suffrage. 6 Opin. Att. Gen., 577; 10 ibid., 35; Sinks v. Reese, 19 Ohio, 306. They are not entitled to the benefit of the public schools. 1 Met. (Mass.), 580.

An act of the legislature of a State ceding to the United States the jurisdiction of the State over a tract of land used as a military reservation, upon condition that such jurisdiction shall continue only so long as the United States shall own and occupy such reservation; that the State shall have the right, within the reservation, to serve civil process and to execute criminal process against persons charged with crime committed within the State, and that roads may be opened and kept in repair within such reservation, cedes to the United States the entire political jurisdiction of the State over the place in question, including judicial and legislative jurisdiction, except as to service of process and opening roads, and the same can not be affected or further limited, without the consent of the United States, by a subsequent act of the State legislature attempting to impose additional restrictions on the jurisdiction ceded. In re Ladd, 74 Fed. Rep., 31.

After such cession a justice of the peace, acting under authority of the State, has no jurisdiction over the ceded territory in matters of alleged criminal violation of the laws of the State committed on such territory. Ibid.

*

It is a general rule of public law, recognized and acted upon by the United States, that whenever political jurisdiction and legislative power over any territory are transferred from one nation or sovereign to another. the municipal laws of the country that is, laws which are intended for the protection of private rights-continue in force until abrogated or changed by the new government or sovereign. By the cession public property passes from one government to the other, but privato property remains as before, and with it those municipal laws which are designed to secure its peaceful use and enjoyment. As a matter of course, all laws, ordinances, and regulations in conflict with the political character, institutions, and constitution of the new government are at once displaced. * But with respect to other laws affecting the possession, use, and transfer of property, and designed to secure good order and peace in the community, and promote its health and prosperity, which are of a strictly municipal character, the rule is general that a change of govern ment leaves them in force until, by direct action of the new government, they are altered or repealed. Chicago and Pacific R. R. v. MeGlinn, 114 U. S., 542, 547; American Insurance Co. v. Cantor, 1 Pet., 542; Halleck Int. Law, ch. 34, sec. 14. While after such cession the municipal laws of the State governing property and property rights continue in force in the ceded territory, except so far as in conflict with the laws and regulations of the United States applying thereto, the criminal laws of the State cease to be of force within the ceded territory, and laws regulating the sale of intoxicating liquors, requiring a license therefor, and punishing unlicensed sales, cease to be operative, both as in conflict with the regulations of the United States governing military reservations, and as penal in character. In re Ladd, 74 Fed. Rep., 31.

Such cessions are necessarily temporary, to be exercised only so long as the places continue to be used for the public purposes for which the property was acquired, or reserved from sale." When they cease to be so used the jurisdiction reverts to the State. Fort Leavenworth R. R. Co. e. Lowe, 114 U. S., 525, 512.

A lease by the United States to a city for market purposes of vacant land which was a part of land ceded by the State to the United States for the purposes of a navyyard and naval hospital, with a provision that the United States may retain such use and jurisdiction no longer than the premises are used for such purposes, operates, at least while the lease is in force, to suspend the exclusive authority and jurisdiction of the United States over the leased land, and thereby makes it subject to the jurisdiction of State courts in an action for ouster therefrom. Palmer v. Barrett, 162 U. S., 399. The character and purposes of the occupation of a reservation having been officially and legally established by that branch of the Government which has control over such matters, it is not open to the courts, on a question of

said lands, subdivisions, and tracts, and each of them, and report their proceedings to the Secretary of the Interior for his action thereon. If such appraisement be disapproved, the Secretary of the Interior shall again cause the said lands to be appraised as before provided; and when the appraisement has been approved he shall cause the said lands, subdivisions, and lots to be sold at public sale,Lands at pub. to the highest bidder for cash, at not less than the Conditions of ap- sale. praised value thereof, nor less than one dollar and twentyfive cents per acre, first having given not less than sixty

jurisdiction, to inquire what may be the actual uses to which any portion of the reserve is temporarily put. Benson v. U. S., 146 U. S., 331.

Over lands reserved for military or other governmental purposes in the Territories the jurisdiction of the United States is necessarily paramount. When a Territory is admitted as a State it is within the power of Congress to stipulate for the power of exclusive jurisdiction over such reservations, or to except them from the jurisdiction of the State. Failing to do this, however, the State can exercise such authority and jurisdiction over them as over similar property held by private individuals; and the United States can acquire ex lusive jurisdiction only when the same has been formally ceded by the legislature of the State in which the lands are situated. Fort Leavenworth R. R. Co. v. Lowe, 114 U. S., 525. Lands acquired by the United States for public uses, by purchase with the consent of the States, or by an exercise of the right of eminent domain, are not public lands, that term applying only to "such lands as are subject to sale or other disposition under general laws." Newhall v. Sanger, 92 U. S., 761.

