here have standing, it is difficult to see why voters whose influence in Congress has been allegedly unconstitutionally diminished would not also have standing. Riegle states that such plaintiffs could [1184] not be dismissed under a doctrine of circumscribed equitable discretion: While we discourage congressional plaintiffs in such cir- 656 F.2d at 881. While, as discussed above, I think a private plaintiff's suit raises identical separation-of-powers concerns because those concerns are about the relationship of the courts to Congress, it is clear that, whatever the majority proposes, it is not that we hold to Riegle. This becomes even clearer when my colleagues offer their rationale for dismissing this suit: giving orders to the Speaker of the House of Representatives is a "startingly unattractive" idea. Supra at 1176. It is, but the law deserves and is susceptible of greater definition than that. Even Riegle provides more, and the standing rule enunciated by this court in Goldwater provides much more. "[R]udderless adjudication" is not a necessity. My colleagues' reliance upon the rationale of Davids v. Akers, 549 F.2d 120 (9th Cir. 1977), does not help matters. That case is nearly identical to this, and the Davids court, in a passage the majority quotes, indicates the difficulty courts would have in framing rules to deal with the subject, 549 F.2d at 125. Indeed, the Davids opinion, though it had held that the political question doctrine posed no bar, concluded its recitation of problems by saying that "a judicially discoverable and manageable standard cannot be found," id., though that is one of the categories of nonjusticiable political questions set out in Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217, 82 S.Ct. 691, 710, 7 L.Ed.2d 663 (1962). It is clear that many of the difficulties recited relate to defining the rights of legislators, not to the fashioning of relief. This suggests to me that Davids and the majority are actually applying the political question doctrine, here under the name of remedial discretion. The shift in terminology is not insignificant. Political question, like standing, is a doctrine that raises a jurisdictional bar to judicial power, while remedial discretion, as described in Judge Gordon's opinion for the majority, raises no bar and grants the judiciary unfettered discretion to hear a case or not, depending on the attractiveness of the idea. My colleagues' disinclination to rest this case upon a jurisdictional ground-whether that of standing or political question-rests squarely upon the erroneous notion, expressed in Riegle and reiter Second, the nullification-of-vote standard is wholly consistent with the malapportionment cases. A Democratic Senator would have standing under that standard to challenge a rule that counted his vote as one-third of a Republican's just as much as he would have standing to challenge a rule that counted it not at all. Just such a mathematically calculable reduction of the vote (as opposed to a reduction of generalized influence) is the harm in malapportionment cases; this is a necessary result of the application of the Equal Protection Clause and the one-man onevote rule. ated today, that there must be judicial power in all cases and that doctrines must not be adopted which might frustrate that power.4 Thus, the majority argues: Thus while there are compelling prudential reasons why Supra at 1170. Of course, when a court finds a jurisdictional bar to its exercise of power, it does state what the law is. When, on the other hand, a court claims a discretion, whose contours are not suggested, to decide or not to decide, the court refuses to say what the law is.5 Moreover, the assertion that to find a lack of jurisdiction is an abandonment of a constitutional duty to pronounce upon the merits of any issue offered the court can only mean that all limitations on the jurisdiction of Article III courts, including those derived from Article III itself, are unconstitutional. That proposition may fairly be described as novel. The Supreme Court does not subscribe to it. Very recently, in Valley Forge, a decision that appears to be particularly inconvenient for the standing determination by the majority, the Court repeated its rejection of a similar contention: “But “[t]he assumption that if respondents have no standing to sue, no one would have standing, is not a reason to find standing.' Schlesinger v. Reservists Committee to Stop the War, 418 U.S., at 227 [94 S.Ct. at 2935].” 454 U.S. at 489, 102 S.Ct. at 489. My colleagues note that courts sometimes review arguably internal acts of legislatures. Supra at 1170-1171. These cases stand for the proposition that some such actions create standing; in no way do they suggest that legislative actions producing "diminution of influence," as opposed to the nullification of a vote, create an injury in fact. Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 89 S.Ct. 1944, 23 L.Ed.2d 491 (1969), the most important of these cases, involved Powell's exclusion from the House. The Supreme Court did not address standing. In assuming that standing existed, Powell is consistent with the rule of Goldwater; denied his seat, Powell was denied his vote, and had standing to sue. Similarly, Bond v. Floyd, 385 U.S. 116, 87 S.Ct. 339, 17 L.Ed.2d 235 (1966), which did not discuss standing, involved an exclusion from the Georgia legislature. United States v. Ballin, 144 U.S. 1, 5, 6, 12 S.Ct. 507, 509, 36 L.Ed. 321 (1892), which upheld a congressional rule, also without a discussion of standing, merely suggested in dicta that such rules are sometimes reviewable. None of these cases suggests that diminution of influence is a judicially cognizable injury; none of them even addresses the question. 5 The same reluctance to relinquish the possibility of power in future cases seems to underlie my colleagues' refusal to decide the issue raised under the Speech or Debate Clause: "Because our remedial discretion provides sufficient foundation for our dismissal of this suit, we decline to affirm the district court's invocation of the Speech or Debate Clause, which again might hamstring us in the future." Supra at 1171-1172 (footnote omitted). It is, moreover, a dubious practice to decide the question of remedy without deciding the Speech or Debate Clause issue. The district court regarded the Speech or Debate Clause as jurisdictional. 