invites the United States to assume and exercise a paramount influence in the affairs of the nations situated in this hemisphere; that is, to become and remain a great western continental power, balancing itself against the possible combinations of Europe. The advance of the country toward that position constitutes what, in the language of many, is called "progress;" and the position itself is what, by the same class, is called "manifest destiny." It is held by all who approve that progress, and expect that destiny, to be necessary to prevent the re-colonization of this continent by the European states, and to save the island of Cuba from passing out of the possession of decayed Spain, into that of any one of the more vigorous maritime powers of the old world.

In December, 1823, James Monroe, president of the United States, in his annual message to Congress, proclaimed the first of these two policies substantially as follows: "The American continents, by the free and independent condition which they have assumed and maintain, are henceforth not to be considered as subjects for future colonization by any European power; and while existing rights should be respected, the safety and interest of the United States require them to announce that no future colony or dominion shall, with their consent, be planted or established in any part of the North American continent." This is what is called, here and elsewhere, the Monroe doctrine, so far as it involves re-colonization.

John Quincy Adams and John C. Calhoun were then members, chief members, of Monroe's administration. John Quincy Adams afterward acknowledged that he was the author of that doctrine or policy; and John C. Calhoun, on the 15th of May, 1848, in the senate, testified on that point fully. A senator had related an alleged conversation, in which Mr. Adams was represented as having said that three memorable propositions contained in that message, of which what I have quoted was one, had originated with himself. Mr. Calhoun replied, that "Mr. Adams, if he had so stated, must have referred to only the one proposition concerning re-colonization [the one now in question]," and then added as follows: "As respects that, his (Mr. Adams's) memory does not differ from mine. It originated entirely with Mr. Adams."-App. Cong. Globe, 1847-'48, p. 631. Thus much for the origin of the Monroe doctrine on re-coloni

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zation. Now, let us turn to the position of John Quincy Adams, concerning national jealousy of the designs of European powers upon the island of Cuba. The recent revelations of our diplomacy on that subject begin with the period when that statesman presided in the department of state. On the 17th of December, 1822, Mr. Adams informed Mr. Forsyth, then American minister in Spain, that "the island of Cuba had excited much attention, and had become of deep interest to the American Union;" and, referring to reported rival designs of France and Great Britain upon that island, instructed him to make known to Spain "the sentiments of the United States, which were favorable to the continuance of Cuba in its connection with Spain." On the 28th of April, 1823, Mr. Adams thus instructed Mr. Nelson, the successor of Mr. Forsyth :

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The islands of Cuba and Porto-Rico still remain, nominally, and so far really dependent upon Spain, that she yet possesses the power of transferring her own dominion over them to others. These islands, from their local position, are natural appendages to the North American continent; and one of them, Cuba, almost in sight of our shores, from a multitude of considerations, has become an object of transcendent importance to the commercial and political interests of our Union. Its commanding position, with reference to the gulf of Mexico and the West India seas; the character of its population; its situation midway between our southern coast and the island of St. Domingo; its safe and capacious harbor of the Havana, fronting a long line of our shores destitute of the same advantage; the nature of its productions and of its wants, furnishing the supplies and needing the returns of a conimerce immensely profitable and mutually beneficial-give it an importance in the sum of our national interests with which that of no other foreign territory can be compared, and little inferior to that which binds the different members of this Union together. Such, indeed, are, between the interests of that island and of this country, the geographical, commercial, moral, and political relations, formed by nature, gathering in the process of time, and even now verging to maturity, that, in looking forward to the probable course of events, for the short period of half a century, it is scarcely possible to resist the convietion that the annexation of Cuba to our federal republic will be indispensable to the continuance and integrity of the Union itself. It is obvious, however, that for this event we are not yet prepared. Numerous and formidable objections to the extension of our territorial dominions beyond sea, present themselves to the first contemplation of the subject; obstacles to the system of policy by which alone that result can be compassed and maintained, are to be foreseen and surmounted, both from at home and abroad; but there are laws of political as well as of physical gravitation; and if an apple, severed by the tempest from its native tree, can not choose but fall to the ground, Cuba, forcibly disjoined from its own unnatural connection with Spain, and incapable of self-support, can gravitate only toward the North American Union, which, by the same law of nature, can not cast her off from its bosom.

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"It will be among the primary objects requiring your most earnest and unremitting attention, to ascertain and report to us every movement of negotiation between Spain and Great Britain upon this subject. * * So long as the constitutional gov ernment may continue to be administered in the name of the king, your official intercourse will be with his ministers, and to them you will repeat, what Mr. Forsyth has been instructed to say, that the wishes of your government are that Cuba and PortoRico may continue in connection with independent and constitutional Spain."

Thirty years afterward, viz: on the 4th day of January, 1853, the senator from Michigan (Mr. Cass,) without one word of

acknowledgment of Mr. Adams's agency in instituting those measures of "progress" toward the "manifest destiny" of the country, submitted the resolutions which are under consideration, and which are in these words :—

"Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That the United States do hereby declare, that the American continents, by the free and independent condition which they have assumed and maintain, are henceforth not to be considered as subjects for future colonization by any European power; and while existing rights should be respected,' and will be by the United States, they owe it to their own 'safety and interests' to announce, as they now do, that no future European colony or dominion shall, with their consent, be planted or established on any part of the North American continent;' and should the attempt be made, they thus deliberately declare that it will be viewed as an act originating in motives regardless of their 'interests and their safety,' and which will leave them free to adopt such measures as an independent nation may justly adopt in defence of its rights and its honor.