When an act admitting a State into the Union, or organizing a Territorial government, provides that the lands in possession of an Indian tribe shall not be a part of such State or Territory, the new government has no jurisdiction over them. Langford v. Monteith, 102 Ü. S., 145. For an example of such a reservation on the part of Congress in the admission of a State into the Union see the act of July 10, 1890 (26 Stat. L., 222), admitting the State of Wyoming.

Jurisdiction over territory in a State may be acquired by the United States, under the seventeenth clause of section 8 of Article I of the Constitution, by the purchase of such territory, with the consent of the State, for the erection of forts, magazines, arsenals, dockyards, and other needful buildings.' The Constitution gives Congress the power of exercising exclusive legislation over such place, and this is held to mean exclusive jurisdiction. The State's consent to the purchase for any one of these constitutional purposes invests the United States with exclusive jurisdiction, and the State can not, even by the express language of its legislation, reserve to itself any part of this jurisdiction. (The reservation of the right of serving process for causes of action arising outside such territory is not held to be an actual reservation of a part of the exclusive jurisdiction intended to be vested in the United States.) But it would seem that this is only true when the purchase is for one of the constitutional purposes. By correct construction, "other needful buildings" would wean buildings of the same character as those specified-buildings intended for military or defensive purposes. A more comprehensive meaning has, indeed, been sometimes given to the expression, but no justification for such construction is found. a

a In Pinckney's draft of a constitution there was this clause: To provide such dockyards and arsenals and erect such fortifications as may be necessary for the United States, and to exercise exclusive jurisdiction therein." (This draft was submitted May 29, 1787.)

There was no corresponding provision in the Constitution reported by the com. mittee of detail (August 6), but the committee of eleven, by report of September 5, recommended the adoption of the clause as it now reads, except that it did not have the words "by the consent of the legislature of the State." In the debate on the proposition" Mr. Gerry contended that this power might be made use of to enslave any particular State by buying up its territory, and that the strongholds proposed would be a means of awing the State into an undue obedience to the General Gov. ernment. Mr. King thought himself the provision unnecessary, the power being already involved; but would move to insert, after the word 'purchased,' the words by the consent of the legislature of the State.' This would certainly make the power safe." (5 Elliot's Debates, 511.)

And in The Federalist (No. 43) it is remarked: "Nor would it be proper for the places on which the security of the entire Union may depend to be in any degree dependent on a particular member of it."

So Story says (§ 1224) ;

The other part of the power, giving exclusive legislation over places ceded for the erection of forts, magazines, etc., seems still more necessary for the public convenience and safety. The public money expended on such places, and the public property deposited in them, and the nature of the military duties which may be required there, all demand that they should be exempted from State authority. In truth, it would be wholly improper that places on which the security of the entire Union may depend should be subjected to the control of any member of it. The power, indeed, is wholly unexceptionable, since it can only be exercised at the will of the State; and therefore it is placed beyond all reasonable scruple. Yet it did not

days' public notice of the time, place, and terms of sale, immediately prior to such sale, by publication in at least two newspapers having a general circulation in the country or section of country where the lands to be sold are situate; and any lands, subdivisions, or lots remaining unsold may be reoffered for sale at any subsequent time in the same manner, at the discretion of the Secretary of the Interior; and if not sold at such second offering for want of bidders, then the Secretary of the Interior may sell the same at private sale, for cash, at not less than the appraised value, nor less than one dollar and twenty-five cents per acre: Provided, That any settler who was in actual occupation Rights of actu- of any portion of any such reservations prior to the location of such reservation, or settled thereon prior to January first, eighteen hundred and eighty-four, in good faith for the purpose of securing a home and of entering the same under the general laws and has continued in such occupation to the present time, and is by law entitled to make a homestead entry shall be entitled to enter the land so occupied, not exceeding one hundred and sixty acres in a body, according to the Government surveys and subdivisions: Provided further, That said lands were subject to entry under the public land laws at the time of their withdrawal. Sec. 2, ibid.

al settlers.

escape without the scrutinizing jealousy of the opponents of the Constitution, and was denounced as dangerous to State sovereignty.'

And, as observed by Judge Seaman (In re Kelly, 71 Fed. Rep., 545, 549) : "The rule thus stated, whereby legislative consent operates as a complete cession, is applicable only to objects which are specified in the above provision, and can not be held to so operate, ipso facto, for objects not expressly included therein. Whether it rests in the discretion of Congress to extend the provision to objects not specifically enumerated, although for national purposes, upon declaration as needful buildings, and thereby secure exclusive jurisdiction, is an inquiry not presented by this legislation; and I think it can not be assumed by way of argument that such power is beyond question. In New Orleans v. U. S., 10 Pet., 662, 737, the opinion of the Supreme Court is expressed by Mr. Justice McLean, without dissent, as follows:

Special provision is made in the Constitution for the cession of jurisdiction from the States over places where the Federal Government shall establish forts or other military works. And it is only in these places, or in the Territories of the United States, where it can exercise a general jurisdiction.'