524 F.Supp. at 521. The majority does not explicitly state whether it regards the Clause as jurisdictional. Its theory, however, rests implicitly on the proposition that the Clause is non-jurisdictional. It is true, as the opinion says, that it does not decide the merits of the case; rather, it skips over them (as opposed to stopping short) to decide the case on the grounds of the remedy-a question that properly comes after the merits. At the least, this departs from the Supreme Court's recently announced principle that Speech or Debate Clause issues are generally to be dealt with before the merits are reached. Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 236, 99 S.Ct. 2264, 2272, 60 L.Ed.2d 846 n. 11 (1979) (explaining departure from usual priority rule). One of the dissents in Davis argues that prior determination of Speech or Debate Clause issues is a near-absolute, not merely a general, requirement. 442 U.S. at 251, 99 S.Ct. at 2280 (Stewart, J., dissenting). In short, I find nothing in Riegle or in the majority's opinion that adequately explains the conclusion that plaintiffs have standing. Nor do I find anything that justifies the assumption of an unconfined judicial power to decide or not to decide; just such a power, of course, inheres in the version of remedial discretion offered today. Since my view of standing requires affirmance of the district court, I do not reach the issues presented by the Speech or Debate Clause and the political question doctrine. 557 F.Supp. 366 (1983) ANNE W. WALKER, PLAINTIFF V. HON. ED JONES, ET AL., DEFENDANTS Civ. A. No. 82-2723 United States District Court, District of Columbia Feb. 15, 1983 Former employee of restaurant system of United States House of Representatives brought action for declaratory and injunctive relief, reinstatement and damages due to her alleged wrongful discharge from her job as general manager. The District Court, John Lewis Smith, Jr., J., held that under speech and debate clause of United States Constitution, chairman, members and staff of subcommittee on services of committee on house administration could not be held liable for employee's discharge from her job as general manager of restaurant system of United States House of Representatives. Speech and debate clause protects members of Congress from being sued for their actions within the "legislative sphere." U.S.C.A. Const. Art. 1, § 6. 2. United States 12 Congressional staff members are immune from suit if their actions would be protected under the speech and debate clause if performed by congressmen. U.S.C.A. Const. Art. 1, § 6, cl. 1. Speech and debate clause is to be interpreted broadly to effectuate its purposes. U.S.C.A. Const. Art. 1, § 6, c. 1. 4. United States 12 Under speech and debate clause of United States Constitution, chairman, members and staff of subcommittee on services of committee on house administration could not be held liable for employee's discharge from her job as general manager of restaurant system of United States House of Representatives, because actions of Congress in making internal arrangements for its own necessities are within "legislative sphere" protected by the clause. U.S.C.A. Const. Art. 1, §§ 6, 6, cl. 1. Harry Garber, David C. Venable, John L. Gilece, Venable, Garber & Gilece, Washington, D.C., for plaintiff. Stanley M. Brand, Gen. Counsel to the Clerk, Steven R. Ross, Deputy Counsel to the Clerk, Michael L. Murray, Asst. Counsel to the Clerk, U.S. House of Representatives, Washington, D.C., for defendants. MEMORANDUM JOHN LEWIS SMITH, Jr., District Judge. Anne M. Walker brings this action for declaratory and injunctive relief, reinstatement, and damages due to her alleged wrongful discharge from her job as general manager of the restaurant system of the United States House of Representatives. Defendants in this case are The Honorable Ed Jones, Chairman of the Subcommittee on Services of the Committee on House Administration; The Honorable Robert H. Mollohan and The Honorable James K. Coyne, members of the Subcommittee on Services; and Thomas D. Marshall, Staff [367] director of the Subcommittee on Services. The action is before the Court on defendants' motion to dismiss. The Subcommittee on Services of the Committee on House Administration (the Subcommittee), among other duties, is responsible for the administration of the House Restaurant System. This system provides food services for Members of the House of Representatives, their guests, and House employees. As part of its administration of the restaurant system, the Subcommittee is responsible for hiring and firing restaurant employees. Subsequent to May 26, 1982, the Subcommittee delegated full authority to hire and fire employees within the jurisdiction of the Subcommittee to Chairman Jones. Anne Walker was employed as general manager of the House Restaurant System from Approximately December, 1970, until June 30, 1982. Walker alleges that she was discharged because of her sex, in violation of the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution. She also alleges that Chairman Jones made untrue public statements indicating that she was fired because she was an inefficient manager and had been improperly "skimming" restaurant funds for her own use. The Complaint which began this action was filed on September 23, 1982. Walker's Complaint contains five counts. The basis for relief asserted in each count is the alleged unlawful discharge of Walker from her job as general manager of the House Restaurant System. In their motion to dismiss, defendants argue, inter alia, that Chairman Jones' discharge of Walker from her job cannot be the basis for defendants' liability because the discharge was an action within the legislative sphere protected by the Speech and Debate Clause of the United States Constitution, Article I, § 6. [1, 2] The Speech and Debate Clause states that "for any Speech or Debate in either House, [Members of Congress] shall not be questioned in any other Place." Article I, § 6, clause 1. As interpreted by the courts, the Speech and Debate Clause protects Members of Congress from being sued for their actions within the "legislative sphere." See, e.g., United States v. Brewster, 408 U.S. 501, 526, 92 S.Ct. 2531, 2544, 33 L.Ed.2d 507 (1972); Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606, 92 S.Ct. 2614, 33 L.Ed.2d 583 (1972). In addition, congressional staff members are immune from suit if their actions would be protected under the Speech and Debate Clause if performed by Congressmen. See Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. at |