"And be it further resolved, That while the United States disclaim any designs upon the island of Cuba, inconsistent with the laws of nations, and with their duties to Spain, they consider it due to the vast importance of the subject to make known, in this solemn manner, that they should view all efforts on the part of any other power to procure possession, whether peaceably or forcibly, of that island, which, as a naval or military position, might, under circumstances easy to be foreseen, become dangerous to their southern coast, to the Gulf of Mexico, and to the mouth of the Mississippi, as unfriendly acts directed against them, to be resisted by all the means in their power."

In bringing together these actions of John Quincy Adams in 1822, and of the senator from Michigan in 1853, and placing them in juxtaposition in the history of the senate, I have done all that the senator from Michigan seems to have left undone, to vindicate the departed statesman from the censures heaped upon him by the living one in 1850.

I proceed to consider the resolutions thus offered by the senator from Michigan.

The honorable senator from New Hampshire offers an amendment, as a condition of his vote, in these words:

"And be it further resolved, That while the United States in like manner disclaim any designs upon Canada, inconsistent with the laws of nations, and with their duties to Great Britain, they consider it due to the vast importance of the subject to make known, in this solemn manner, that they should view all efforts on the part of any other power to procure possession, whether peaceably or forcibly, of that province, which, as a naval or military position, must, under circumstances easy to be foreseen, become dangerous to their northern boundary, and to the lakes, as unfriendly acts directed against them, to be resisted by all the means in their power."

I will vote for that amendment. It is not well-expressed. But it implies the same policy in regard to Canada which the main resolutions assert concerning Cuba. The colonies, when they confederated in 1775, invited Canada to come in. Montgomery gave up his life in scaling the heights of Abraham, in the same VOL. III.-39

year, to bring her in. Scott, in 1814, poured out his blood at Chippewa to bring her in. If the proposition shall fail, I shall lament it as a repudiation by the senate of a greater national interest than any other distinct one involved in this debate; but I shall, nevertheless, vote for the resolutions of the senator from Michigan. I shall do so, because—

1. The reverence I cherish for the memory of John Quincy Adams, the illustrious author of the policy which they embody, inclines me to support them.

2. While I do not desire the immediate or early annexation of Cuba, nor see how I could vote for it at all until slavery shall have ceased to counteract the workings of nature in that beautiful island, nor even then, unless it could come into the Union without injustice to Spain, without aggressive war, and without producing internal dissensions among ourselves, I nevertheless yield up my full assent to the convictions expressed by John Quincy Adams, that this nation can never safely allow the island of Cuba to pass under the dominion of any power that is already, or can become, a formidable rival or enemy; and can not safely consent to the restoration of colonial relations between any portions of this continent and the monarchies of Europe.

The re-establishment of such relations would, of course, reproduce, in a greater or less degree, the commercial and political embarrassments of our relations with other American communities, and even with European nations, from which we obtained relief only through the war of 1812, and the subsequent emancipation of the Spanish colonies on this continent, and their organization as free and independent republics. Sir, I am willing, on the demand of the senator from Michigan, or of any other leader, and without any demand from any leader, to declare myself opposed-radically opposed-opposed at all times, now, henceforth, and for ever-opposed, at the risk of all hazards and consequences, to any design of any state or states on this continent, or anywhere else, which may, by possibility, result in reproducing those evils-the greatest which could befall this country, short of that greatest of all, to which they would open the waythe subversion of our own hard-won independence, and the returning dominion of some European power over ourselves. I shall, therefore, vote for these resolutions, if it shall please the senate to come to decisive action upon them; and I shall vote for re

affirming and maintaining the principles of John Quincy Adams, as defined in the Monroe doctrine, and in his policy in regard to Cuba, at all times, and under all circumstances whatsoever.

But while thus expressing my devotion to those principles, I can not too strongly express myself against the manner in which they have been brought in issue here on this occasion. The issue is made at a time, and under circumstances, which render it inevitable that we must fail, signally fail, in maintaining the great principles which it involves.

This issue is raised at a wrong time. We are more than half way through a session constitutionally limited to ninety days, and engaged with vast and various subjects which can not be disposed of without long and most discursive debate.

I think the issue is raised in a wrong way. Practically, and by custom, the president of the United States holds the initiative of measures affecting foreign relations. The president now in the executive house will go out in thirty days, and his sanction, even if we had it, would therefore be of no value. But even that sanction, such as it would be, is withheld--and, I must confess, rightly withheld. The people have elected a new president, who is just ready to enter on administration, and upon whom the responsibilities of the conduct of foreign relations, for four years at least, must rest. Not only do we not know what his opinions on this question are, but our action would anticipate the publication of those opinions, and embarrass-is it too strong an expression to say, factiously embarrass?—the incoming administration.

Moreover, we are not only required to advance in this matter without the light that executive exposition might throw upon our path, but we are required to proceed without the aid or advice. of the committee to whom the care of foreign relations has been confided by the senate, and, as there is reason to believe, in opposition to their deliberate judgment.

Again, it results from the very nature of the case that a majority for the resolutions can not be obtained, either in the senate, or in Congress, or in the country.

The principles involved in the resolutions have become a tradition among the American people, and on acknowledged occasions they would act upon them as traditions vigorously and with unanimity. On the other hand, the Americans are a practical