"And in U. S. e. Bevans, 3 Wheat,, 336, 390, the claim was urged that the words 'other place' would include a ship of war of the United States lying at anchor in Boston Harbor, and bring it within the statute defining murder committed within any fort, arsenal, dockyard, magazine, or in any other place or district of country under the sole jurisdiction of the United States;' but it was stated by the court, through Chief Justice Marshall, that the construction seems irresistible that by the words "other place" was intended another place of a similar character with those previously enumerated; that the context shows the mind of the legislature to have been fixed on territorial objects of a similar character.' See also The Federalist, No. 43, by Madison."

"Section 355 of the Revised Statutes is in part based on the clause of the Constitu tion referred to, and in part not. The consent of the State to a purchase, given in order to satisfy the requirement of this section, would invest the United States with exclusive jurisdiction, if the purchase be for one of the constitutional pur poses; but the section provides for other purposes also, and as to these it would seem that a simple consent to the purchase (assuming that such consent, being for a pur pose not falling under the clause of the Constitution, amounts to a cession of juris diction) would only carry with it so much jurisdiction as would be necessary for the purpose of the purchase. Probably this would be held to be concurrent juris. diction. Taking into consideration the fact that States can not, under any circumstances, interfere with the instrumentalities of the Government of the United States, it may, indeed, be questioned whether, even under this view, unnecessary precau tions have not been taken in regard to the acquisition of jurisdiction; and certainly it can not be presumed that a State intends to part with more of its sovereignty

Sec. 3, ibid.

sale.

SEC. 3. That the Secretary of the Interior shall cause Appraisement of buildings, etc., any improvements, buildings, building materials, and other and public sale. property which may be situate upon any such lands, subdivisions or lots not heretofore sold by the United States Conditions of authorities, to be appraised in the same manner as hereinbefore provided for the appraisements of such lands, subdivisions, and lots, and shall cause the same, together with the tract or lot upon which they are situate, to be sold at public sale, to the highest bidder for cash, at not less than the appraised value of such land and improvements, first giving the sixty days' notice as hereinbefore provided; or he may, in his discretion, cause the improvements to be sold separately, at public sale for cash, at not less than the appraised value, to be removed by the purchaser within such time as may be prescribed, first giving the sixty days' public notice before provided; and if in any case the lands and improvements, or the improvements separately, as the case may be, are not sold for want of bidders, then the Secretary of the Interior may, in his discretion, cause the same to be reoffered for sale, at any subsequent time, in the same manner as above provided, or may cause the same to be sold at private sale for not less than the appraised value: Provided, That where buildings or improvements have been heretofore sold by the United States authorities the land upon which such buildings or improve- Lands to be ments are situate not exceeding the smallest subdivision owners of buildor lot provided for by this act upon the reservation on provements. which said buildings are situate shall be offered for sale to the purchaser of said improvements and buildings at the appraised value of the lands and if said purchaser shall fail for sixty days after notice to complete said purchase of lands the same shall be sold under the provisions of this act: And provided further, That the proceeds of the military reservation lands sold on Bois Blanc Island near to Fort Mackinaw military reservation shall be set apart as separate fund for the improvement of the National Park on the Island of Mackinaw, Michigan, under the direction of the Secretary of War. Sec. 3, ibid.

a

first offered to

ings and im

Proceeds of Bois Blanc Is

sale of lands on

land set apart for improvement of National Park,

etc.

11 Stat., 87.

Military reser

SEC. 4. That the provisions of the act of August eight- 11 Stat., 336. eenth, eighteen hundred and fifty-six, relative to military vations in Florireservations in the State of Florida, and the sixth section

than is necessary. A consent to the purchase, under section 355, Revised Statutes, if the purchase be for other than one of the purposes described in the clause of the Constitution, may, therefore, be accompanied with any limitations not interfering with an instrumentality of the Government of the United States.

"The most common way of acquiring jurisdiction, however, is by the State's expressly ceding it to the United States. In such case the State may make similar limitations, and this even if the place be used by the United States for one of the purposes mentioned in the clause of the Constitution. To bring the case under the clause there must be a purchase with consent. (Fort Leavenworth R. R. Co. v. Lowe, 114 U.S., 539; In re Kelly, 71 F. R., 545.)" (J. A. G.)

da.